Williams v. Williams

• Citation: 20 Colo. 51,37 P. 614
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. WILLIAMS.
• Decision Date: 07 May 1894
• Court: Supreme Court of Colorado

37 P. 614

20 Colo. 51

WILLIAMS v. WILLIAMS.

Supreme Court of Colorado

May 7, 1894

Appeal from district court, Arapahoe county.

Action by Kate Williams against Elizabeth M. Williams for alienating the affections of her husband, and causing him to separate from and desert her. The defendant was the husband's mother. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff in the sum of $12,500. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.

The complaint, omitting the formal parts, is as follows: 'On or about the 9th day of July, 1888, in the state of New York the plaintiff was lawfully married to one Edward L. Williams who is the son of defendant. That at all times since said marriage the said Edward L. Williams and the plaintiff have been, and now are, husband and wife. That by reason of said marriage the plaintiff became and was entitled to the support, company, and society of her said husband. That from and after the time of said marriage, and until the interference on the part of defendant hereinafter set forth the said Edward L. Williams was deeply attached to his said wife, the plaintiff; and the plaintiff and her said husband lived happily together as husband and wife, and but for the wrongful and malicious acts of the defendant, hereinafter set forth, would have continued so to live together. That shortly after the said marriage the said defendant, conceiving and harboring an intense dislike of the plaintiff, wrongfully and maliciously sought to prejudice the mind of said Edward L Williams against the plaintiff, and alienate his affections from her, and has ever since sought and endeavored, by subtle contrivances, by coaxing and threats of disinheriting the said Edward L. Williams, to entice him to separate himself from the plaintiff, and to leave and desert her. Plaintiff further alleges that on or about the ___ day of _____, 1889 the plaintiff and her said husband were by said defendant persuaded and induced to leave their home, in the state of New York, where they had resided up to said date, and where plaintiff had friends and acquaintances, and to come to the city of Denver, in the state of Colorado, where the plaintiff was an entire stranger; that a few days prior to their said departure from New York the defendant, in pursuance of her said design to alienate the affections of the said Edward L. Williams from the plaintiff, and to entice him to leave the plaintiff, and with a view of having the plaintiff, as well as her said husband, more completely in the power of defendant, fraudulently induced and procured him to turn over and transfer to her, the said defendant, all, or nearly all, of his property, consisting of stocks, bonds, securities, etc., of the value of about twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000); that shortly after their arrival in Denver the plaintiff and her said husband were joined by the defendant; that said defendant, upon her arrival in Denver, continued, and has at all times since continued, her endeavors to alienate the affections of the said Edward L. Williams from the plaintiff, and to induce and entice him to leave the plaintiff; plaintiff avers and alleges that said defendant has, by her said arts and contrivances, by threats made to the said Edward L. Williams, and by misrepresenting the plaintiff to him, wrongfully and maliciously alienated the affections of her said husband from the plaintiff, and has wrongfully and maliciously enticed him to separate himself from her, whereby the plaintiff has been deprived of the society, comfort, and support of her said husband, by reason of which the plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000). Wherefore, plaintiff demands judgment,' etc. The answer admits the marriage of the plaintiff, Kate Williams, with the defendant's son, Edward L. Williams, but denies all the charges of fraud and wrongdoing alleged against defendant. The statute providing for exemplary damages in certain cases is as follows: 'That in all civil actions in which damages shall be assessed by a jury for a wrong done to the person, or to personal or real property, and the injury complained of shall have been attended by circumstances of fraud, malice or insult, or a wanton and reckless disregard of the injured party's rights and feelings, such jury may, in addition to the actual damages sustained by such party, award him reasonable exemplary damages.' Sess. Laws 1889, p. 64.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Husbands and wives are equal under the law, in respect to the conjugal affection and society which each owes to the other. The wife may maintain an action for damages against one who wrongfully induces and procures her husband to adandon her or send her away.

2. In an action for enticing away a husband or wife, it is sufficient to allege in the complaint the ultimate facts, without a statement of the arts made use of to accomplish the illegal purpose.

3. In determining whether the declarations of a person not a party are, or are not, competent evidence in a particular case, the nature of the issue, and the special circumstances under which the declarations were made, must be taken into consideration.

4. Whenever it is proper to prove the doing of an act by a certain person, the declarations of such person, accompanying the act and having reference thereto, are admissible in evidence as explanatory of the act itself. Thus, in an action by a wife for enticing away her husband, it is proper to admit in evidence the declarations of the husband, having reference to his separation or contemplated separation from his wife, for the purpose of showing what caused such separation, though his mere declarations are not admissible to show what defendant's conduct really was.

5. In an action for enticing away a husband, an instruction to the effect that if the conduct of the defendant was unjustifiable, and actually caused the injury complained of, then malice in law is implied from such conduct, is not technically accurate, as an abstract proposition. Such rule ignores the distinction between the intentional commission of a wrongful act and the doing of a wrongful act through mere error of judgment, and also the distinction between a grievous wrong and a mere nominal trespass.

6. In general, malice may be implied whenever there is a deliberate intention to do a grievous wrong without legal justification or excuse. The very essence of malice is a disposition or willingness to do a wrongful act greatly injurious to another.

7. The relation of parent and child may excuse much partiality by one for the other, but such relation does not excuse gross injustice deliberately perpetrated against the rights of others.

8. An instruction technically erroneous does not furnish ground for reversal, if the jury are not misled, or if, as a whole, the case is fairly presented to them, and especially if their verdict is obviously correct. In reviewing a charge, it is to be considered as a whole, in reference to the actual matters in controversy. If, when thus considered, it is clear that the jury were not led to a wrong conclusion, the judgment will not be reversed merely on the ground that the charge contains some proposition not technically accurate in the abstract.

9. In the act restoring exemplary damages, the words, 'wrong done to the person,' are not restricted to physical or bodily injuries. These words, construed with the entire language of the act, include injuries affecting the mind and sensibilities of the individual.

10. In an action for enticing away a husband or wife, no absolute rule as to the measure of damages can be laid down. Where the right of recovery is clear the court will not disturb a verdict on the ground that it is too much or too little, unless it is grossly disproportionate to the rights of the parties, as shown by the evidence.

On Rehearing.

1. Under the statute providing for exemplary damages, the damages claimed being essentially unliquidated, and there being no definite limit to the exemplary damages allowable, except that they be reasonable, the common-law practice may be followed in declaring for and awarding such damages.

2. It is not necessarily erroneous for a trial court to omit to charge upon every point of a case, or to omit to give a correct instruction of its own motion upon every point upon which an incorrect instruction is prayed.

Morrison & Kohn and C. S. Thomas, for appellant.

Lipscomb & Hodges, for appellee.

ELLIOTT, J. (after stating the facts).

1. A question is raised in limine which goes to the very foundation of this action. The question is whether a wife, as a matter of law, can have any right of action against one who induces her husband to abandon and forsake her. It is conceded that the husband may have a right of action against one who entices away his wife, but it is urged that, by reason of the legal unity of husband and wife, no such right of action exists in her favor. It is true there are some decisions to that effect, but they are neither numerous nor convincing. The case of Logan v. Logan, 77 Ind. 558, was rendered by a divided court, two of the five judges dissenting. Subsequently, a contrary opinion was rendered by the same court. See Haynes v. Nowlin, 129 Ind. 581, 29 N.E 389. The case of Van Arnam v. Ayers, 67 Barb. 544, was expressly overruled in the case of Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N.Y. 584, 23 N.E. 17. The view urged in behalf of defendant, it is said, logically results from the doctrine of coverture, which, according to the ancient common law, precluded the wife from bringing and maintaining suits in her own name. That doctrine often resulted in the rankest injustice to married women. By sundry legislative acts, dating from an early period, the disabilities of coverture have been gradually removed in Colorado, and ...