Brophy v. McCranie

Decision Date18 April 1994
Docket NumberNo. S94A0603,S94A0603
PartiesBROPHY et al. v. McCRANIE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Milton Harrison, Harrison, Harrison & Llop, Eastman, for Brophy.

Billy W. Walker, McRae, Denmark Groover, Jr., Groover & Childs, Macon, for McCranie.

HUNT, Chief Justice.

This appeal involves the Hospital Authorities Law, OCGA § 31-7-70, et seq., and the appointment and composition of members of the Dodge County Hospital Authority under that law.

McCranie, the sole commissioner of Dodge County, brought this quo warranto action seeking a declaration that seven of the nine trustees of the hospital authority were holding office illegally. Subsequently, the parties discovered that in 1993 the General Assembly had passed a local act dealing with the composition of the Dodge County Hospital Authority Board. McCranie amended his action to add a challenge to the constitutionality of the local act, and the trial court ruled in his favor on all issues. We reverse the trial court's order insofar as it holds the trustees are not legal holders of their offices, but affirm the trial court's order regarding the unconstitutionality of the 1993 act.

1. The trial court held the trustees were holding office illegally because each of them had been appointed to succeed himself in violation of a 1969 county resolution which prohibited succession without a break of twelve months. The trustees, citing Commissioners of Wayne County v. Smith, 240 Ga. 540, 242 S.E.2d 47 (1978) argued that the 1969 resolution was an invalid attempt to alter by "home rule" the provisions of the Hospital Authorities Law. We agree.

McCranie contends, and the trial court held, that the 1969 resolution that was adopted by the sole county commissioner at that time, and which has never been repealed, is valid and determinative of the issues in this case by virtue of OCGA § 31-7-72(c) of the Hospital Authorities Law which provides:

Appointments to fill vacancies for either an unexpired or full term on the boards of all hospital authorities in existence prior to March 15, 1964, shall be governed by the terms of a resolution adopted prescribing the manner by which vacancies are filled, unless changed by local legislation or constitutional amendment. (Emphasis supplied.)

The answer to the question presented in this appeal is the meaning of "resolution" in the foregoing section. McCranie's position is that the "resolution" referred to in OCGA § 31-7-72(c) is that of the local governing authority, here the sole county commissioner. Thus, he argues that the 1969 resolution is one "adopted prescribing the manner by which vacancies are filled," and controls because it has not been repealed or changed by valid local legislation or amendment. On the other hand, the trustees argue that the "resolution" referred to is that of the hospital authority, made at the time of the 1964 Hospital Authorities Law. On its face, McCranie's argument appears valid. However, a review of the legislative history of the Hospital Authorities Law shows that the trustees are correct, that the above cited language of OCGA § 31-7-72(c) was consolidated from the existing law, that certain clarifying words were omitted when the General Assembly enacted the Official Code of Georgia Annotated in 1982, and that the "resolution" referred to in OCGA § 31-7-72(c) is that of the hospital authority's board.

The Hospital Authorities Law of 1964 provided a specific method to fill vacancies on the board of any hospital authority activated on or after March 15, 1964 (Ga.L.1964, pp. 598, 600, enacted as Code Ann. § 88-1803, now codified as OCGA § 31-7-72(b)). With regard to hospital authorities like that of Dodge County, which were in existence prior to March 15, 1964, the law provided:

Appointments to fill vacancies either for an unexpired or full term on the board of all hospital authorities in existence prior to March 15, 1964, shall be made as follows:

(1) Prior to May 1, 1964, the board of such hospital authority shall by resolution elect to have vacancies filled on such board pursuant to the provisions of this Chapter or in the same manner as such appointments were filled prior to the approval of this Act or its otherwise becoming law.

(2) After said resolution has been formally adopted by the board, it shall be filed with the governing authority of all participating unit or units of such authority and all appointments to fill vacancies thereafter shall be governed by the terms of such resolution unless changed by local legislation or constitutional amendment.

Ga.L.1964, pp. 598, 600, enacted as Code Ann. § 88-1803. Thus, under the first part of the foregoing section, the 1964 law required the boards of all hospital authorities pre-existing that law to adopt a resolution electing to have vacancies on the board filled either by the provisions of the new law or by the same manner the board had followed prior to the 1964 law. Under the second part of this section, the 1964 statute provides that once the hospital authority made its election of which system of appointments to follow, the terms of the hospital authority's resolution govern "unless changed by local legislation or...

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5 cases
  • Sheriff v. State, S03G0492.
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • October 6, 2003
    ...of the enactment of the 1982 Code. Charter Med. Info. Svcs. v. Collins, 266 Ga. 720, 722, 470 S.E.2d 655 (1996); Brophy v. McCranie, 264 Ga. 187(1), 442 S.E.2d 230 (1994); Newsome v. Dept. of Human Resources, 199 Ga. App. 419(1), 405 S.E.2d 61 (1991). Thus, the statute should read as it did......
  • Hewett v. Kalish
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • April 25, 1994
  • Charter Medical Information Services, Inc. v. Collins
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • May 28, 1996
    ...alter the substantive law in existence on the effective date of this Code." We recently addressed a similar issue in Brophy v. McCranie, 264 Ga. 187, 442 S.E.2d 230 (1994). With the enactment of the Official Code, two paragraphs contained in the former Code were consolidated into one and ce......
  • UNIFIED GOVERNMENT v. Hospital Authority, S04A0449.
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • May 3, 2004
    ...Authority nominated one or more individuals to fill a vacancy, and the county appointed one of the nominees. See Brophy v. McCranie, 264 Ga. 187, 189, 442 S.E.2d 230 (1994). The mere fact that that two-step procedure was not set forth in a written document is of no consequence. Obligations ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • Local Government Law - R. Perry Sentell, Jr.
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 47-1, September 1995
    • Invalid date
    ...fact that the doctor was on call because of his hospital staff privileges did not change his status of independent contractor. Id. 185. 264 Ga. 187, 442 S.e.2d 230 (1994). 186. Id. at 187, 442 S.e.2d at 230. The governing authority sought, via an action in quo warranto, to have seven of the......
  • Hewitt v. Kalish: Qualifying as an "expert Competent to Testify" Under O.c.g.a. Section 9-11-9.1 - Richard T. Hills
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 46-4, June 1995
    • Invalid date
    ...9-ll-9.1(a), would be superfluous and irrelevant. Id. at 586, 436 S.E.2d at 712. 11. 210 Ga. App. at 587, 436 S.E.2d at 713. 12. Hewett, 264 Ga. at 187, 442 S.E.2d at 236. 13. Id. at 184, 442 S.E.2d at 234. 14. Id. (quoting Bowen v. Adams, 203 Ga. App. 123, 123-24, 416 S.E.2d 102, 103 (1992......

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