Brother v. State
Decision Date | 29 June 2005 |
Docket Number | No. PD-1820-02.,PD-1820-02. |
Citation | 166 S.W.3d 255 |
Parties | Thomas Eric BROTHER, Jr. v. The STATE of Texas. |
Court | Texas Supreme Court |
J. Don Carter, Fort Worth, for appellant.
Tanya S. Dohoney, Assist. DA, Fort Worth, Matthew Paul, State's Attorney, Austin, for State of Texas.
Appellant was charged with driving while intoxicated by misdemeanor information. He filed a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence, claiming, inter alia, that (1) the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle for DWI and (2) the stop was prohibited by Article 14.03 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. After a hearing, the trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress. Appellant pleaded guilty to the offense but appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling. Brother v. State, 85 S.W.3d 377, 385 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002). We granted review to determine whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's implicit conclusion that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop appellant's car and that the officer had statutory authority to make the stop outside his geographical jurisdiction, the City of Hurst. We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Based on the following facts, the court of appeals concluded that the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion to stop appellant's car. Appellant's erratic driving was reported by a citizen who called "911" on her cell phone after she witnessed appellant speeding, tailgating, and weaving across several lanes of traffic. The citizen who continued to monitor appellant's driving by following appellant in her car, kept in contact with the "911" dispatcher until the arresting officer stopped appellant. The citizen testified at the suppression hearing that the dispatcher instructed her to follow appellant and activate her hazard lights so that the responding officer would be able to identify the correct vehicle. The citizen remained at the scene after the stop, and she provided the officer with her contact information. The court of appeals concluded that, although the officer did not witness the erratic driving, the detailed information he received from the "911" dispatcher was sufficient to warrant the traffic stop. Brother v. State, 85 S.W.3d at 381-82.
The crux of appellant's complaint is that the officer did not personally observe any activity that would give rise to a reasonable suspicion that DWI was afoot. However, the record reflects that the officer received facts of appellant's erratic driving from the dispatcher before he stopped appellant's car. Specifically, the officer testified at the suppression hearing that The officer further testified that he knew which car to stop because the dispatcher had provided him with the license plate number and that the citizen had been instructed to follow behind appellant's car with her hazard lights on. Thus, based on this testimony and the following analysis, we hold that the officer was apprised of sufficient facts by which to conclude that criminal activity, i.e., DWI, was afoot.1
Under the Fourth Amendment, a temporary detention is justified when the detaining officer has specific articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, lead the officer to conclude that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). These facts must amount to more than a mere hunch or suspicion. Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).
The factual basis for stopping a vehicle need not arise from the officer's personal observation, but may be supplied by information acquired from another person. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). For example, in Armendariz v. State, we held that a stop based on facts observed by an undercover officer and transmitted by radio to a deputy sheriff did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 123 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex.Crim.App.2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 974, 124 S.Ct. 1883, 158 L.Ed.2d 469 (2004).
It has been widely recognized that the reliability of a citizen-informant is generally shown by the very nature of the circumstances under which the incriminating information became known to him or her. State v. Markus, 478 N.W.2d 405 (Iowa Ct.App.1991).2
In Pipkin v. State, the Fort Worth court of appeals held that a stop based on facts relayed to law enforcement by a citizen cell phone caller were sufficiently corroborated and the stop was justified, even though the officer did not personally witness any erratic driving. 114 S.W.3d 649, 654 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). The citizen-witness testified that he called "911" because Pipkin was driving thirty miles per hour under the posted speed limit; and as the caller drove by Pipkin's car, the caller saw Pipkin smoking a crack pipe. The Fort Worth Court concluded that the stop was reasonable because the caller was a disinterested private citizen who provided law enforcement with a detailed description of Pipkin's car and location and made himself accountable for his intervention by providing his contact information to the dispatcher. Id. at 655-56. Looking to its own precedent, the Fort Worth court held that the facts relayed to the dispatcher, which detailed Pipkin's driving and described his criminal behavior, in addition to the description and location of the vehicle, provided adequate corroboration for the officer to have reasonably concluded that the information given to him was reliable and a temporary detention was justified. See id. at 655-56.3
Here, the citizen gave a detailed description of appellant's car and location, as well as his erratic driving. As requested by the "911" dispatcher, the citizen followed behind the suspect with her emergency lights on, which assisted the officer in identifying the proper vehicle. Throughout the incident, the citizen kept in contact with the "911" dispatcher, and she remained at the scene after appellant's car was stopped by police. There, she provided police with her contact information. She later appeared as a witness at the suppression hearing, and she testified about her firsthand observations. Relying on the information supplied by the citizen, the officer testified he was able to locate and identify appellant's vehicle. And, as noted, the officer testified that the facts relayed to him through the "911" dispatcher caused him to believe that appellant was driving while intoxicated.
Appellant's argument that an officer must personally witness facts giving rise to criminal activity, is against the great weight of authority.4 The federal courts and our lower Texas courts have consistently held that a stop based on facts supplied by a citizen-eyewitness, which are adequately corroborated by the arresting officer,5 do not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment.
Moreover, appellant's argument is simply unsound. To require officers who are apprised of detailed facts from citizen-eyewitnesses to observe suspects and wait until additional suspicious acts are committed, would be foolish and contrary to the balance of interests struck in Terry and its progeny. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 29, 88 S.Ct. 1868 ().6 Accordingly, we hold that the court of appeals did not err in concluding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the stop was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. at 331, 110 S.Ct. 2412; Pipkin, 114 S.W.3d at 654.
Article 14.03 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that city police officers may not stop and arrest persons for traffic violations committed outside the officers' geographical jurisdiction. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.03(g); State v. Kurtz, 152 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex.Crim.App.2004). Appellant was stopped outside the City of Hurst but within Tarrant County. The arresting officer was a licensed peace officer of the City of Hurst. See art. 14.03(g) ( ).
Construing Article 14.03 and the applicable common law decisions, the court of appeals held that the stop was not prohibited because "a city officer's geographical jurisdiction is county-wide." See Brother v. State, 85 S.W.3d at 384-85. Although the court of appeals reached the right result, the focus of its conclusion was misdirected. That is, it was not necessary for the court of appeals to determine whether the officer had jurisdiction to stop appellant for mere traffic offenses, because subsection (g) provides that an officer outside his jurisdiction may stop a person who is driving while intoxicated. See Art. 14.03(g) () (emphasis added).
Appellant was stopped outside the arresting officer's jurisdiction based on the officer's probable cause that DWI was underway, and the officer so testified. The officer was resolute...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Vine Street v. Keeling ex rel. Estate of Keeling
... ... The Court has jurisdiction over Vine Street's federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b) and over Vine Street's state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 ... LIABILITY ... CERCLA Liability ... Congress enacted CERCLA to ... ...
-
York v. State
...the offense and take the person before a magistrate in compliance with Article 14.06 of this code. FN7. See Brother v. State, 166 S.W.3d 255, 260 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (city police officer who had articulable suspicion to believe that defendant was driving while intoxicated could detain him o......
-
Cronin v. State, No. 03-04-00266-CR (TX 9/23/2005), 03-04-00266-CR.
...Crim. App. 1997); Hernandez, 983 S.W.2d at 869. These facts must amount to more than a mere hunch or suspicion. Brother v. State, 166 S.W.3d 255, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Williams v. State, 621 S.W.2d 609, 612 (Tex. Crim. App. 1......
-
Clifton v. State, No. 03-06-00648-CR (Tex. App. 8/20/2009)
...State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). These facts must amount to more than a mere hunch or suspicion. Brother v. State, 166 S.W.3d 255, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The foregoing is an objective standard that disregards any subjective intent of the officer making the detention or......
-
Arrests
...Art. 14.03 subsections (d) and (g) a city police officer may arrest a suspect for DWI outside of his jurisdiction. Brother v. State, 166 S.W.3d 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). §1:33.1 Suspect’s Commission of Offense There are several factors that can help to indicate that a suspect may be commi......
-
Arrests
...Art. 14.03 subsections (d) and (g) a city police officer may arrest a suspect for DWI outside of his jurisdiction. Brother v. State, 166 S.W.3d 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). §1:33.1 Suspect’s Commission of Offense There are several factors that can help to indicate that a suspect may be commi......
-
Arrests
...Art. 14.03 subsections (d) and (g) a city police officer may arrest a suspect for DWI outside of his jurisdiction. Brother v. State, 166 S.W.3d 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). §1:33.1 Suspect’s Commission of Offense There are several factors that can help to indicate that a suspect may be commi......
-
Arrests
...Art. 14.03 subsections (d) and (g) a city police officer may arrest a suspect for DWI outside of his jurisdiction. Brother v. State, 166 S.W.3d 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). §1:33.1 Suspect’sCommission of Offense There are several factors that can help to indicate that a suspect may be commit......