Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Texas & P. Ry. Co.

• Citation: 159 F.2d 822
• Decision Date: 19 March 1947
• Docket Number: No. 11663.,11663.
• Parties: BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN v. TEXAS & P. RY. CO.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

159 F.2d 822 (1947)

BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN v. TEXAS & P. RY. CO.

No. 11663.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

February 5, 1947.

Rehearing Denied March 19, 1947.

Kemble K. Kennedy, of Baton Rouge, La., for appellants.

M. E. Clinton, H. Payne Breazeale, and Fred G. Benton, all of Baton Rouge, La., Frank H. Peterman, of Alexandria, La., Esmond Phelps, of New Orleans, La., Fred G. Hudson, Jr., of Monroe, La., and Thos. T. Railey, of St. Louis, Mo., for appellees.

Before SIBLEY, HUTCHESON, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.

HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge.

This is another of those cases arising under the Railway Labor Act, of which Brotherhood v. T. & N. O.¹ was the first, where on appeal the primary question for decision is, does the suit present a justiciable controversy? The secondary one is, is the judgment right?

The matter comes up in this way. Grounding jurisdiction on diversity and on the Railway Labor Act of 1934,² plaintiffs-appellees sued the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Rapids Lodge No. 856 of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, and some thirty individual members of the Brotherhood and the Lodge. They alleged that the Brotherhood and the Lodge were demanding that plaintiffs negotiate with them a change³ in the agreement for yard operations in the joint yards at Alexandria, negotiated and executed June 2, 1927,⁴ and in force ever since without change, and threatening them with penalties if they refused, while the individual defendants were demanding that they refuse and threatening to sue them if they did not.⁵ Motions to dismiss were filed by the Brotherhood and the Lodge and the individual defendants. Both of these motions were denied, and answers were filed by the Brotherhood and the Lodge⁶ and the individual defendants.⁷

The case coming on for trial, plaintiffs proved, as they had alleged, the execution of the contract of June 2, 1927, the request to change it, the suit brought by the individual defendants against them and the Brotherhood in the State court, the demand of the individual defendants that plaintiffs refrain from negotiating with the Brotherhood, and their threats to sue plaintiff if they did.

The individual defendants offered a great deal of documentary evidence pertaining to the controversy inside the Brotherhood over the change in the agreement, beginning about 1938, and continuing thereafter. This included the decision by the executives of the three brotherhoods originally signing the contract that it was intended to be a permanent apportionment and not to be changed, the appeal to the Board of Appeals, the reversal by the Board of the decision of the executives, the efforts of defendants to appeal to the Board of Directors and the Grand Lodge, and the ruling of the President that the decision was final and not appealable. On the contentions they made that the Board of Appeals was without authority to review the matters at issue, they offered the Constitution and Rulings of the Order, and a mass of documents and correspondence. In addition, they offered oral evidence, including that of two of the defendants that the change proposed would injuriously affect the seniority of Texas and Pacific employees, causing some of them to lose both pay and jobs. The Brotherhood and the Lodge offered the Constitution and Rulings and the printed report of the Board of Appeals decision dated October, 1943.

The district judge devoted his inquiry to, and turned his decision on, the question whether the decision of the Board of Appeals was, as contended by the individual defendants, illegal and void. He decided: that it was: that the Brotherhood, was without authority to negotiate for a change in the agreement; "that the plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory judgment herein; and that the individual trainmen employees are entitled to a decree, maintaining in effect the contract of June 2, 1927." He gave judgment accordingly,⁸ and the Brotherhood and the Lodge have appealed, specifying six errors. The first two, dealing with the question, does the plaintiff's suit present a justiciable controversy?, attack as erroneous the action of the district judge in denying the motion to dismiss. The last four, dealing with the question, is the judgment on the merits right?, attack the declaration as completely erroneous.

In support of its first two assignments, that the issues presented are not justiciable, appellants, agreeing with the plaintiffs that this controversy arises under the Railway Labor Act, insist that it must be settled under and in accordance with its provisions. They plant themselves firmly on the Act as it has been construed in General Committee of Adjustment of Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. M.-K.-T. R. Co., 320 U.S. 323, 64 S.Ct. 146, 88 L.Ed. 76; Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation, 320 U. S. 297, 64 S.Ct. 95, 88 L.Ed. 61; Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, Enterprise Lodge, No. 27 v. Toledo, P. & W. R. R., 321 U.S. 50, 64 S.Ct. 413, 88 L.Ed. 534, 150 A.L.R. 810, and on our decision in Bradley Lumber Co. v. N.L.R.B., 5 Cir., 84 F.2d 97, 100,⁹ where the action arising under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., was for a declaratory judgment.

On their second group of errors, that the court erred in declaring that the Board of Appeals was without jurisdiction to act, and, therefore, the Brotherhood was without authority to negotiate a change in the agreement, they insist that the matters dealt with in this declaration concern merely questions of policy, disputes between members, discipline and government of the Association, internal matters which do not warrant the interference of the courts. In support they cite many cases. They insist, too, that Section 15(b) of the Constitution specifically vests appellate jurisdiction in the Board of Appeals and makes its decision a final adjudication of any and all rights on questions involved in the appeal. Finally, they urge upon our attention the provisions of Section 9 of the Constitution: that the president shall interpret all laws pertaining to the Brotherhood and shall decide all controversies and appeals presented to him by subordinate lodges or members thereof; that such decisions shall be final unless reversed by the Board of Directors or Board of Appeals; and that when such decisions have been rendered it shall be the duty of the president to use all the authority and power vested in him to have the decisions placed in effect. Pointing to the record which shows, that the president directed that the appeal be taken to the Board of Appeals, and that he has determined, (1) that the case was properly appealed there, and (2) that no appeal lay from its finding, they insist that on the merits the judgment was completely wrong.

The carrier appellees, insisting that they have a real controversy; that there exists no administrative remedy of which they can avail; that Congress has not conferred upon the National Railroad Adjustment Board or upon the National Mediation Board, power and authority to decide the questions presented; and that the remedy of declaratory judgment is available to them; place their reliance on Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 65 S.Ct. 226, 89 L.Ed. 173; Tunstall v. Brotherhood, 323 U.S. 210, 65 S.Ct. 235, 89 L.Ed. 187; and Elgin v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 65 S.Ct. 1282, 89 L.Ed. 1886. As to so much of the judgment as declared that "under the existing circumstances neither of plaintiffs (railroad appellees) is required by law to confer, negotiate, bargain or treat with the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, its officers, agents or representatives, concerning its, or their, desire to amend or interpret said contract of June 2, 1927," they insist that the judgment was right, since it was predicated on a finding that the Brotherhood was not authorized to interpret and amend the contract of June 2, 1927.

The individual employee appellees, as to the correctness of the order denying the motion to dismiss, make common cause with the railroad appellees. On the merits, they urge: that the judgment was right: that the effect of a change in the contract would be to affect adversely their seniority rights; that the seniority rights of laboring men are fundamental, constitutional rights, secured and protected by the Fifth Amendment; and that the court having determined that the Brotherhood was not authorized to negotiate for them, the declaratory judgment was properly granted.

We think it may not be doubted: that the complaint presented no justiciable controversy; that it was fundamental error not to grant the motion to dismiss; and that the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to dismiss the suit. We, therefore, do not reach the second question, whether the judgment was right on the merits.

In view of the extended discussion of the Act in the cited cases, the reasons which compel our conclusion that the suit should have been dismissed may be stated in the briefest compass. The cases relied on by appellants state the general rule. Those cited by the carrier appellees and the recent case of Order of Railway Conductors of America v. Swan, 67 S.Ct. 405, state narrow exceptions to it. That this case comes squarely under the general rule and not under any of the exceptions, the briefest consideration of the Steele, Tunstall, Burley and Swan cases will show. In the Steele and Tunstall cases, the court fully recognized the broad scope and binding force of the general rule as declared in the Switchmen's union and the General Committee cases. In sustaining the right of Steele and of Tunstall to judicial relief, it took the greatest pains to point out that it sustained that right because, with the Union acting adversely on racial grounds to the very persons they were supposed to represent, the constitutional right of the plaintiffs not to be so discriminated against would be sacrificed or obliterated if it were without the remedy which courts can...