Brothers v. State, 7 Div. 463.

• Decision Date: 30 June 1938
• Docket Number: 7 Div. 463.
• Citation: 236 Ala. 448,183 So. 433
• Parties: BROTHERS v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

183 So. 433

236 Ala. 448

BROTHERS v. STATE.

7 Div. 463.

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 30, 1938

Rehearing Denied Oct. 6, 1938.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Etowah County; J. H. Disque, Jr., Judge.

Bay Brothers was convicted of murder in the first degree, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

Rains &amp Rains and Motley & Motley, all of Gadsden, for appellant.

A. A Carmichael, Atty. Gen., and Wm. H. Loeb, Asst. Atty. Gen for the State.

BOULDIN Justice.

Bay Brothers was indicted for the murder of Dessie Brothers, his wife; was convicted of murder in the first degree and his punishment fixed at death.

The defendant was indicted by the name of "Bay Brothers, whose Christian name is unknown to the grand jury other than as stated."

The motion to quash the indictment on the ground that defendant was not indicted by his true name, and giving his true name as Israel Isiah Brothers was properly overruled.

The evidence without dispute disclosed that he was commonly known as and called "Bay Brothers." So far as appears he was not called by any other, even by his parents and the members of his family.

The name is for the purposes of identification. When the name by which he is generally known and called is stated in the indictment, the added words as above may be treated as surplusage and entirely disregarded. Wells v. State, 88 Ala. 239, 7 So. 272; 1 Bish. Co. Pleading, § 487; Heard's Co. Pleading, §§ 135, 136.

The trial was had on a plea of not guilty, and a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.

The State's evidence touching the homicide was to the following effect: Defendant, while drunk, often abused his wife and children; they frequently fled to the home of Lee McElroy, whose wife was a sister of Mrs. Brothers. On Friday night before the killing on the following Wednesday morning he followed them to the McElroy home, went through the rooms turning down the cover of beds until he found his wife, and began throwing missiles at her, whereupon Lee McElroy struck him on the head with a hammer. This blow, not serious, stopped him. He disappeared. His wife and children remained at McElroy's until Tuesday, when they returned home. Before day light on Wednesday morning, he entered his home with a shot gun, fired on and killed the deceased. After she had fallen he grabbed a hammer and beat her person.

He then fled with the gun and remained in hiding until arrested several weeks later.

The killing in the manner outlined was not controverted.

The defense mainly relied upon was under the plea of insanity.

Some evidence under the plea of not guilty went to the question of mitigation on the theory that defendant was so drunk at the time of the killing as to be incapable of entertaining the specific intent essential to a conviction of murder or murder in the first degree.

A great many exceptions were reserved to rulings on evidence.

Glen Brown, a police officer, arriving at the scene about daybreak, testified, over objection and exception that the body of deceased was exposed from the hips down. He further testified to blood on the person, and stains indicating a struggle after deceased was shot.

This testimony of the condition of the clothing in connection with the other facts disclosed was admitted without error. This was evidence of matters at the scene of the crime tending to shed light on the nature and character of the slaying. Madley v. State, 192 Ala. 5, 68 So. 864.

The State, over repeated objections and exceptions, was permitted to go at length into the abusive conduct of defendant toward his wife, when drinking, including previous assaults, threats, accusations of infidelity; as well as abuse and beating of the children, their leaving home, their appearance of fright, etc.

In dealing with wife murder there are two recognized rules of law in the admission of testimony of this character.

The motive for the killing is always a proper subject of proof. In the case of husband and wife the normal relation of affection and lack of motive may be shown to have given place to anger, hate, resentment and jealousy, evidenced by words and conduct such as disclosed by the evidence in question. Fowler v. State, 155 Ala. 21, 45 So. 913; Smith v. State, 92 Ala. 30, 9 So. 408; Reeves v. State, 201 Ala. 45, 77 So. 339; 30 C.J. 184, § 408.

A still wider range of evidence is allowable when reliance is had upon a plea of insanity.

Thus in Anderson v. State, 209 Ala. 36, 42, 95 So. 171, it is said (page 178):

"It has become a maxim of the law that in cases where insanity is relied upon as a defense, 'Every act of the party's life is relevant to the issue.' Howard v. State, 172 Ala. 402, 410, 55 So. 255, 257, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 990; Wright v. Tatham (1838) Clark & F. 670, 715, 722; 1 Greenl. on Ev. (16th Ed.) p. 58."

Further discussion in that case sustains the view that any words or conduct of deceased shedding light on the question of sanity are admissible although they disclose other criminal acts of the defendant. See, also, Birchfield v. State, 217 Ala. 225, 115 So. 297; Russell v. State, 201 Ala. 572, 78 So. 916.

This is not to say the court has no discretion as to the length to which these matters may be drawn out. Nor should evidence be permitted as to other and distinct offenses which sheds no light on the question of sanity or insanity. The rule that a man is not on trial for all the misdeeds of his life, not required to prepare for a defense against other charges, is not to be ignored and evidence which is calculated merely to bias the jury against him should be refused. The jury on request should be instructed as to the limited purpose for which such evidence is to be considered. Spicer v. State, 188 Ala. 9, 18-20, 65 So. 972.

In the case at bar the defendant offered evidence intended to show mental debility from the time of defendant's youth; other evidence of hereditary taint. This evidence dealt with insanity among collateral relatives. Evidence of habitual drunkenness coupled with hereditary predisposition culminating in a diseased state of mind rendering him irresponsible under the doctrine of the Parsons Case, Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854, 60 Am.Rep. 193, was the trend of such testimony.

We may say here, the solution of this question was for the jury. We find no error in the rulings on the competence of non-expert witnesses. Parrish v. State, 139 Ala. 16, 36 So. 1012.

In this state of the evidence the State was...