Broussard v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.

Decision Date24 May 1979
Docket NumberNo. 8272,8272
Citation582 S.W.2d 261
PartiesK. BROUSSARD et al., Appellants, v. LUMBERMENS MUTUAL CASUALTY CO. et al., Appellees.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

James McNicholas, Beaumont, for appellants.

Dewey Gonsoulin, David W. Ledyard, Beaumont, for appellees.

CLAYTON, Justice.

Appellants Broussard and International Galvanizers, Inc., (Galvanizers) filed this suit against St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company (St. Paul) and Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company (Lumbermens) to recover the sum of $57,233.66, which sum Broussard had previously recovered in a judgment against Galvanizers. In a non-jury trial the court, based upon an agreed statement of facts, entered a take nothing judgment, from which judgment Broussard and Galvanizers appeal.

Broussard sustained a serious personal injury on July 31, 1970, on the premises of Galvanizers while helping to load a flatbed trailer with steel pipe, such trailer being owned by Galvanizers. Broussard and Industrial Labor Supply, Inc., were covered by a Texas Employers Insurance Association policy of worker's compensation insurance. Broussard filed a worker's compensation case against such insurance carrier and subsequently settled his claim against Texas Employers.

On March 17, 1972, Broussard filed a third party action against Galvanizers. The defense of this action was tendered by Galvanizers to St. Paul and Lumbermens. St. Paul had issued an automobile liability policy to David Dean, President of Galvanizers, and Lumbermens had issued to Galvanizers a comprehensive general liability policy. St. Paul and Lumbermens, after obtaining reservation of rights agreements, filed their answers in this case and subsequently withdrew their answers and defenses to such suit, and Galvanizers then assumed its own defense. On November 3, 1975, Broussard obtained a judgment against Galvanizers for the sum of $57,233.66. On February 22, 1977, Broussard and Galvanizers brought this suit against St. Paul and Lumbermens seeking to recover such sum under their policies.

Appellants Broussard and Galvanizers' first point complains of error by the trial court in "ruling that Dean and International Galvanizers did not have 'good cause' for late notice of the accident." Under the agreed statement of facts, it was agreed and stipulated by the parties that Broussard sustained serious injuries on July 31, 1970, which required hospitalization for over a month and medical treatment for several years; that Dean, President of Galvanizers, learned of Broussard's accident and injuries on the same day but did not give notice of the accident to St. Paul or Lumbermens until he was served with suit papers in March 1972, some twenty months later; that no other representative of Galvanizers gave notice of such accident to St. Paul or Lumbermens prior to March 1972; and, that the only reason that Dean did not report the accident any sooner was because Broussard was being taken care of by his worker's compensation carrier.

The policies issued by St. Paul and Lumbermens contained the provision that in the event that an accident occurs written notice shall be given by or on behalf of the insured to the company or any of its authorized agents "as soon as practicable," and that "no action shall lie against the company unless, as a condition precedent thereto, the insured shall have fully complied with all the terms of this policy. . . ."

Compliance with the provision that notice be given "as soon as practicable" is a condition precedent, the breach of which voids policy coverage. Dairyland Mutual Ins. Co. of Texas v. Roman, 498 S.W.2d 154 (Tex.1973); Members Mutual Insurance Co. v. Cutaia, 476 S.W.2d 278 (Tex.1972); New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Hamblen, 144 Tex. 306, 190 S.W.2d 56 (1945); Klein v. Century Lloyds, 154 Tex. 160, 275 S.W.2d 95 (1955); Latham v. Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co., 482 S.W.2d 655 (Tex.Civ.App. Houston (1st Dist.) 1972, writ ref'd n. r. e.); Carroll v. Employers Casualty Co., 475 S.W.2d 390 (Tex.Civ.App. Beaumont 1971, writ ref'd n. r. e.).

The facts not being in dispute as to whether notice was given "as soon as practicable," the question becomes one of law for the determination by the court. Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Harper, 129 Tex. 249, 103 S.W.2d 143, 146, 110 A.L.R. 529 (1937); Klein v. Century Lloyds, supra; Carroll v. Employers Casualty Company, supra; Norman v. St. Paul...

To continue reading

Request your trial
9 cases
  • In re Eastern Transmission Corp.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • 9 d4 Julho d4 1992
    ...as used in a notice provision, have been construed to require notice "within a reasonable time." Broussard v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 582 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Tex.Civ.App.1979); McPherson v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 350 F.2d 563, 566 (5th Cir.1965). See also, New Amsterdam Casualt......
  • United Neurology, P.A. v. Hartford Lloyd's Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas
    • 31 d2 Março d2 2015
    ...that notice be given “as soon as practicable” is a condition precedent, the breach of which voids policy coverage. Broussard v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 582 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1979 and cases cited therein). If the policy fails to define “prompt,” the courts construe it as w......
  • Duzich v. Marine Office of America Corp.
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 8 d4 Outubro d4 1998
    ...reasonable time, and what is a reasonable time depends upon the facts and circumstances in each particular case. Broussard v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 582 S.W.2d 261, 262-63 (Tex.Civ.App.--Beaumont 1979, no writ); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Asarco, Inc., 562 S.W.2d 557, 561 (Tex.Civ.App.--......
  • Laster v. American Nat. Fire Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas
    • 17 d4 Outubro d4 1991
    ...of notice. See, e.g., Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. of Texas v. Roman, 498 S.W.2d 154, 158 (Tex.1973); Broussard v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 582 S.W.2d 261, 262-63 (Tex.Civ. App. — Beaumont 1979, no A conclusion that there is no genuine issue of fact as to the untimely notice ground ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT