Broward Marine, Inc. v. New England Marine Corp. of Delaware
| Decision Date | 30 July 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 78-1953,78-1953 |
| Parties | BROWARD MARINE, INC., Appellant, v. NEW ENGLAND MARINE CORPORATION OF DELAWARE, Bendix Corporation, Cummins EngineCompany, Inc. and Dayton Electric Manufacturing Company, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Thomas D. Lardin of Weaver & Weaver, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
William F. McGowan, Jr. of Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A., Tampa, for appellee Bendix Corp.
H. Vance Smith of Macfarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly, Tampa, for appellee Cummins Engine Co., Inc.
Nathaniel G. W. Pieper of Fowler, White, Gillen, Boggs, Villareal & Banker, P.A., Tampa, for appellee Dayton Electric Manufacturing Co.
Appellant Broward Marine, Inc. (Broward) appeals a final judgment dismissing with prejudice its crossclaims for indemnity and contribution against Bendix Corporation (Bendix), Cummins Engine Co., Inc. (Cummins), and Dayton Electric Manufacturing Co. (Dayton). We reverse.
New England Marine Corporation (New England) filed a complaint against Broward, Bendix, Cummins and Dayton on behalf of itself and its insurer. The complaint alleged that Broward manufactured and was the retail seller of the yacht Spare Time which was equipped with an air compressor manufactured by Cummins, and further equipped with an air regulating valve manufactured by Bendix. The compressor and valve were sold and supplied to Broward by Cummins. Further, the yacht was equipped with an air receiver tank manufactured by Dayton. The complaint further alleged that all defendants breached their express and implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose and that, as a result, the air receiver tank exploded, causing damage to the yacht.
Broward filed an answer to the complaint and crossclaims against Bendix, Cummins and Dayton. The crossclaims alleged that Broward's liability was vicarious, while the liability of the other defendants was active, and demanded indemnity and/or contribution.
New England subsequently reached a settlement with Bendix, Cummins and Dayton, by the terms of which each of these three defendants agreed to pay New England $2,000 and New England agreed to give each defendant a complete release from all liability arising from the lawsuit. In the same instrument, New England released Broward from all claims arising out of
possible passive negligence based on defects in the design or manufacture of air receiving system or any component parts thereof, including the air receiving tank, the air regulating valve, the air compressor, or their component parts manufactured and supplied by . . . (Bendix Cummins and Dayton) and installed aboard THE SPARE TIME at the time of the vessel's manufacture by Broward Marine, Inc. insofar as Broward Marine, Inc. could or might be entitled to maintain an indemnity action over against either The Bendix Corporation, Cummins Engine Co., Inc. or Dayton Electric Manufacturing Co. The parties to this Release do not intend to release Broward Marine, Inc. from the consequences of its own active negligence or defective design nor from liability it might have because of the acts, omissions, negligence or defective products of persons or companies not a party to or within the terms of this Release. (emphasis ours)
New England subsequently filed an amended complaint solely against Broward, claiming that the yacht manufactured by Broward was negligently designed and asking in excess of $25,000 damages. Broward answered and filed an amended crossclaim for indemnification and contribution against Bendix, Cummins and Dayton. 1
The third-party defendants and New England filed motions to dismiss the crossclaim. 2 At the motion hearing, New England's counsel stated that its amended complaint sought damages only for active negligence against Broward. The trial court entered an amended order dismissing Broward's crossclaims with prejudice and stating:
Having advised the Court that the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint only seeks damages for any active negligence on the part of the Defendant, BROWARD MARINE, INC., and the Court having heard argument of counsel, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the Crossclaims of the Defendant, BROWARD MARINE, INC., against the Defendants, the BENDIX CORPORATION, CUMMINS ENGINE COMPANY, and DAYTON ELECTRIC MANUFACTURING CO., be and the same are hereby dismissed, with prejudice, and it is further
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the Defendant, BROWARD MARINE, INC., is entitled, as a setoff, to the benefit of any consideration received by the Plaintiff, NEW ENGLAND MARINE CORPORATION OF DELAWARE, from the Defendants, the BENDIX CORPORATION, CUMMINS ENGINE COMPANY, and DAYTON ELECTRIC MANUFACTURING COMPANY as reflected in that Release dated May 25, 1978, which is on file and that at the appropriate time said consideration will be setoff from any recovery Plaintiff may obtain from the Defendant. . . .
(emphasis ours)
Broward correctly argues that the trial court committed reversible error in looking beyond the four corners of the crosscomplaint when it ruled on the motions to dismiss. The court's order to dismiss was based on: 1) the release executed between New England and Bendix, Cummins and Dayton (contribution), and 2) the fact that New England's amended complaint sought damages based solely on Broward's active negligence (indemnity).
The law is clear, and New England concedes, that a court may not go beyond the four corners of a complaint to test the legal sufficiency of its allegations. As our sister court stated in Reed v. Sampson, 349 So.2d 684 (Fla.4th DCA 1977):
Where a motion to dismiss a complaint rests on facts outside the scope of the allegations contained in the complaint, the trial court commits reversible error in dismissing the complaint based on these extraneous matters. Tiseo v. Arnold, 237 So.2d 21 (Fla.2d DCA 1970).
340 So.2d at 685. The crosscomplaint, standing alone, is sufficient to state a cause of action on the theories of contribution and indemnity.
As to contribution, the final order of dismissal obviously relied, at least in part, on the executed release which was filed with the court by New England and mentioned in each of the motions to dismiss. Moreover, as this...
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