Browder v. General Motors Corp.
| Decision Date | 24 November 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ.A. 96-D-789-N.,Civ.A. 96-D-789-N. |
| Citation | 991 F.Supp. 1402 |
| Parties | Mahlon Daniel BROWDER, Jr., Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION; State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
James H. Tipler, Andalusia, AL, Mal Stanley Duncah, Atlanta, GA, Mark J. Christensen, Andalusia, AL, Susan S. DePaola, Montgomery, AL, for plaintiff.
D. Alan Thomas, Gregory Schuck, Birmingham, AL, R. Chris Harvey, Kurt Meaders, Dallas, TX, Gary L. Weaver, Andalusia, AL, R. Todd Derrick, Herman W. Cobb, Dothan, AL, for defendants.
DE MENT, District Judge.
Before the court are is a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm"). State Farm filed its Motion on August 25, 1997 along with: (1) a "Narrative Summary Of Undisputed Facts And Memorandum Of Law Of The State Of Alabama With Arguments;" and (2) a "Notice Of Filing Of Exhibits To Motion For Summary Judgment." Plaintiff filed a response on October 15, 1997 entitled "Plaintiff's Response To Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company's Motion For Summary Judgment." Plaintiff also filed his own Affidavit in support of his motion.
After a careful review of the arguments of counsel, relevant law, and the record as a whole, the court finds that for the reasons set forth below, State Farm's Motion For Summary Judgment is due to be granted.
The court properly exercises subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity). The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.
On a motion for summary judgment, the court is to construe the evidence and factual inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Summary judgment can be entered on a claim only if it is shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). As the Supreme Court has explained the summary judgment standard:
[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
The trial court's function at this juncture is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citations omitted). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11th Cir.1989).
The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and of establishing, based on relevant "portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions in the file, together with affidavits, if any,'" that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once this initial demonstration under Rule 56(c) is made, the burden of production, not persuasion, shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by (his) own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
In meeting this burden the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is a metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec, Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). That party must demonstrate that there is a "genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. An action is void of a material issue for trial "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587; see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
At approximately 3:00 a.m., the morning of September 3, 1994, Browder was a passenger in a 1994 Chevrolet K-5 Blazer designed and manufactured by GM. The driver of the vehicle was one of Browder's friends named Tony Pierce. The two were traveling south on United States Highway 31 in Conecuh County Alabama. The weather was clear and dry, and the highway was an unlit, rural, two lane asphalt road. A portion of Highway 31 approximately one-quarter of a mile from its intersection with County Road 71 had previously been closed for construction and had only recently reopened. Pierce believed that the purpose of the construction was to straighten out several dangerous curves in the road. Pierce had not been on Highway 31 since it had been reopened.
As Pierce was driving, he noticed that two of the curves had been straightened out by the construction. One of the curves near the end of the construction, however, had not yet been straightened. At the point where the curve began, there was a bump in the road from where the old pavement met the new pavement.
As Pierce entered this part of the roadway, the Blazer ran off the right-hand side of the road. Pierce "snatched it back," and then "lost control" of the vehicle. ) The Blazer slid sideways, overturned, and eventually came to a stop in an upright position, on the left-hand side of the road. The vehicle was facing north, the opposite direction it had been traveling.
Pierce was still inside the vehicle when it came to a rest, and suffered no significant injuries. Browder was ejected from the vehicle during the accident, and was found approximately ten to twenty yards away. He suffered severe injuries, including partial paralyzation. Why the vehicle left the roadway and overturned is the subject of this lawsuit. Tangentially, Plaintiff sued State Farm for their alleged failure to pay Plaintiff's uninusured motorist claim. That specific issue is the subject of this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
Browder's Complaint, as amended, sets forth four distinct Counts. Count I alleges wantonness against the driver of the vehicle, Tony Pierce. Browder contends that as a result of Pierce's "willful or wanton misconduct in the operation of his vehicle, the vehicle left the roadway and overturned." (Compl. ¶ 11.) Although Pierce is no longer a Defendant in this action,1 his actions while operating the Blazer are relevant to the issue of State Farm's liability.
Count II alleges negligence against "John Does 11 through 30" involving the portions of the roadway upon which Plaintiff was traveling. (Compl. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff has not amended his Complaint to properly name any fictitious Defendants, however, and no evidence is offered against any person or entity involved with the design, construction, or repair of the roadway. In fact, Plaintiff does not substantively address this Count in any subsequent pleadings. Finally, "there is no provision for fictitious party practice under federal law." McCree v. Sam's Club, 159 F.R.D. 572, 574 n. 1 (M.D.Ala.1995); see also New v. Sports & Recreation, Inc., 114 F.3d 1092, 1094 n. 1 (11th Cir.1997). Accordingly, the court finds that Count II of Plaintiff's Complaint, as amended, is due to be dismissed.
Counts III and IV are against GM and State Farm respectively. Count III alleges that the Blazer was "unreasonably dangerous because of its propensity to roll over." (Compl. ¶ 19.) Browder alleges that this unreasonably dangerous condition was a proximate cause of his injuries. (Id. ¶ 20.) Count IV contends that State Farm breached a contract of insurance it entered into with Browder by not paying compensation due under the contract's uninsured/under-insured motorist provision. (Id. ¶¶ 22-23.)
A. Browder's Contentions Against State Farm
Browder's claim against State Farm is for breach of the uninsured/under-insured provisions of an insurance contract. (Compl. ¶¶ 22-23.) Browder contends that State Farm has not compensated him for injuries suffered from the owner or operator (Pierce) of an uninsured/under-insured automobile "for which Plaintiff would be legally entitled to recover damages." (Id.) Specifically, Browder contends that he has not received any compensation to which he is entitled under the policy, even after informing State Farm of his injuries resulting from the September 4, 1994 accident. (Id.)
Although State Farm "admits the existence of a policy of insurance between the defendant and the plaintiff," and "admits that the plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident on the date alleged," it "otherwise denies the material averments of paragraph[s 22 and 23]" of Plaintiff's complaint as outlined above. (State Farm's Answer ¶¶ 22-23.)
In addition to the defenses and denials articulated in its Answer, State Farm raises three grounds in support of its Motion For Summary Judgment. (State Farm's Mem. Of Law at 5). First, State Farm denies that the alleged tortfeasor, Mr. Pierce, is an uninsured or under-insured motorist. (Id.) Second, State Farm denies that Pierce acted negligently or wantonly, as...
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