New v. Sports & Recreation, Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 May 1997
• Docket Number: 96-6711,Nos. 96-6615,s. 96-6615
• Citation: 114 F.3d 1092
• Parties: 11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 30 Jeanette E. NEW, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SPORTS & RECREATION, INC., Defendant-Appellant. In re SPORTS & RECREATION, INC., Petitioner.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1092

114 F.3d 1092

11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 30

Jeanette E. NEW, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SPORTS & RECREATION, INC., Defendant-Appellant.

In re SPORTS & RECREATION, INC., Petitioner.

Nos. 96-6615, 96-6711.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

May 30, 1997.

William D. Jones, III, Barry V. Frederick, Paul E. Toppins, Johnston, Barton, Proctor & Powell, Birmingham, AL, for Sports & Recreation, Inc.

Mark L. Redditt, Cherry, Givens, Peters, Lockett & Diaz, Mobile, AL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

Before HATCHETT, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge, and CLARK, Senior Circuit Judge.

HATCHETT, Chief Judge:

We decline to review the district court's remand order for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant Sports & Recreation, Inc. (S & R) employed appellee Jeanette New as a department manager. On May 26, 1995, New allegedly sustained injuries during the On September 27, 1995, New filed an action against S & R in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama. Her complaint contained three counts. Count I sought workers' compensation benefits, which New claimed S & R had not paid. In Count II, New claimed that S & R had wrongfully discharged her as punishment for her attempt to recover workers' compensation benefits. Counts I and II named S & R as the sole defendant. Count III asserted a claim for disability benefits and/or medical expenses against fictitious defendants A, B and C, incorporating several allegations contained in Count I and realleged in Count II. The complaint described these fictitious defendants as "those persons, corporations or other legal entities who or which employed Plaintiff on the occasion of Plaintiff's injury...." Thus, S & R remained the only named defendant in the complaint.

performance of her employment. S & R granted New a leave of absence pursuant to its medical leave plan. During her leave, New instituted an action against S & R to recover workers' compensation benefits. S & R's benefits administrator provided written notification to New that her leave of absence would expire on September 6, 1995. The administrator advised New that New's failure to report to work on or before September 7, 1995, would result in her voluntary resignation from the company. New did not return to work as of that date, and S & R terminated her employment.

On November 22, 1995, S & R removed this suit to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama. S & R claimed four grounds for removal: (1) federal question jurisdiction over Count II pursuant to preemption by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.; (2) federal question jurisdiction over Count III based on ERISA preemption; (3) supplemental jurisdiction over Counts I and II as removable with Count III under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c); and (4) federal diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. In response, on December 21, 1995, New filed a timely motion to remand the action to state court. ¹

On May 13, 1996, the district court granted New's motion to remand this case to the Circuit Court of Mobile County for further proceedings. The district court granted New's request to strike fictitious parties A, B and C from the complaint and refused to consider Count III of the complaint in analyzing New's remand motion because Count III did not specifically assert a claim against S & R. The district court then held that 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) barred removal of the case because Counts I and II of the complaint arose under the provisions of the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act, Ala.Code § 25-5-1 et seq. (1975). ² S & R filed a notice of appeal and, subsequently, a petition for writ of mandamus. ³ This court consolidated the appeal and the petition for writ of mandamus for this proceeding.

CONTENTIONS

S & R contends that the district court erred in remanding this action to the state court. S & R argues that this court has jurisdiction to hear this mandamus petition contesting the order of remand because the district court based its decision to remand on grounds other than 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). S & R asserts that the district court addressed only section 1445(c), and not section 1447(c), in determining that Counts I and II arose under the Alabama workers' compensation New contends that this court has no jurisdiction to review a remand order premised on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a timely motion for remand asserting procedural defects in removal. New argues that she moved for remand pursuant to grounds authorized by section 1447(c) and the district court based its decision to remand this action on lack of jurisdiction, even if the order referred only to section 1445(c). New asserts that Thermtron is therefore not applicable to these facts, and this court thus has no power of review even if it finds the district court decision erroneous. See Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 343, 96 S.Ct. at 589.

laws and thus were more appropriately heard in state court. In addition, the district court's refusal to consider Count III of the complaint constitutes a secondary, non-section 1447(c) reason for the remand decision. S & R argues that section 1447(d) only precludes appellate review of remand orders invoking section 1447(c), pursuant to the holding in Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 96 S.Ct. 584, 46 L.Ed.2d 542 (1976). S & R contends that the district court's failure to specifically address section 1447(c) gives this court appellate jurisdiction under the Thermtron court's reading of the general prohibition against review of remand orders found in section 1447(d). ⁴

ISSUE

In this appeal, we address whether 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) precludes appellate review of a remand order granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c).

DISCUSSION

The only issue resolved in this opinion is whether this court is empowered with jurisdiction over this proceeding. We are convinced that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) precludes us from reviewing this remand order and, therefore, we decline to grant S & R's petition for writ of mandamus and dismiss this consolidated appeal.

Congressional mandate and case law from the Supreme Court as well as this circuit severely circumscribe this court's ability to review the district court's remand order. A district court "order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise," except in cases brought under the civil rights statutes. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1994). This statute imposes "broad restrictions on the power of federal appellate courts to review district court orders remanding removed cases to state court." Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, --- U.S. ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. 494, 496, 133 L.Ed.2d 461 (1995). The language of this statute appears to bar most remand orders from appellate review.

The Supreme Court curtailed this strict rule, however, in Thermtron, when it held that "only remand orders issued under § 1447(c) and invoking the grounds specified therein ... are immune from review under section 1447(d)." 423 U.S. at 346, 96 S.Ct. at 590. Section 1447(c) requires the district court to remand any case to the state court if "it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction" over the claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1994). "[Section] 1447(d) must be read in pari materia with § 1447(c), so that only remands based on grounds specified in § 1447(c) are immune from review under § 1447(d)." Petrarca, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 497. ⁵ Therefore, this court This court then broadly read the Thermtron holding, finding that a district court does not have to expressly state its reliance on section 1447(c) to preclude appellate review. See Fowler v. Safeco Ins. Co., 915 F.2d 616, 617 n. 3 (11th Cir.1990); Division of Archives, History & Records Management v. Austin, 729 F.2d 1292, 1293 (11th Cir.1984). Rather, a district court must openly state its reliance on grounds other than those contained in section 1447(c) to permit review of the remand order. Division of Archives, 729 F.2d at 1293. Appellate review is therefore prohibited if the district court remands pursuant to a determination that it lacks jurisdiction to hear the claim. See In re Surinam Airways Holding Co., 974 F.2d 1255, 1257 n. 4 (11th Cir.1992).

                is only empowered to review a petition for writ of mandamus where the district court remanded the proceeding on "grounds not authorized by the removal statutes."  Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 353, 96 S.Ct. at 594.   Cases remanded for lack of jurisdiction are immune from review even if the district court's decision is clearly erroneous.  In re Decorator Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 1371, 1374 (11th Cir.1992)
                

The district court order at issue in this writ petition focused on a jurisdictional defect. The district court stated that New's motion for remand constituted "a jurisdictional question, so the only consideration involved is whether this court has been granted jurisdiction of the case." The court found that removal had been improperly granted because Counts I and II of New's claim arose under the Alabama workers' compensation statutes. ⁶ The district court held that section 1445(c) renders civil actions brought pursuant to workers' compensation statutes non-removable. Moreover, the court held that section 1445(c) precludes federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over claims arising under workers' compensation laws.

"[A] failure to cite 1447(c), or mention its buzzwords, does not per se give us license to review a remand order." Loftin v. Rush, 767 F.2d 800, 802 (11th Cir.1985); see also Division of Archives, 729 F.2d at 1293. This court's decision in Division of Archives relaxed the Thermtron holding and rejected any requirement that the district court use "magic words" in order to preclude appellate review. To the...