Brown's Estate, In re
| Decision Date | 27 January 1960 |
| Citation | 117 So.2d 478 |
| Parties | In re ESTATE of Daniel Emmitt BROWN, Deceased. GULF FERTILIZER CO., a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. Ida Catherine Brown ROBINSON, Administratrix de bonis non of the Estate of Danlel Emmitt Brown, deceased, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Macfarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly, Tampa, for appellant.
Howard P. Garman, Jr., Ft. Lauderdale, for appellee.
This appeal has been transferred here by the District Court of Appeal, Second District, to which court the appeal was improvidently taken. 1
Appellant sought compulsory payment of its claim filed against the estate administered by the appellee, contending that Section 733.211, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., was unconstitutional as it purported to act retrospectively in barring claims against estates pre-existing its passage because the time prescribed is not reasonable for the assertion of such claims. The trial judge denied the relief on the ground that the questioned statute barred any right to payment. As the decision on the validity of the statute was necessary to the determination of the cause, and such finding was inherent in the judgment, we are squarely faced with the constitutional problem. 2
The administration of the estate of Daniel Emmitt Brown was commenced on October 26, 1949. On November 25, 1949, The Gulf Fertilizer Company filed its claim against the estate founded on an unpaid promissory note. Other claims were also filed. No objection was made to the form or legality of the claim submitted by the appellant. On August 29, 1951, the administrator of the estate died and an order was entered appointing the present appellee. On June 6, 1956, appellant filed its petition for compulsory payment of claim. On November 4, 1958, a motion to dismiss appellant's petition was filed, and on December 1, 1958, the order questioned here was entered by the courty judge denying appellant's petition on the ground that its claim was barred by the provisions of Section 733.211, F.S.A.
Section 733.211 was enacted on June 15, 1953 and has the following title and provisions:
'An Act Relating to Probate Law and Limitation of Actions on Claims Against Estates.
'(1) Whenever anyone shall have filed a claim against any estate in any probate proceedings in this state, in accordance with this chapter, and which claim has not had objection filed thereto or has not been paid, settled or otherwise disposed of and no * * * compulsory payment thereof, then at the expiration of three years from the date such claim is filed such claim shall be forever barred and foreclosed and have no further force or effect and no proceeding or action shall thereafter ever be brought for enforcement or payment of same. This section shall not affect the lien of any duly recorded mortgage or the lien of any person in possession of personal property or the right to foreclose and enforce such mortgage or lien.
'(2) This section shall not apply to any claim upon which legal proceedings are brought for enforcement or compulsory payment of same on or before January 1, 1954.'
Appellant urges Article III, Section 33 of the Constitution of the State of Florida is applicable in this instance. This section provides:
This constitutional provision only refers to those causes of action affected by general statutes of limitation wherein the statute begins to run when the cause of action arises. In the instant case there was no previous time limit within which an action had to be instituted against the estate, once the claim was filed. Ergo, the constitutional provision was not applicable since the time was not lessened but merely defined. 3
Public policy requires that estates of decedents be speedily and finally determined. It is pursuant to this policy that statutes of non-claim have been enacted by the Legislature. It is not the purpose of the probate act to unreasonably restrict the rights of creditors, but the object of the act is to expedite and facilitate the settlement of estates in the interest of the public welfare and for the benefit of those interested in decedents' estates. 4
Appellant's contention that the time prescribed was not reasonable for the assertion of such claims has been the subject of a landmark decision in this State, i. e. In re Woods' Estate, 1938, 133 Fla. 730, 183 So. 10, 12, 117 A.L.R. 1202. The eight month statute of non-claim was pleaded in defense of a claim on a promissory note filed against the estate. The validity of the statute of non-claim was directly at issue. The court held:
'* * * There is a wide distinction between general statutes of limitation and the so-called short, special, non-claim or administrative statute of limitations under which claims against estates of deceased persons must be presented, and in some instances prosecuted, within a given time after the administration of an estate begins and notice is published for the benefit of creditors. Not only is the purpose of of these nonclaim statutes different, but the event which starts the period to running and makes them effective is different. General statutes of limitation begin to run when the cause of action arises, but nonclaim statutes do not become effective except as to claims against decedent's estates and only after an administrator has been appointed, and letters of administration issued and notice given to the creditors as required by the statute. Our court has recognized a distinction between these two classes of statutes in the case of Bradford v. Shine, 13 Fla. 393, 7 Am.Rep. 239.
'In the case of Brooks v. Federal Land Bank of Columbia, 106 Fla. 412, 143 So. 749, [at page 753] Justice Ellis, speaking for the Court, rightly said:
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