In Re Woods' Estate, in Re

• Decision Date: 01 August 1938
• Citation: 183 So. 10,133 Fla. 730
• Parties: In re WOODS' ESTATE.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

183 So. 10

133 Fla. 730

In re WOODS' ESTATE.

Florida Supreme Court

August 1, 1938

Proceeding in the matter of the estate of Ollie M. Woods, deceased wherein D. E. Richards filed a claim against the estate. From an order striking the claim from the files and records of the probate proceedings, the claimant appeals.

Affirmed. Appeal from Circuit Court, Dade County; H. F Atkinson, Judge.

COUNSEL

Boone &amp Boone, of Miami, for appellant.

Alonzo Wilder, of Miami, for appellee.

OPINION

BROWN Justice.

It appears from the 'agreed statement of facts and stipulations of parties' (T.R. 25-28) that on January 6, 1926, Ollie M. Woods, deceased, executed and delivered a note in the sum of $6,250 to D. E. Richards, appellant. The note was payable on or before thirty days after date, with interest at eight per cent per annum until fully paid. On October 10, 1934, the said Ollie Woods died and thereafter Josephine Woods was appointed and qualified as administratrix of his estate. The first publication of notice to creditors was had on November 5, 1934.

On October 15, 1935, D. E. Richards filed his claim against the estate in the County Judge's Court in and for Dade County, Florida, based upon the promissory note. Thereafter on November 8, 1935, on the motion of the administratrix, an order was entered in said County Judge's Court striking from the files and records of the said probate proceedings the claim of D. E. Richards. Richards duly appealed to the Circuit Court from this order of the County Judge and the order was affirmed. From this order of affirmance, this appeal was takne.

The appellant Richards started a law action on November 5, 1935, for the purpose of recovering on the promissory note. The administratrix as defendant in that action filed two pleas to the declaration pleading the eight-month statute of nonclaim to the plaintiff's right to recovery upon said promissory note. The plaintiff filed a demurrer to the two pleas, attacking the constitutionality of the eight-month statute of nonclaim in so far as the same is applicable to the cause of action sued upon. The Circuit Judge overruled the demurrer. The same issues were raised by the appeal from the order striking the claim of D. E. Richards as was raised by the demurrer to the pleas filed in the law action; so it was stipulated by the parties that the law action be stayed pending this appeal from the Circuit Court's affirmance of the order of the County Judge striking said claim.

The primary question raised on this appeal is whether or not sections 119 and 120 of the 1933 Probate Act, being Sections 5541(91) and 5541(92) of the Permanent Supplement to Compiled General Laws of Florida, are constitutional as applied to the appellant and the admitted facts herein.

Appellant first claims that these two sections, as applied to the facts in the present case, are violative of the Florida Constitution, Article 3, Section 33, which provides:

'No statute shall be passed lessening the time within which a civil action may be commenced on any cause of action existing at the time of its passage.'

The promissory note became due on February 6, 1926. The law in effect at that time was Chapter 10119, of the Acts of 1925, which provided that all administrators or executors shall publish a notice once a week for eight consecutive weeks and all claims or demands should be presented to the county judge within twelve months from the time of the first publication of said notice. 'Any claims or demands not so presented within twelve months from the time of the first publication of the notice provided for in Section 1 hereof, shall be barred by limitation.' Section 2.

In 1933 the present Probate Act became effective and Sections 119 and 120 of that act lessened the time of publication of notice to creditors from eight weeks (as provided for in the 1925 act) to four weeks, and lessened the time in which a creditor might file his claim from twelve months to eight months from the time of the first publication of notice.

Appellant Richards filed his claim in less than twelve months after publication of notice but seventy days after the eight-month period had run. It is contended by appellant that as his cause of action arose before the 1933 Probate Act was passed, lessening the time in which to file his claim, that these two sections of the probate act are unconstitutional as a violation of the above quoted Article 3, Section 33 of the Florida Constitution, in so far as it affects his claim; and that he is entitled to the twelve-month period allowed him under the 1925 Act; that a liberal application should be made of Section 33 of Art. 3 in order to prevent the working of injustice upon appellant, and others similarly situated; citing Ellison, as Adm'r, v. Allen, 8 Fla. 206; Baugher v. Boley, 63 Fla. 75, 58 So. 980; State Bank of Orlando & Trust Co. v. Macy, 101 Fla. 140, 133 So. 876, 78 A.L.R. 1119; Ramseyer v. Datson, 120 Fla. 414, 162 So. 904. While there are some expressions in some of these cases favorable to appellant's contention, none of them, as we read them, are strictly in point here, as to the matters actually decided. There is a wide distinction between general statutes of limitation and the so-called short, special, nonclaim or administrative statute of limitations under which claims against estates of deceased persons must be presented, and in some instances prosecuted, within a given time after the administration of an estate begins and notice is published for the benefit of creditors. Not only is the purpose of these nonclaim statutes different, but the event which starts the period to running and makes them effective is different. General statutes of limitation begin to run when the cause of action arises, but nonclaim statutes do not become effective except as to claims against decedent's estates and only after an administrator has been appointed, and letters of administration issued and notice given to the creditors as required by the statute. Our court has recognized a distinction between these two classes of statutes in the case of Bradford v. Shine, 13 Fla. 393, 7 Am.Rep. 239.

In the case of Brooks v. Federal Land Bank of Columbia, 106 Fla. 412, 143 So. 749, Justice Ellis, speaking for the Court, rightly said (page 753):

'A statute of nonclaim while partaking of the nature of a statute of limitations is not wholly such. It constitutes part of the procedure of the court, the orderly, expeditious, and exact settlement of the estates of decedents, and constitutes part of the procedure which courts must observe in the settlement of estates of deceased persons, and, where no exemption from the provisions of a statute exist, the court is powerless to create one. If such were not the case, the settlement of an estate might be deferred indefinitely and heirs and legatees, the rightful owners of the property of the estate, or beneficiaries of the will of the decedent, kept out of the enjoyment of their possessions and deprived of the benefits secured to them by the laws of the state for such unreasonable time as to practically deprive them of their property.'

See, also, Smith v. Feschheimer, 124 Fla. 757, 169 So. 395; Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Estate of Lovera, 125 Fla. 682, 171 So. 512.

We are of the opinion that a reasonable construction of Section 33 of Article 3 makes it applicable primarily to general statutes of limitations, and that it can not be said with logic or reason that this section was violated in the present case. The twelve-month statute of non-claim under the former statute was never applicable to the appellant's claim, as Ollie Woods did not die while the 1925 statute was in force. Appellant never had the right to apply the 1925 statute against the estate of Ollie Woods as that statute never began to run against Woods. When Woods died in 1934, the aforesaid sections 119 and 120 of the 1933 Probate Act were in force. This was the only nonclaim statute that ever affected the appellant's claim. See sections 119 and 120 of chapter 16103, Acts of 1933. Said section 120 reads as follows:

'Section 120. Form and Manner of Presenting Claims--Limitation.--No claim or demand, whether due or not, direct or contingent liquidated or unliquidated, or claim for personal property in the possession of the personal representative or for damages, shall be valid or binding upon an estate, or upon the personal representative thereof, or upon any heir, legatee or devisee of the decedent, unless the same shall be in writing and contain the place of residence and post office address of the claimant and shall be sworn to by the claimant, his agent or attorney and be filed in the office of the County Judge granting letters. Any such claim or demand not so filed within eight months from the time of the first publication of the notice to creditors shall be void even though the personal representative has recognized such claim or demand by paying a portion thereof or interest thereon or otherwise; provided, however, that the lien of any duly recorded mortgage and the lien of any person in possession of personal property and the right to foreclose and enforce such mortgage or lien shall not be impaired or affected by failure to file claim or demand as hereinabove provided, but such failure shall bar the right to enforce any personal liability against the estate, and the claimant shall be limited to the...