Brown v. Alaska Airlines Inc.

• Decision Date: 23 November 2022
• Docket Number: 2:22-cv-668
• Parties: MARLI BROWN and LACEY SMITH, Plaintiffs, v. ALASKA AIRLINES, INC., and ASSOCIATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS-CWA, AFL-CIO, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington

MARLI BROWN and LACEY SMITH, Plaintiffs, v. ALASKA AIRLINES, INC., and ASSOCIATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS-CWA, AFL-CIO, Defendants.

No. 2:22-cv-668

United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle

November 23, 2022

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT ASSOCIATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS-CWA, AFL-CIO'S MOTION TO DISMISS

BARBARA JACOBS ROTHSTEIN, U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Association of Flight Attendants, CWA, AFL-CIO (“AFA” or the “Union”). AFA seeks dismissal of two of Plaintiffs' three claims against it (1) the Eighth Cause of Action, which is a claim by Plaintiff Marli Brown against AFA, based on the Washington Law Against Discrimination, RCW §§ 49.60.010, et seq.; and (2) the Eleventh Cause of Action, a claim by Plaintiff Lacey Smith against AFA, based on Oregon's Unlawful Discrimination in Employment law, OR Rev. Stat. § 659A.030(c). AFA argues that both state-law claims are preempted by the federal duty of fair representation, which is grounded in the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151, et seq. Having reviewed the parties' briefs and the relevant caselaw, the Court finds and rules as follows.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Marli Brown, a resident of Washington, and Lacey Smith, a resident of Oregon, were flight attendants employed by Defendant Alaska Airlines (“Alaska”). Am. Compl., ¶ 1, Dkt. No. 39. In February 2021, Alaska initiated disciplinary proceedings against both women, based on comments the women posted on a company-wide intranet site known as “Alaska's World.” The comments were in response to a statement Alaska made expressing support for the Equality Act, proposed federal legislation that would “add ‘sexual orientation and gender identity' as protected classes to a variety of federal statutes.” Am. Compl., ¶ 2. According to Plaintiffs, the legislation “would curtail the applicability of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.” Id. Brown and Smith independently posted comments they claim were grounded in their religious convictions, criticizing the Equality Act and challenging Alaska's statement of support.^[1]Alaska removed the comments and suspended Plaintiffs pending further investigation, asserting that the comments had violated the company's anti-discrimination policies.

Defendant AFA is the certified union for Alaska Airlines flight attendants, with exclusive authority to represent the flight attendants, including Plaintiffs, in the grievance procedures set forth in the parties' governing collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). Am. Compl., ¶ 27 (citing RLA); ¶¶ 131-37. After Alaska suspended Plaintiffs, representatives of AFA contacted Plaintiffs and attended meetings with Alaska on their behalf. According to Plaintiffs, during Brown's meeting, “AFA said little in Marli's defense,” and “did not advocate for Marli's rights as a member of a protected class not to face discrimination on the basis of religion.” Id., ¶¶ 147-48. During Smith's meeting, Plaintiffs allege, AFA “did not advocate for Lacey's right to be free from discrimination on the basis of religion.” Id., ¶ 243.

In March 2021, after meeting with the two flight attendants and their union representatives, Alaska terminated both women, citing the women's “Alaska's World” posts and the company's employment policies prohibiting discrimination and harassment. Am. Compl., ¶¶ 156, 252. AFA appealed the terminations on both Plaintiffs' behalf, and represented Plaintiffs at the subsequent hearings. Id., ¶¶ 163, 259-60. However, after Alaska denied Plaintiffs' appeal of their terminations, AFA made a determination it would no longer represent Plaintiffs in the grievance process, including arbitration proceedings. Id., ¶¶ 194, 282.

Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit against both Alaska Airlines and the AFA. The essence of the Amended Complaint is that Defendants discriminated against the Plaintiffs on the basis of their Christian faith. In their suit against the Union, Plaintiffs claim that “[b]ecause of [Plaintiffs'] religious beliefs, AFA did not defend [Plaintiffs] as vigorously as it defends other flight attendants.” Am. Compl., ¶¶ 133, 242. This motion pertains to only two of the three claims against AFA, seeking dismissal of Brown's WLAD claim against AFA, and a similar claim under the Oregon Unlawful Discrimination in Employment law, brought by Smith.^[2]

III. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Dismiss Standard

The allegations in a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). On a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law either for lack of a cognizable legal theory or for insufficient facts under a cognizable theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). In ruling on the motion, a court must “accept all material allegations of fact as true and construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Vasquez v. Los Angeles Cnty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007). Well-pled allegations in the complaint are assumed to be true, but a court is not required to accept legal conclusions couched as facts, unwarranted deductions, or unreasonable inferences. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986); Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001), opinion amended on denial of reh'g, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001).

B. Whether Plaintiffs' State-Law Claims Are Preempted by Federal Law

1. The Duty of Fair Representation Preempts State-Law Claims That Are Based on Union's Role as Collective Bargaining Representative

AFA seeks dismissal of the two state-law claims against it, arguing that they are preempted by the “duty of fair representation,” an implied cause of action grounded in the RLA. See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 47 (1979).^[3]That duty serves as a check on a union's authority, under the RLA, to act as the exclusive bargaining representative of its members. Beckington v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 926 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he union's authority as exclusive bargaining representative carries with it a correlative duty ... to represent fairly the interests of all bargaining-unit members during the negotiation, administration, and enforcement of collective-bargaining agreements.”) (cleaned up, citing Foust, 442 U.S. at 46). Under the duty of fair representation, a union has an obligation to “represent all members ... without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct.” Jones v. Union Pac. R.R., 968 F.2d 937, 941 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967)). The duty “applies to all representational activity in which the union engages, including the ‘negotiation, administration, and enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.'” Madison v. Motion Picture Set Painters & Sign Writers Loc. 729, 132 F.Supp.2d 1244, 1256 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (quoting Foust, 442 U.S. at 47; Airline PilotsAss'n v. O'Neil, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991)). Relevant to the instant case, “[t]he duty to investigate and file grievances is a core function of union representation.” Thompson v. Int'l Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers Union, Loc. 1 of Washington, No. C12-2066Z, 2013 WL 3865073, at *4 (W.D. Wash. July 24, 2013) (citing Tenorio v. N.L.R.B., 680 F.2d 598, 601 (9th Cir.1982)).

Federal courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have held that the federal duty of fair representation preempts state-law claims that arise out of the union's role “as its members' exclusive collective bargaining representative.” See Adkins v. Mireles, 526 F.3d 531, 539-40 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The federal statutory duty which unions owe their members to represent them fairly . . . displaces state law that would impose duties upon unions by virtue of their status as the workers' exclusive collective bargaining representative.”).^[4]Adkins did not involve state-law antidiscrimination claims, and the Ninth Circuit has not expressly addressed whether the duty of fair representation preempts claims under a state's antidiscrimination statute. However, nothing in Adkins suggests that the duty should preempt certain state-law claims arising in the context of the union's representation, but not others; to the contrary, the preemptive scope of the duty of fair representation is described in Adkins as being quite broad: “the duty of fair representation occupies the field of regulation of union-member relations when a union carries out its representational functions.”^[5]Adkins, 526 F.3d at 541-42.

Furthermore numerous district courts in the Ninth Circuit, including this Western District of Washington, have applied Adkins to hold that the duty of fair representation preempts claims brought under state antidiscrimination statutes, where those claims arose in the context of the union's representation of the employee in the grievance process. See, e.g., Thompson, 2013 WL 3865073, at *4 (plaintiffs' WLAD claims “are preempted because they are based on conduct that falls squarely within the Union's duty not to discriminate within “the normal incidents of the union-employee relationship.”) (quoting Adkins, 526 F.3d at 539-40); Wright v. N. Am. Terrazo, No. C12-2065JLR, 2013 WL 441517, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 5, 2013) (“Mr. Wright brings a claim for discrimination on the basis of race under the WLAD.... The substance of Mr. Wright's WLAD claim is that the Union discriminated against him, an action that falls under the duty of fair...