Brown v. Apfel

• Decision Date: 27 October 1999
• Docket Number: No. C.A. 98-206-L.,C.A. 98-206-L.
• Citation: 71 F.Supp.2d 28
• Parties: Kevin C. BROWN, Plaintiff, v. Kenneth S. APFEL, Commissioner of Social Security Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

71 F.Supp.2d 28

Kevin C. BROWN, Plaintiff, v. Kenneth S. APFEL, Commissioner of Social Security Defendant.

No. C.A. 98-206-L.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

October 27, 1999.

Morris Greenberg, Maria L. Nunez, Green, Greenberg & Nesselbush, Providence, RI, for Plaintiff.

Robin E. Feder, U.S. Attorney's Office, Providence, RI, for Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

LAGUEUX, Chief Judge.

Kevin C. Brown ("Plaintiff") brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)(1994), seeking review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Health and Human Services ("Commissioner") denying disability insurance benefits. The Commissioner determined that, although plaintiff was under a disability, he was ineligible for insurance benefits because his alcoholism was material to a finding of disability. Magistrate Judge Robert W. Lovegreen reviewed the decision and issued a Report and Recommendation, concluding that the Commissioner's decision should be affirmed. This Court adopts the Magistrate Judge's recommendation but uses somewhat different reasoning as set forth below. The Court writes on this subject because it is important to explicate Congress' policy not to have the Social Security system subsidize alcoholism.

I. Background

Plaintiff was born on October 9, 1958 and completed fourteen years of education. In the relevant past, he was employed as a correctional officer. Plaintiff has been in and out of various detoxification programs since at least 1985. Plaintiff's alleged disability stems from an accident which occurred at work on September 20, 1992 while he was carrying a weight. Plaintiff testified that as a result of chronic pain following this incident, he became depressed. He admitted to using excessive amounts of alcohol which he testified was an attempt to alleviate his depression and pain. Since the time of the accident, plaintiff has not worked in any gainful employment and has received a variety of medical treatments for his back pain. Plaintiff has not been treated for depression or any other mental condition.

II. Procedural History

On April 29, 1994, plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits, alleging an inability to work since September 20, 1992 due to low back pain, alcoholism and depression. The application was denied initially by the Social Security Administration. An Administrative Law Judge of the Department of Health and Human Services ("ALJ") considered the case de novo. On March 19, 1996, the ALJ held a hearing at which plaintiff, appearing with his counsel, and a medical expert testified. On April 10, 1996, the ALJ rendered his decision granting plaintiff's application for benefits. However, this decision was vacated by the ALJ sua sponte because he had failed to consider the revision to Section 223(d) of the Social Security Act contained in Public Law 104-121, effective March 29, 1996, which precludes recovery of disability insurance benefits "if alcoholism or drug addiction would (but for this subparagraph) be a contributing factor material to the Commissioner's determination that the individual is disabled." Pub.L. No. 104-121 § 105(a)(1), 105(b)(1), 110 Stat. 847, 852-853 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C)(1996)).

On October 15, 1996, a second hearing was held at which plaintiff, plaintiff's father and the same medical expert testified. A vocational expert was present at the hearing but did not testify. A supplemental hearing was held on December 5, 1996, at the direction of the ALJ, at which plaintiff again testified as did two experts, a psychiatrist and a psychologist. On January 17, 1997, the ALJ rendered his decision that, although plaintiff was under a disability, the revised Section 223(d) precluded plaintiff's recovery of disability insurance benefits, as his alcoholism was material to the finding of a disability. The ALJ's decision was reviewed and affirmed by the Department of Health and Human Services' Appeals Council on February 6, 1998 and thus became the final decision of the Commissioner.

Plaintiff sought timely review of the ALJ's decision before this Court by filing this suit on April 13, 1998. The complaint requests reversal or, in the alternative, a remand of the Commissioner's decision. The Commissioner, in turn, filed a motion to affirm his decision. This Court subsequently referred the case to Magistrate Judge Robert W. Lovegreen for a Report and Recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)(1994). Magistrate Judge Lovegreen issued a Report recommending that the Commissioner's decision be affirmed. Plaintiff has objected to the Report and Recommendation in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C)(1994).

III. Standard of Review

The role of a district court in reviewing a decision of the Commissioner is limited because, although questions of law are reviewed de novo, "[t]he findings of the Commissioner ... as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)(1994). The term "substantial evidence" has been defined as "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971)(quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)).

The determination of substantiality must be made upon an evaluation of the record as a whole. See Ortiz v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 955 F.2d 765, 769 (1st Cir.1991)("We must uphold the Secretary's findings ... if a reasonable mind, reviewing the evidence in the record as a whole, could accept it as adequate to support his conclusion.")(quoting Rodriguez v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 647 F.2d 218, 222 (1st Cir.1981)). However, this Court must avoid reinterpreting the evidence or otherwise substituting its own judgment for that of the Commissioner. See Colon v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 877 F.2d 148, 153 (1st Cir.1989). Indeed, the resolution of conflicts in the evidence is for the Commissioner, not the courts. Rodriguez, 647 F.2d at 222(citing Richardson, 402 U.S. at 399, 91 S.Ct. 1420).

A district court need not, however, perform the initial evaluation of the decision. Instead, it may refer the matter to a United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)(1994). In this case, per order of the Court, Magistrate Judge Lovegreen conducted an initial review of the Commissioner's decision using the above standards and found that the ALJ had applied the correct legal standards and that the denial of disability benefits was based on substantial evidence. Magistrate Judge Lovegreen thus recommended that the decision be affirmed.

As he is entitled to under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C)(1994), plaintiff objected to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. When an objection is properly filed, as in this case, this Court "shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C)(1994). However, this Court's de novo review is not limited to the specific objections made by plaintiff. "[W]hile the statute does not require the judge to review an issue de novo if no objections are filed, it does not preclude further review by the district judge, sua sponte or at the request of a party, under a de novo or any other standard." Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 154, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985). See also Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 271, 96 S.Ct. 549, 46 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). Thus, this Court reviews the record de novo to determine whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and whether the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence.

IV. Evidence

The evidence in this case has been documented voluminously in the proceedings below. Plaintiff does not dispute the ALJ's finding, and the Magistrate Judge's subsequent recommendation to affirm, that plaintiff's back pain does not independently render him disabled. Instead, plaintiff challenges the ALJ's findings, and the Magistrate Judge's subsequent recommendation to affirm, regarding plaintiff's other impairments, namely his alleged personality disorder and depression ("mental impairments") and his alcoholism. Thus, this Court will outline only the evidence pertinent to the ALJ's findings on those issues.

Alcoholism

Plaintiff has received treatment for alcohol abuse on and off over the past 14 years.

From April 20, 1985 until May 21, 1985, plaintiff was an inpatient at Edgehill Newport with an admitting diagnosis of alcoholism, low dose Valium abuse and history of low back injury. (Tr. 321). He provided a history of drinking for two years and was consuming one and one-half quarts of vodka and a pint of ginger brandy daily. He denied depression or suicidal ideation. During the course of treatment, he was weaned from alcohol, placed on back exercises and placed on Antabuse therapy. He was to start outpatient counseling at the end of May, 1985.

On May 24, 1986, plaintiff was again admitted to Edgehill Newport with a history of sobriety for nine months until three to four months earlier when he again began drinking and using Valium. (Tr. 331). He underwent detoxification and was discharged on May 27, 1986 to continue his aftercare program.

From July 25 to July 29, 1993, plaintiff was a patient at Good Hope Center having referred himself in a state of intoxication. (Tr. 351). He had consumed 18 beers, a pint of ginger brandy and one-half pint of vodka that day. He gave a history of prior treatment and detoxification at Edgehill in 1985, High Point in 1986, Edgehill in 1987, High Point in 1989, three to four days detoxification at Butler Hospital (date unknown) and counseling at CIS in Warwick, once weekly for three months. The reason provided by plaintiff for admission to Good Hope Center was ...