Brown v. Borruso
| Decision Date | 25 April 1997 |
| Citation | 238 A.D.2d 884,660 N.Y.S.2d 780 |
| Parties | Sheilagh L. BROWN, Appellant, v. Michael BORRUSO, et al., Defendants, General Motors Corp. and Takata Corp., Respondents. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Julian and Pertz, P.C. by Richard Pertz, Utica, for Appellant.
Thorn and Gershon, Nancy Bogen, of counsel by Kristin Martin, Albany, for Respondent, GM Corp.
O'Connor, O'Connor, Mayberger and First by Justin Corcoran, Albany, for Respondent, Takata Corp.
Before DENMAN, P.J., and PINE, DOERR, BALIO and FALLON, JJ.
Plaintiff commenced an action against, inter alia, General Motors Corp. (General Motors) and Takata Corp. (Takata) (defendants) seeking damages for personal injuries she sustained in an automobile accident. Plaintiff testified at an examination before trial that she was wearing her seat belt prior to the accident, but she did not have to remove her seat belt to exit the vehicle after the accident. She alleged that she sustained a head injury when her head hit the windshield. She further alleged that the seat belt locking mechanism in the 1988 Pontiac LeMans she was driving had been the subject of a recall and that her injuries were the result of a defective seat belt locking mechanism.
The parties consented to the destructive testing of the seat belt locking mechanism, which was conducted by an engineering expert of Takata, in the presence of plaintiff's counsel and expert and representatives of defendants. When the seat belt locking mechanism was disassembled, the defect that was the subject of the recall was not present. Defendants moved for summary judgment, submitting the affidavit of a General Motors senior analysis engineer and the affidavit of the Takata engineer who performed the testing. Both experts opined that the testing revealed that the defect that was the subject of the recall was not present in the seat belt worn by plaintiff.
In opposition to the motion, plaintiff submitted her own affidavit, her deposition testimony, the police report and the recall notice. Supreme Court granted the motion, concluding that defendants had submitted proof in admissible form establishing that the seat belt locking mechanism was not defective and that plaintiff had failed to raise an issue of fact.
To make out a prima facie case of strict products liability based upon a manufacturing defect, plaintiff may rely upon the circumstances of the accident and proof that the product did not perform as intended (see, Landahl v. Chrysler Corp., 144 A.D.2d 926, 927, 534 N.Y.S.2d 245; Fox v. Corning Glass Works, 81 A.D.2d 826, 438 N.Y.S.2d 602). In our view, the allegations of plaintiff that the seat belt was fastened while she was driving, that it was not fastened after the accident, and that she sustained a head injury, are sufficient to make out a prima facie case of a defect in the seat belt locking mechanism.
A defendant moving for summary judgment to dismiss a strict products liability...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Berger v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc.
...a manufacturing defect in the product." Minda v. Biomet, Inc., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 15574, at *3 (citing Brown v. Borruso, 238 A.D.2d 884, 885, 660 N.Y.S.2d 780, 781 (4th Dep't 1997)). The burden "then shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate a triable issue as to whether in fact there was a ......
-
Prohaska v. Sofamor, S.N.C.
..."may rely upon the circumstances of the accident and proof that the product did not perform as intended." Brown v. Borruso, 238 A.D.2d 884, 885, 660 N.Y.S.2d 780 (4th Dept.1997). Still, plaintiff "must submit some direct evidence that a defect existed." Id. (citation omitted). Here, plainti......
-
TEDONE v. HJ Heinz Co.
...in admissible form establishing that plaintiff's injuries were not caused by a manufacturing defect in the product." Brown v. Borruso, 660 N.Y.S.2d 780, 781 (1997); see also Rachlin v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., Inc., 734 N.Y.S.2d 798, 799 (2001). Defendants can meet this burden by submitting ev......
-
Cassatt v. Zimmer, Inc.
...in the tibial component, and she failed to submit "some direct evidence that [such] a defect existed" ( Brown v. Borruso, 238 A.D.2d 884, 885, 660 N.Y.S.2d 780 [4th Dept. 1997] ; see Blazynski v. A. Gareleck & Sons, Inc., 48 A.D.3d 1168, 1169, 852 N.Y.S.2d 500 [4th Dept. 2008], lv. denied 1......