Brown v. Brown
| Decision Date | 13 April 1938 |
| Docket Number | 384. |
| Citation | 196 S.E. 333,213 N.C. 347 |
| Parties | BROWN v. BROWN. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Lenoir County; Henry A. Grady, Judge.
Suit for divorce by Claude L. Brown against Rosa Hooker Brown. From an adverse decree, plaintiff appeals.
No error.
This is an action for divorce under provisions of chapter 100 Pub.Laws 1937, in which the plaintiff makes the necessary allegations, including the allegation of two years' separation.
The defendant, answering, admitted that the plaintiff had been a resident of the state of North Carolina for a period of one year, and that the plaintiff and defendant had lived separate and apart for a period of two years. By way of further answer and plea in bar the defendant further alleged that the plaintiff wrongfully and unlawfully abandoned the defendant and his two children and wrongfully, unlawfully, and willfully thereafter refused to render any support to them. At the hearing the evidence tended to show that the plaintiff had been indicted and convicted of the crime of abandonment and nonsupport of his wife and his children begotten of her during coverture. The evidence likewise tended to show that the defendant had instituted an action against the plaintiff for subsistence and upon due hearing an order had been entered requiring the plaintiff to make contribution to the support of his wife and children; that thereafter, upon citation, it was found by the court that the plaintiff had wrongfully and unlawfully abandoned his wife and children that he had contumaciously failed to make the payments required and had been adjudged in contempt and sentenced to prison.
Issues were submitted to and answered by the jury as follows:
1. Were the plaintiff and defendant married as alleged in the e complaint? A. Yes.
2. Has the plaintiff resided in the State of North Carolina for one year? A. Yes.
3. Has there been a separation of husband and wife, and have they lived separate and apart for more than 2 years? A. Yes.
4. Has the said separation of husband and wife been due to the criminal and unlawful acts of the husband, as alleged in the answer? A. Yes."
The portion of statute allowing divorce on ground of separation of spouses for two years, which re-enacted, in identical words, portion of prior act which was judicially construed as denying relief to one whose claim was based upon violation by himself of the criminal or penal laws of state, would be conclusively presumed to have same meaning, force, and effect theretofore given to it by judicial construction. Pub.Laws 1931, c. 72; Pub.Laws 1933, c. 163; Pub.Laws 1937, c. 100.
Where terms used in a statute have acquired a settled meaning through judicial interpretation, and the same terms are used in a subsequent statute, it is presumed that the Legislature in passing the later law knew what the judicial construction was which had been given to the words of the prior re-enactment.
Joe Dawson, of Kinston, for appellant.
J. B James, of Greenville, appellee.
Courts are governmental agencies created for the administration of justice. From time immemorial it has been a recognized fundamental policy that their doors are not to be opened to enable one to procure an advantage growing out of, or bottomed upon, his own wrongful or unlawful act. As said by Stacy, C.J., in Reynolds v. Reynolds, 208 N.C. 428, 181 S.E. 338: "'It is very generally held, universally, so far as we are aware, that an action never lies when a plaintiff must base his claim, in whole or in part, on a violation by himself of the criminal or penal laws of the state'-Hoke, J., in Lloyd v. R. R., 151 N.C. 536, 66 S.E. 604, 45 L.R.A. (N.S.) 378. In Waite's Actions and Defenses, Vol. 1, p. 43, the principle is broadly stated, as follows: 'No principle of law is better settled than that which declares that an action cannot be maintained upon any ground or cause which the law declares to be illegal,' citing Davidson v. Lanier, 4 Wall. 447, 18 L.Ed. 377; Rolfe v. Delmar, 30 N.Y.Super.Ct. (7 Rob.) 80; Stewartson v. Lothrop, 12 Gray (Mass.) 52; Howard v. Harris, 8 Allen (Mass.) 297; Pearce v. Brooks, L.R. 1 Exch. 213; Smith v. White, L.R. 1 Eq.Cas. 626.
To say that civil rights, enforceable through the courts, may inure to one out of his own violation of the criminal law, and against the very person injured, would be to blow hot and cold in the same breath, or, Janus-like, to look in both directions at the same time. The law is not interested in such double dealing or sleight of hand performances; it sets its face like flint in the opposite direction."
While it is a well-settled rule that all questions of public policy are for the determination of the Legislature and not for the courts, it will not be assumed that any statute enacted by the Legislature was intended to override or depart from principles of public policy founded on good morals unless the language of the statute clearly and unequivocally indicates such an intent. The courts will not impute to the Legislature an intent that would be in direct conflict with the very purposes for which the courts are created, or would be violative of sound public policy, or would lead to manifest injustice in...
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