Brown v. Brown

• Decision Date: 29 November 1911
• Citation: 237 Mo. 662,141 S.W. 631
• Parties: BROWN et al. v. BROWN et al.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

141 S.W. 631

237 Mo. 662

BROWN et al. v. BROWN et al.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

November 29, 1911.

1. DEEDS (§ 211)—INVALIDITY—MENTAL CAPACITY—EVIDENCE.

In an action to set aside a deed, evidence held insufficient to show coercion or undue influence, or that the grantor was mentally incapable of executing the same.

2. DEEDS (§ 196) — PRESUMPTIONS — FIDUCIARY RELATION.

Where the grantee in a deed occupied a fiduciary relation toward the grantor, a rebuttable presumption of undue influence is raised.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Randolph County; E. W. Hinton, Special Judge.

Action by James G. Brown and others against John W. Brown and others. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

B. R. Dysart, J. H. Whitecotton, and Willard P. Cave, for appellants. Hammett & Howard, for respondents.

GRAVES, P. J.

Benjamin Brown died on May 27, 1884, leaving surviving him his widow, Rachel Catherine Brown, his children, James G., John W., Sam B. Brown, Janairia I. Stokes, Millie K. Gaines, and his grandchildren, Ben and Cooper Sims and Catherine Haines, children of a deceased daughter. In his lifetime Benjamin Brown owned in fee 200 acres of land in Randolph county. He and his wife as tenants by the entirety owned 327 acres more adjoining, and this last-mentioned tract is the one involved in this suit. Prior to the death of Benjamin Brown, all of his children had married and moved to their own homes, with the exception of John and Sam, the two youngest boys. In about three years after the death of the father the son Sam married and moved away. During the first three years succeeding the death of the father, Sam and John purchased the interests of the other heirs in and to the 200-acre tract above mentioned. The interests of the several heirs were fixed by the will of Benjamin Brown. On the 20th day of March, 1887, Rachel Catherine Brown conveyed the home place of 327 acres to defendant John W. Brown, retaining to herself a life estate therein. At about the same time John W. Brown conveyed to Sam B. Brown all his interest in the 200-acre tract. The widow, Rachel Catherine Brown, likewise at the same time made a deed to Sam B. covering the 200-acre tract. Under the will of the husband she had a life estate in this tract. The estate of Benjamin Brown, although not done promptly, was finally administered upon by the widow as executrix under the will. After John W. moved from the farm, the widow remained there some two or three years, and then moved to a nearby town, where she boarded for five years and until the date of her death in 1908.

The plaintiffs, who are the heirs of Rachel Catherine Brown, before mentioned, with the exception of John and Sam, who are defendants, by bill in equity seek to have the deed of March 21, 1887, conveying the home place to John, set aside and canceled and also ask that the said John be required to account for the rents and profits of the land from and after the death of their mother. The grounds upon which the bill seeks the cancellation of this deed are (1) mental incapacity; (2) false and fraudulent representations; (3) undue influence; and (4) coercion. The pleader in the bill clusters around these grounds a mass of supposed facts, stating them in detail, but the gist of the bill is covered as above stated. John Brown answered denying all material allegations of the bill. Sam Brown did not answer. Trial in the circuit court resulted in a finding of the issues for the defendants and the dismissal of plaintiffs' bill. After the filing and overruling of motion for new trial, plaintiffs duly perfected their appeal to this court. The only assignment of error urged is that the court erred in deciding the issues in favor of the defendants and in dismissing plaintiffs' bill in equity.

1. It is urged that the grantor was mentally incapacitated to make the deed in question. The plaintiffs' evidence upon this question tended to show that in 1881 the grantor in this deed, Mrs. Brown, suffered from a paralytic stroke, and was thereafter physically and mentally weak. This evidence, with but slight exceptions, comes from plaintiffs alone. Their testimony is quite damaging upon all the grounds stated. In many instances it is so strong as would excite suspicion as to its verity. By the plaintiffs Mrs. Brown is made a nervous wreck after this alleged stroke of paralysis. On the other hand, however, her neighbors and friends of many years standing were called. Her several attending physicians were called, and none of them observed any evidence of a paralytic stroke. The overwhelming evidence is that whilst physically Mrs. Brown was not what might be called a robust woman, but, on the contrary, was rather frail, yet she was a woman possessed of a sound business mind, and rather inclined to hold out to the last for her views of a situation. Upon the question of mental capacity, the chancellor nisi could not have done otherwise than find as he did. He was, under the evidence, forced to find that she was possessed of full mental capacity at the making of this deed.

2. Upon the question of coercion, the testimony is, to say the least, conflicting. Defendants testify positively that there was none, and plaintiffs testify to some circumstances which might be said indicated that there was such action upon the part of the defendants. In this, too, their testimony would appear to be largely overdrawn. The whole family seemed to be possessed of some temper, and plaintiffs appear much overwrought in their demeanor upon the witness stand. None of them visited their mother after the year 1887. About that time an inventory was taken of the father's estate by the mother, and the plaintiffs openly charged the mother with making a false inventory. The father had by his will cut out the grandchildren, for the reason, as stated in a codicil to the will, that he had given their mother all of his estate that he intended to go to her. The plaintiffs insisted on their mother ignoring the will, and dividing the estate between them all equally. It would seem that at least part of the plaintiffs were of the impression that the whole 527 acres of land belonged to the estate, but on the taking of the belated inventory the real situation was discovered. This seemed to...