Brown v. Carolina Emergency Physicians

• Decision Date: 17 December 2001
• Docket Number: No. 3420.,3420.
• Citation: 348 S.C. 569,560 S.E.2d 624
• Parties: Chris BROWN, as Personal Representative of his Deceased Son, Nathan Andrew Brown, Appellant, v. CAROLINA EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, P.A., Respondent. Chris Brown, Appellant, v. Carolina Emergency Physicians, P.A., Respondent. Donna Williams Brown, Appellant, v. Carolina Emergency Medicine, P.A., J. Benjamin Crumpler, M.D., and Greenville Hospital System, Respondents.
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals

348 S.C. 569

560 S.E.2d 624

Chris BROWN, as Personal Representative of his Deceased Son, Nathan Andrew Brown, Appellant, v. CAROLINA EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, P.A., Respondent.

Chris Brown, Appellant, v. Carolina Emergency Physicians, P.A., Respondent.

Donna Williams Brown, Appellant, v. Carolina Emergency Medicine, P.A., J. Benjamin Crumpler, M.D., and Greenville Hospital System, Respondents.

No. 3420.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard September 6, 2001.

Decided December 17, 2001.

Rehearing Denied March 29, 2002.

H. Stanley Feldman, of N. Charleston; and Kelley M. Braithwaite, of Columbia, for appellants.

Sally M. Purnell, of Haynsworth, Marion, McKay & Guerard, and E. Brown Parkinson, Jr., both of Greenville, for respondents. CURETON, Judge:

In these medical malpractice actions, Donna Brown, Chris Brown, individually, and Chris Brown, as Personal Representative of Nathan Andrew Brown (Appellants¹), appeal the circuit court orders granting summary judgment to Greenville Hospital System, Dr. Benjamin Crumpler, and Carolina Emergency Medicine, P.A. Appellants allege that Dr. Crumpler's negligent failure to adequately treat and/or failure to hospitalize Donna Brown for psychiatric problems resulted in the beating death of sixteen-month-old Nathan Brown. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In April of 1994, Chris Brown noticed a gradual change in the behavior of his wife, Donna. Donna's usual level of activity decreased and she became lethargic. The family had just moved into a new house. Rather than helping Chris, Donna sat around "not doing anything." Chris testified Donna seemed "depressed."

Chris, a member of the National Guard, was scheduled to depart for a two-week annual training session in New Mexico. Due to his concern for Donna, he requested permission of his commanding officer to stay home. The commanding officer required Chris to obtain a doctor's statement certifying that Donna needed Chris at home. When Donna arrived home on Friday, April 29, 1994, Chris took her to the emergency room at Greenville Memorial Hospital, an affiliate of Greenville Hospital System, to obtain the doctor's statement.

Dr. Crumpler examined Donna in the emergency room of Greenville Memorial Hospital and diagnosed her as suffering from acute delusional psychosis. Crumpler suggested Donna be hospitalized. Neither Chris nor Donna wanted to admit Donna to the hospital. Chris assured Crumpler he would care for Donna at home and bring her back if any problems developed before Monday. Before releasing Donna, Crumpler contacted an adult female family friend and asked her about Donna and the Brown home situation. Based on this conversation, Crumpler believed the plans for Donna were satisfactory. Crumpler gave Chris a note stating he should be excused from Guard duty and advised Chris to take Donna to the Mental Health Center on Monday for follow-up evaluation and treatment. Crumpler prescribed Vistaril.

The next day, Saturday, Chris thought Donna seemed better. By Sunday morning, Donna appeared strangely energetic; she raced around the house singing a hymn. Chris found this disturbing and attempted to get Donna to slow down. He tried to physically restrain Donna's movement. To Chris's surprise, Donna suddenly fell asleep in the middle of struggling with him. Chris took Donna to the bedroom where she remained for approximately thirty minutes. Meanwhile, the Browns' sons, Adam, four, and Nathan, sixteen months, were in the front room of the house.

When Donna awoke, she seemed agitated. Donna resumed walking around the house, singing religious songs. When Donna asked Chris for the key to a shed on their property, Chris refused, fearing for Donna's safety. Donna became angry and repeatedly hit Chris with a rod from the closet. A violent struggle ensued during which Donna struck Chris with the rod, told Chris she hated him, and threatened to kill him.

As Donna and Chris struggled, Adam gave Chris a pipe bender, which Chris thought he could use to pin Donna's arms behind her. In the middle of the struggle, Donna suddenly went limp again and seemed to be asleep. Chris released her and went into the kitchen to call 911. While Chris was on the phone, Donna beat Nathan to death.

Prosecutors charged Donna with murder and two counts of assault and battery with intent to kill. At Donna's criminal nonjury trial, Dr. Larry Montgomery testified Donna is a paranoid schizophrenic who was unable to distinguish between moral and legal right and moral and legal wrong when she killed Nathan. Montgomery opined Donna was not criminally responsible for her actions under the M'Naughten test.² He agreed that Donna had not exhibited any violent behavior prior to her examination by Dr. Crumpler in the emergency room on April 29, 1994. The State stipulated Donna was not guilty by reason of insanity. At the conclusion of the trial, the court found Donna not guilty by reason of insanity.

After the criminal trial, Donna Brown, Chris Brown, as Personal Representative of Nathan Brown, and Chris Brown, individually, filed actions against Dr. Crumpler, Greenville Hospital System, and Carolina Emergency Medicine. They alleged Dr. Crumpler negligently failed to properly diagnose, treat, and hospitalize Donna, causing her to kill her son by beating him to death on May 1, 1994.³

The majority of these actions were subsequently dismissed. The trial court dismissed Chris Brown's actions (both individual and as Personal Representative of Nathan Brown) against Dr. Crumpler and the Greenville Hospital System finding they were filed after the expiration of the statute of limitations. The court denied the motion for summary judgment as to Carolina Emergency Medicine finding it was timely served under the statute of limitations.

The trial court denied Respondents' motion for summary judgment on Donna's claims finding genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether Donna's insanity tolled the statute of limitations during the period of her disability.

The trial court subsequently granted summary judgment on Chris Brown's action against Carolina Emergency Medical and on all of Donna's actions. As to Appellants' allegations of a failure to hospitalize Donna, the court concluded Appellants did not demonstrate a basis for involuntary commitment. In addressing Appellants' allegations of inadequate treatment, the court found Appellants did not show a violation of any standard of medical care which was most probably the proximate cause of any injury. It is from these rulings that Donna and Chris Brown appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"Summary judgment is appropriate when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the conclusions and inferences to be drawn from the facts are undisputed." Etheredge v. Richland Sch. Dist. One, 341 S.C. 307, 311, 534 S.E.2d 275, 277 (2000). "In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the evidence and the inferences which can be drawn therefrom should be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id.

LAW/ANALYSIS

Issues on Appeal

I. Did the court err in granting summary judgment on the ground no evidence existed supporting an involuntary commitment?

II. Did the court err in excluding Dr. Nagelberg's affidavit?

III. Did the court err in granting summary judgment on the ground Appellants failed to meet the "most probably" proximate causation threshold?

IV. Should this court affirm the trial court based on Respondents' additional sustaining grounds?

I. Involuntary Commitment

Appellants contend the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the ground no evidence existed to support Donna's need for involuntary hospitalization. We disagree.

In his reply affidavit, Crumpler asserted the only way he could have admitted Donna, given her refusal to be hospitalized, would have been through an involuntary commitment proceeding. An involuntary commitment requires:

(1) [a] written affidavit under oath by a person stating:

(a) a belief that the person is mentally ill and because of this condition is likely to cause serious harm to himself or others if not immediately hospitalized;

(b) the specific type of serious harm thought probable if the person is not immediately hospitalized and the factual basis for this belief (2) a certification in triplicate by at least one licensed physician stating that the physician has examined the person and is of the opinion that the person is mentally ill and because of this condition is likely to cause harm to himself through neglect, inability to care for himself, or personal injury, or otherwise, or to others if not immediately hospitalized. The certification must contain the grounds for the opinion.

S.C.Code Ann. § 44-17-410 (Supp.2000).

Appellants argued that Crumpler's "diagnosis itself [is] grounds for involuntary commitment." The clear language of the statute, however, requires more than a diagnosis of mental illness to justify the extreme measure of involuntary commitment. This accords with the general rule:

A mental illness or disorder is not, alone, sufficient to justify a commitment, or deprivation of liberty or privacy. Individuals may not be civilly committed involuntarily or deprived of their liberty or privacy unless they pose a danger to themselves or to others, or are gravely or greatly disabled, and neglect, refuse, or are unable to care for themselves or to provide for their basic needs or to protect their lives or health. A state may not confine individuals involuntarily if they are dangerous to no one and capable of surviving safely in freedom alone or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends.

56 C.J.S. Mental Health § 49a (1992).

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Appellants, there is no evidence that the statutory requirements for involuntary commitment were present in this case. Chris assured Crumpler he would take care of Donna if she was not...