Brown v. City of Dallas

• Decision Date: 04 April 1974
• Docket Number: No. 18319,18319
• Citation: 508 S.W.2d 134
• Parties: Glaydell F. BROWN, Appellant, v. CITY OF DALLAS, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 134

508 S.W.2d 134

Glaydell F. BROWN, Appellant, v. CITY OF DALLAS, Appellee.

No. 18319.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas,

Dallas.

April 4, 1974.

J. Michael Tibbals, G. Frank Brown, Dallas, for appellant.

N. Alex Bickley, City Atty., Gary B. Hall, Asst. City Atty., Dallas, for appellee.

CLAUDE WILLIAMS, Chief Justice.

The City of Dallas, for and in behalf of the Dallas Independent School District, brought this action against Glaydell F. Brown to recover delinquent ad valorem taxes for the years of 1971 and 1972 on a 1968 Bonanza aircraft owned by Brown. The City filed its motion for summary judgment supported by a certified copy of the delinquent tax rolls of the City of Dallas showing the delinquent taxes due on the property in question to the Dallas Independent School District by Brown for the years 1971 and 1972. Also supporting the motion for summary judgment was the affidavit of the Director of Revenue and Taxation for the City of Dallas, certifying the correctness of the assessment and the levy of texas on the property in question for those years and certifying the exact amount of said taxes due. Brown's answer to the City's motion was supported by his personal affidavit. The trial court sustained the City's motion and rendered judgment against Brown for the delinquent taxes due, penalty and interest, in the total sum of $394.76. From such judgment Brown perfects this appeal.

Appellant concedes in his brief that the City of Dallas established a prima facie case entitling it to recover judgment for the delinquent taxes due by introducing as summary-judgment evidence, certified copies of the appropriate delinquent tax records of the City of Dallas. Alamo Barge Lines, Inc. v. City of Houston, 453 S.W.2d 132 (Tex.1970). Appellant also concedes that once having established this prima facie case the burden of introducing evidence to show that the airplane in question had acquired a tax situs in another jurisdiction then shifts to the taxpayer. Lawson v. City of Groves,487 S.W.2d 439 (Tex.Civ.App.--Beaumont 1972, no writ). Therefore, the question presented to us is whether appellant Brown, through the medium of his affidavit in opposition to the City's motion for summary judgment, has presented sufficient evidence to create questions of fact concerning the taxable situs of the property within the Dallas Independent School District. We hold that appellant taxpayer has not met this burden.

Since appellant seeks to negate the prima facie case made by appellee City solely on the basis of the contents of his affidavit in opposition to the City's motion, we think it essential to summarize the contents of said affidavit. The affidavit begins with the following statement:

For the year 1971 and until April of 1972, I was the owner of N7150N 1968 E33 Bonanza aircraft which was registered in my name at 9767 Wisterwood, Dallas, Texas, which is located in the Richardson Independent School District of the City of Richardson, Dallas County, Texas. I am a taxpayer and pay school taxes to the Richardson Independent School District.

The affidavit then relates that in 1971 and 1972 Brown rented a hangar at Addison Airport but did not keep the aircraft hangared there at all times. He said that he owned an apartment at Nueces County, Texas; that he had many business activities in Corpus Christi and other parts of Texas and the United States 'where I rent hangar facilities.' He went on to relate that he had parked his airplane at Victoria, Rockport, Rocksprings, Rockwall, Airpark, Kerrville, Sulphur Springs, Bonham, Athens, Junction and other places in Texas. He said he hangared his airplane in Corpus Christi for over two weeks about the middle of January 1972. He said:

There is nothing permanent in the location of my airplane merely because I have a hangar at Addison Airport. The aircraft were (sic) not hangared at Addison Airport for enough time to be considered part of the general mass of property in Addison. In fact, the aircraft have (sic) not been in any one place for a sufficient amount of time to be fairly considered part of the general mass of property of any certain area. Airplanes which are used as frequently as I use my planes simply do not have the permanent character or nature, and therefore are not part of the general mass of property of any limited area except perhaps the North American Continent or the United States.

Appellant contends this case is controlled by the doctrine of Mobilia sequuntur personam. This doctrine was announced by our supreme court in Great Southern Life Ins. Co. v. City...