Brown v. Colegio De Abogados De Puerto Rico, Civil No. 06-1645 (JP).

• Decision Date: 26 September 2008
• Docket Number: Civil No. 06-1645 (JP).
• Citation: 579 F.Supp.2d 211
• Parties: Herbert W. BROWN III, et al., Plaintiffs v. COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS DE PUERTO RICO, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

Page 211

579 F.Supp.2d 211

Herbert W. BROWN III, et al., Plaintiffs v. COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS DE PUERTO RICO, Defendant.

Civil No. 06-1645 (JP).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

September 26, 2008.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ada Sofía Esteves, Esq., David C. Indiano-Vicic, Esq., Indiano & Williams, PSC, Andrés W. López, Esq., Andrés W. López Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Harold D. Vicente-González, Esq., Nelson N. Córdova-Morales, Esq., Vicente & Cuebas, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

JAIME PIERAS, JR., Senior District Judge.

Before the Court is Plaintiffs Herbert W. Brown, III, José L. Ubarri, and David W. Román's (collectively, "Plaintiffs") motion for summary judgment (Nos. 13 and 14) and Defendant Colegio de Abogados (the "Colegio") opposition thereto (No. 70), as well as Plaintiffs' reply brief (No. 73). Plaintiffs filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") for violations of their rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of United States Constitution. Plaintiffs allege that the Colegio, an integrated bar association¹ in Puerto Rico, used approximately forty percent of each attorney's annual dues to purchase a compulsory life insurance policy. Plaintiffs argue that this expenditure was not germane to the purposes justifying an integrated bar association. Plaintiffs now move the Court for summary judgment, arguing that the Colegio is barred by the doctrine of non-mutual collateral estoppel from re-litigating the constitutionality of its compulsory life insurance policy since an earlier decision by this Court found the policy to be unconstitutional. For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment (Nos. 13 and 14) is hereby GRANTED.

I. MATERIAL FACTS NOT IN GENUINE ISSUE OR DISPUTE

The following facts are deemed uncontested by the Court because they were included in the motion for summary judgment and opposition and were agreed upon, or they were properly supported by evidence and not genuinely opposed.²

1. Since the Colegio is an integrated bar association, all members of the plaintiff class are required to be members of the Colegio as a precondition to practicing law in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

2. Member of the Colegio are required to pay annual dues in the amount of $200.00.

3. A portion of the annual dues charged by the Colegio is used to pay for a compulsory life insurance plan.

4. For the year 2006, the compulsory life insurance plan cost each attorney $78.00 of his or her $200.00 annual dues—almost forty percent of the total dues.

5. In 1994, Carlos A. Romero, Jr. ("Romero") brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico asserting, inter alia, that the Colegio's mandatory life insurance program is not germane to the purposes that justify an integrated bar association.

6. On February 25, 1999, the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico granted summary judgment in the Colegio's favor.

7. Romero appealed the grant of summary judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, and the First Circuit reversed and remanded the case back to the District Court, with instructions to certify a question to the Puerto Rico Supreme Court.

8. On remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the District Court certified the following question to the Puerto Rico Supreme Court: "Is the Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico authorized to compel members to purchase life insurance coverage through the Colegio as a condition of membership in the bar of Puerto Rico?"

9. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico answered the certified question in the affirmative, stating that the Colegio is authorized, pursuant to Puerto Rico law, to compel its members to pay for life insurance from their annual dues.

10. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, however, did not address Romero's arguments pursuant to the United States Constitution regarding the Colegio's mandatory life insurance plan.

11. On October 9, 2002, after eight years of litigation, the United States District Court (J. Saris, sitting by designation), issued a Memorandum and Order concluding that "... the mandatory life insurance plan is not germane [to the purposes of the Colegio], and that Romero may not be forced to pay for it through his membership dues."

12. The District Court granted Romero a permanent injunction against the Colegio prohibiting the Colegio from collecting "that portion of [Romero's] annual dues attributable to the Colegio's mandatory group life insurance program."

13. The District Court also awarded Romero damages as a result of the Colegio's unconstitutional taking of his money to pay for the compulsory life insurance policy, as well as interest and attorneys' fees.

14. The Colegio sought to appeal the District Court's judgment, but later voluntarily dismissed the appeal before it reached the briefing stage.

15. The Colegio was aware of the District Court's October 9, 2002, Memorandum and Order and ensuing Judgment in the Romero case upon notification, since it was a party to that litigation.

16. The Colegio did not specifically notify its membership of the District Court's ruling and of the unconstitutionality of its compulsory life insurance program, however the decision was mentioned in the Treasurer's Report for the years 2003 and 2004.

17. On November 30, 2005, a group of five attorneys wrote a letter to the Colegio, through its President Julio Fontanet, Esq., directing the Colegio to stop charging them that portion of their annual dues attributable to the mandatory life insurance program.

18. On February 2, 2006, the Colegio sent a letter in response stating that it would return to each of the five attorneys the $78.00 used for the purchase of compulsory life insurance, under three "conditions":

(a) The authorization was for the current year (2006), because the Colegio's Board supposedly could not bind the new Board that would take office in September 2006. As a result, the Colegio stated, the attorneys would be forced to make additional requests come dues-paying time for the 2007 fiscal year and every year thereafter;

(b) The Colegio's action supposedly could not be deemed as a precedent for future cases;

(c) The premium for the compulsory life insurance in 2006 was $78.00, and could change the following year.

19. On February 23, 2006, the group of five attorneys wrote the Colegio and rejected each and every one of the preconditions that the Colegio wished to impose upon them before it returned to each of them the $78.00 used for the purchase of compulsory life insurance.

20. On February 27, 2006, a second group of eight attorneys wrote a letter to the Colegio requesting the return of the portion of their dues attributable to the purchase of compulsory life insurance, and directing the Colegio to stop charging them that portion based on the Romero decision.

21. On March 3, 2006, the Colegio sent out letters to the attorneys in the first group of five attorneys, along with individual checks for $78.00 each.

22. The group of eight attorneys were reimbursed with the unearned premium of their coverage in the life insurance program for the year 2006 after the matter was submitted by the Colegio to the Review Board.

23. On April 20, 2006, the Colegio wrote a letter to the group of eight attorneys, informing them that it had filed a petition before a state-based "Review Board," which named the attorneys that composed the group of eight (along with six others) in the caption. As to these attorneys, the Colegio asked the Review Board to advise whether the Colegio, instead of returning the compulsory insurance premium, could provide the attorneys with vouchers to be used in Colegio seminars, to purchase Colegio-issued books or materials, or to enroll the attorneys in the Colegio's optional health or disability insurance plans.

24. Membership dues for attorneys who are seventy-five years or older and have been admitted to practice law in Puerto Rico for twenty-five years or more are reduced by fifty percent.

25. Dues for the Colegio's members must be paid by January 31 of each year.

26. Plaintiffs never filed an objection before the Colegio regarding their participation in the life insurance program nor did they ask to be reimbursed with the portion of their annual membership dues destined to fund their coverage in the life insurance program.

27. On October 14, 2006, the Colegio's new Governing Board ratified the agreement taken by the previous Board to cancel the life insurance program paid with a portion of the annual membership dues starting from December 31, 2006.

28. Since the discontinuance of the life insurance program offered by the Colegio in 2006, no portion of the annual membership dues paid by its members has been used to pay for such a program.

II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment serves to assess the proof to determine if there is a genuine need for trial. Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir.1990). Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate when "the record, including the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reveals no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Zambrana-Marrero v. Suarez-Cruz, 172 F.3d 122, 125 (1st Cir.1999) (stating that summary judgment is appropriate when, after evaluating the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the evidence "fails to yield a trial worthy issue as to some material fact"); Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 985 F.2d 1113, 1116 (1st Cir.1993); Canal Ins. Co. v. Benner, 980 F.2d 23, 25 (1st Cir.1992). The Supreme Court has stated that "only...