Brown v. County of Jefferson

• Decision Date: 11 June 2021
• Docket Number: 9:20-CV-1192 (GLS/ATB)
• Parties: MARK JAMES BROWN, SR., Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF JEFFERSON et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

MARK JAMES BROWN, SR., Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF JEFFERSON et al., Defendants.

No. 9:20-CV-1192 (GLS/ATB)

United States District Court, N.D. New York

June 11, 2021

MARK JAMES BROWN, SR., PLAINTIFF, PRO SE

ANDREW J. KOWALEWSKI, ESQ., ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT GUILFOYLE AMBULANCE SERVICE, INC.

REPORT-RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER

ANDREW T. BAXTER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter has been referred to me for Report and Recommendation by the Honorable Gary L. Sharpe, United States Senior District Judge. On September 29, 2020, plaintiff commenced this civil action against, inter alia, Guilfoyle Ambulance Service, Inc. (“Guilfoyle”). (Complaint (“Compl.”)) (Dkt. No. 1). By Decision and Order dated January 4, 2021, Judge Sharpe dismissed several defendants and causes of action pursuant to 28 U.S.C §§ 1915, 1915A. (Dkt. No. 8).

Presently before this court is Guilfoyle's motion to dismiss plaintiff's state law medical malpractice claim against it.^[1] (Dkt. No. 13). Plaintiff has not filed a response to Guilfoyle's motion, despite being afforded several extensions of time to do so. (Dkt. Nos. 15, 16, 25, 26). For the reasons set forth below, I recommend that the district court grant Guilfoyle's motion to dismiss plaintiff's state law medical malpractice claim. I further recommend that the district court dismiss, sua sponte, plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment deliberate medical indifference claim against Guilfoyle for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and effectively order that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety as against Guilfoyle.

I. Facts

In his prior order, Judge Sharpe summarized the facts as stated in plaintiff's complaint. (Dkt. No. 8 at 3-5). The court will briefly review the facts as necessary to discuss the causes of actions asserted against Guilfoyle.

On July 5, 2019, plaintiff ran a red light and immediately noticed that a police vehicle had turned on its lights behind him, signaling for plaintiff to stop his vehicle. (Compl. at 9). Plaintiff stopped his vehicle and began to flee on foot. (Id.). He was eventually apprehended by non-moving defendant Jefferson County Sheriff Deputy Keefer, at which time plaintiff alleges that, among other things, Deputy Keefer “twisted [plaintiff's] arm while face down and both hands behind [his] back.” (Id.). Plaintiff heard three cracks in his arm “as [his] arm went limp.” (Id.).

Plaintiff was transported to Jefferson County Jail. (Id. at 10). Within one hour of arriving, defendant Guilfoyle Ambulance Service, Inc.“arrived and examined [plaintiff's] arm and determined there were no abnormalities.” (Id.). Plaintiff has attached to his complaint a patient care report describing the extent of treatment provided by the Guilfoyle paramedics. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 4-6). The report states, in part, that “after an assessment, [plaintiff] did not have any life threatening injuries. [Plaintiff] stated that he did not wish to be taken to the hospital.” (Id. at 6). In a sworn deposition attached to the complaint, and in a handwritten note on the records of the ambulance company, plaintiff denied that he ever refused medical treatment. (Id. at 1, 6).

III. § 1983 Claim

A. Legal Standard

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may not preside over cases if subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 700 (2d Cir. 2000). Lack of subject matter cannot be waived and may be raised at any time or by the court sua sponte. Id.; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). “If subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, the action must be dismissed.” Lussier, 211 F.3d at 700-01; see also Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007) (“Federal courts must determine that they have jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits.”).

In the context of federal civil rights claims, § 1983 “is apposite only when the person against whom the provision is invoked has acted ‘under color of' law. It is well-established that this jurisdictional prerequisite is congruent to the ‘state action' concept.” Perez v. Sugarman, 499 F.2d 761, 764 (2d Cir. 1974). Private parties are generally not state actors, and are therefore not usually liable under § 1983. Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)); see also Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties . . . .”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The absence of state action in a § 1983 case is a jurisdictional defect. Id.; Robinson v. Bergstrom, 579 F.2d 401, 404 (7th Cir. 1978) (“[W]here state action is found lacking, the section 1983 complaint is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”), overruled on other grounds, Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981); see also Schlein v. Milford Hosp., Inc., 561 F.2d 427, 427 (2d Cir. 1977) (affirming subject matter jurisdiction dismissal based in part on lack of “ ‘state action' within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Joseph v. Ulster Cty. Cmty. Action Comm. Inc., 475 F.Supp. 944, 948 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (“Because we find that there was no state action, we conclude that this Court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim under § 1983.”).

Notwithstanding the general rule as cited above, the actions of a nominally private entity may be attributable to the state for purposes of a § 1983 action when: “(1) the entity acts pursuant to the ‘coercive power' of the state or is ‘controlled' by the state (‘the compulsion test'); (2) when the state provides ‘significant encouragement' to the entity, the entity is a ‘willful participant in joint activity with the [s]tate,' or the entity's functions are ‘entwined' with state policies (‘the joint action test' or ‘close nexus test'); or (3) when the entity ‘has been delegated a public function by the [s]tate,' (‘the public function test').” Caballero v. Shayna, No. 18-CV-1627, 2019 WL 2491717, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 2019) (citing Sybalski v. Indep. Grp. Home Living Program, Inc., 546 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 2008)). “The fundamental question under each test is whether the private entity's challenged actions are ‘fairly attributable' to the state.” Id. (quoting Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 207 (2d Cir. 2012)).

B. Application

Plaintiff is suing Guilfoyle Ambulance Service, Inc., a corporation operating out of Watertown, New York which holds itself out to be the “oldest continually run commercial ambulance service” in the country.^[2] Plaintiff does not allege any facts suggesting that Guilfoyle is a publicly operated entity. Nor has plaintiff alleged facts suggesting that Guilfoyle may be considered a state actor under any of the aforementioned exceptions, or describing how Guilfoyle's actions are otherwise “fairly attributable to the state.” Because plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that Guilfoyle acted under color of state law, the complaint fails to state a claim for relief against the ambulance company under § 1983. See, e.g., Grogan v. Blooming Grove Volunteer Ambulance Corps, 768 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 2014) (private volunteer ambulance organization that contracted with a municipality to provide emergency medical services was not a state actor subject to § 1983 liability under any of the relevant exceptions). Considering the absence of any alleged state action, the district court should dismiss, sua sponte, plaintiff's § 1983 deliberate medical indifference claim against Guilfoyle.

II. State Law Medical Malpractice Claim

A. Legal Standards

1. Motion to Dismiss

To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, ” do not suffice. Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555). Plaintiff's factual allegations must also be sufficient to give the defendant “‘fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted).

When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted); Int'l Audiotext Network, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 62 F.3d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1995). The court must heed its particular obligation to treat pro se pleadings with liberality. Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2005); Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam).

In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court may review documents integral to the complaint upon which the plaintiff relied in drafting his pleadings, as well as any documents attached to the complaint as exhibits and any statements or documents incorporated into the complaint by reference. Rothman v Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2000); Int'l Audiotext Network, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 62 F.3d at 72 (the court may take into consideration documents referenced in or attached to the complaint in deciding a motion to dismiss, without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment). Finally, the court may consider matters of which judicial notice may be taken, such as public filings and administrative decisions. See Kavowras v. New York Times, Co., 328 F.3d 50, 57 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing inter alia County Vanlines, Inc. v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 148, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (taking judicial notice of NLRB decisions)). See also ...