Brown v. Darden
| Decision Date | 25 May 1932 |
| Docket Number | No. 6184.,6184. |
| Citation | 50 S.W.2d 261 |
| Parties | BROWN et al. v. DARDEN. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Albert Sidney Johnson, of Dallas, W. J. Embrey, of Brenham, and C. R. Kennon and Clinton G. Brown, both of San Antonio, for appellants.
C. L. Bell, of San Antonio, Lamar Gill, of Raymondville, and Bailey, Nickels & Bailey, of Dallas, for appellee.
Thos. B. Love, of Dallas, amicus curiæ.
Certified question from the Court of Civil Appeals of the Fourth Supreme Judicial District in an appeal from the district court of Bexar county in the Ninety-Fourth judicial district.
The state Democratic executive committee on March 9, 1932, adopted a resolution which reads: "Be it resolved; That in the ensuing Democratic primary election nominations of candidates for congressmen at large shall be by a majority vote of those lawfully participating in such primary; that three places shall be designated on the official ballot, and each candidate shall be required to designate the place for which he seeks a nomination; and failing to secure a majority vote therefor in the first primary, a second primary shall be held and nomination effected in the same manner and way for each designated place as is now prescribed for candidates for the nomination of the party for the office of Governor in the state of Texas."
Thereafter Mrs. Ida M. Darden presented to the chairman of said committee a request, accompanied by tender of the proper fee, to have her name placed on the Democratic primary ballots, without further designation of the office for which she sought nomination than as the office of Congressman at Large. The request strictly complied with subdivisions 1 and 2 of article 3111 of the Revised Civil Statutes of Texas.
The committee advised Mrs. Darden that, unless she designated whether she was a candidate for the nomination for Congressman at Large No. 1, or Congressman at Large No. 2, or Congressman at Large No. 3, the committee at its meeting to be held on the second Monday in June would refuse to place her name on the official primary ballots. Mrs. Darden refused to comply with the executive committee's resolution or request to further designate the place for which she was a candidate, but instead instituted a suit against the members of the committee to compel the certification on the second Monday in June of her name in order that it might appear on the Democratic primary ballots in accordance with her request as filed.
The district court on an agreed statement of the foregoing facts adjudged the committee's resolution to be void, and ordered the members of the committee to accept Mrs. Darden's request and to direct their chairman to certify her name for a place on the primary ballots as a candidate for the Democratic nomination for Congressman at Large without further designation of such office.
The members of the committee having duly appealed from the judgment of the district court, the honorable Court of Civil Appeals of the Fourth Supreme Judicial District has certified to the Supreme Court for its determination the following question: "Did the State Executive Committee have the right, power and authority to adopt and enforce the method prescribed in the said resolution (which designated three numerical places) for the nomination of candidates for congressman at large from this state?"
The court answers the question, "Yes."
The only federal statute attempting to regulate party nominations for Congressman at Large, which is relevant to our inquiry, reads as follows: "Candidates for Representative or Representatives to be elected at large in any State shall be nominated in the same manner as candidates for governor, unless otherwise provided by the laws of such State." USCA, title 2, § 5.
There is no necessity for any determination as to whether this statute is void under the reasoning in the opinions in cases like Newberry v. United States, 256 U. S. 232, 41 S. Ct. 469, 65 L. Ed. 913; for by the very terms of the federal statute, where a state has enacted laws governing such nominations, they must control, and we have reached the conclusion that the statutes of Texas require and support the action of the state Democratic executive committee.
At the outset we are confronted by the fact that Mrs. Darden rests her case on the proposition that article 3111 of the Revised Civil Statutes of Texas does govern the office to which she seeks the Democratic nomination. The contention in her behalf is that the state committee should be compelled to certify her name for a place on the primary ballot, on her request, because such request fulfills the requirements of article 3111, to which requirements no addition nor subtraction can lawfully be allowed. Yet, if article 3111 does govern, it is solely for the reason that within its meaning the office of Congressman at Large is a state office. For article 3111 relates to no one save to a candidate for a party's nomination "for any state office." Obviously the words "state office" have the same meaning in article 3111 as in article 3102, dealing with the same subject-matter of party primary nominations. And in article 3102 it is distinctly provided that "no person shall be declared the nominee of any political party at any primary election for any State * * * office unless he * * * has received a majority of all the votes cast at such primary elections for all candidates for such office." So we cannot accept as sound Mrs. Darden's main contention, viz. that article 3111 governs her right to have her name placed on the primary ballots without requiring her to secure "a majority of all the votes cast at such primary election for all candidates" for the office to which she aspires to be nominated. Some such action as...
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...throughout, and where the meaning in one instance is clear, this meaning will be attached in all other instances. Brown v. Darden, 50 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Tex. 1932); Southwest Properties, L.P. v. Lite-Dec of Texas, Inc., 989 S.W.2d 69, 71 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1998, pet. denied); see also Bo......
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