Brown v. Executive 200, Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 December 1980
• Docket Number: No. 80-246,80-246
• Citation: 416 N.E.2d 610,18 O.O.3d 446,64 Ohio St.2d 250
• Parties: , 18 O.O.3d 446 BROWN, Atty. Gen., Appellant, v. EXECUTIVE 200, INC. et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 250

64 Ohio St.2d 250

416 N.E.2d 610, 18 O.O.3d 446

BROWN, Atty. Gen., Appellant, v. EXECUTIVE 200, INC. et al., Appellees.

No. 80-246.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Dec. 30, 1980.

Syllabus by the Court

The standard of proof required in a criminal contempt proceeding is proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

On March 29, 1978, the Attorney General for the state of Ohio filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Allen County requesting a temporary restraining order and preliminary and permanent injunctions to prohibit operation of an illegal pyramid sales scheme in violation of R.C. 1333.91 et seq. The complaint was brought against, inter alia, appellees Executive 200, Inc., Statford Mader, the president of the company, and Richard Savage, a principal promoter of the pyramid sales scheme. A temporary restraining order was issued the next day. Negotiations between the parties resulted in the filing of a Consent Judgment Entry on April 11, 1978, permanently enjoining appellees from engaging in such activities.

On June 21, 1978, the Attorney General filed a show cause order for contempt against appellees alleging that they had violated the April 11th judgment entry, and requesting relief pursuant to the civil penalty provisions in R.C. 1333.94 and 2705.05.

After hearings on the contempt motion, the trial court judge found appellees in contempt for violating the judgment entry. The court imposed a $10,000 fine on appellee Executive 200, Inc., $9,000 of which was to be automatically purged if Executive 200, Inc., would immediately cease and desist from all future violations of the judgment entry and R.C. 1333.91 and 1333.92. Appellee Mader was sentenced to ten days in the Allen County jail, which he could reduce to three days upon the same conditions. Appellee Savage was sentenced to five days in jail, all of which could be purged on the same conditions.

The entire judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeals. It determined that the penalties imposed were of a criminal nature requiring proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that the lower court had erred in applying a clear and convincing standard of proof.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

William J. Brown, Atty. Gen., Alex Shumate and Barbara K. Roman, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellant.

Lawson, Rumer & Smith, Michael A. Rumer and Thomas L. Smith, Lima, for appellees.

PAUL W. BROWN, Justice.

The first issue we must consider is what degree of proof is required for a court to impose a criminal contempt sanction. Appellees contend that in criminal contempt proceedings guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The clear weight of authority requires that a defendant must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt to be punished for criminal contempt. E. g., Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co. (1911), 221 U.S. 418, 31 S.Ct. 492, 55 L.Ed. 797; In re Coleman (1974), 12 Cal.3d 568, 116 Cal.Rptr. 381, 526 P.2d 533; Wilmington v. General Teamsters Local Union 326 (Del.Super.1974), 321 A.2d 123. In Gompers, supra, the United States Supreme Court, at page 444, stated: "(N) otwithstanding the many elements of similarity in procedure and in punishment, there are some differences between the two classes of proceedings which involve substantial rights and constitutional privileges. Without deciding what may be the rule in civil contempt, it is certain that in proceedings for criminal contempt the defendant is presumed to be innocent, (and) he must be proved to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt * * *." (Emphasis added.) This language was cited with approval in Bloom v. Illinois (1968), 391 U.S. 194, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522, wherein the court further stated, at page 201, that "criminal contempt is a crime in every fundamental respect * * *." Also, as we recently stated in State v. Kilbane (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 201, 205, 400 N.E.2d 386: "The most important consequences arising from this classification of contempts is that many of the significant constitutional safeguards required in criminal trials are also required in criminal contempt proceedings." Therefore, we now hold that the standard of proof required in criminal contempt proceedings is proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and a contemnor cannot be given a criminal contempt sanction unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. ¹

We must now turn to the instant cause and determine if criminal contempt is involved. While appellees concede that an action under R.C. 1333.94 ² is a civil enforcement proceeding, they assert that when such proceedings are filed jointly ³ with contempt proceedings under R.C. 2705.02 et seq., ⁴ the proceedings become criminal in nature. We cannot agree. Contempt proceedings are regarded as sui generis. State v. Timson (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 122, 311 N.E.2d 16. They are neither wholly civil nor wholly criminal actions. Gompers, supra. Rather, "(t)hey bear some resemblance to suits in equity, to criminal proceedings and to ordinary civil actions; but they are none of these." Cincinnati v. Cincinnati District Council 51 (1973), 35 Ohio St.2d 197, at page 202, 299 N.E.2d 686. Therefore, appellees' contention is untenable, since an action brought under R.C. 2705.05 alone may be deemed to be essentially civil in nature. See, e. g., Windham Bank v. Tomaszczyk (1971), 27 Ohio St.2d 55, 271 N.E.2d 815.

Because violation of a prohibitory injunction, as in the instant cause, can amount to both civil and criminal contempt, United States v. United Mine Workers (1947), 330 U.S. 258, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884, it is possible that the trial court imposed both types of sanctions to punish for both the civil and criminal contempt aspects of this cause. For this reason, we will look at the nature of the various penalties imposed in order to determine if they are criminal or civil. Any civil penalties imposed will be valid since the trial judge stated that the appellees were guilty of contempt by clear and convincing evidence. Any criminal sanctions, however, may be invalid since the standard of proof for criminal penalties may not have been met here. Indeed, it is possible that there was sufficient uncontroverted evidence for the trial judge to find appellees guilty of contempt beyond a reasonable doubt, but we cannot be certain of this because the trial judge stated in his findings of fact that appellees were guilty of contempt by clear and convincing evidence.

While both types of contempt contain an element of punishment, courts distinguish criminal and civil contempt not on the basis of punishment, but rather, by the character and purpose of the punishment. Gompers, supra; Kilbane, supra. Punishment is remedial or coercive and for the benefit of the complainant in civil contempt. Prison sentences are conditional. The contemnor is said to carry the keys of his prison in his own pocket, In re Nevitt (C.A. 8, 1902), 117 F. 448, 461, since he will be freed if he agrees to do as ordered. Criminal contempt, on the other hand, is usually characterized by an unconditional prison sentence. Such imprisonment operates not as a remedy coercive in its nature but as punishment for the completed act of disobedience, and to vindicate the authority of the law and the court. See, generally, Gompers, supra; Bd. of Edn. v. Brunswick Edn. Assn. (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 290, 401 N.E.2d 440; State v. Local Union 5760 (1961), 172 Ohio St. 75, at 82-83, 173 N.E.2d 331. Therefore, to determine if the sanctions in the instant cause were criminal or civil in nature, it is necessary to determine the purpose behind each sanction: was it to coerce the appellees to obey the consent judgment decree, or was it to punish them for past violations?

As to appellee Executive 200, the civil penalty provisions of R.C. 1333.94 specifically authorize courts to impose fines of up to $5,000 for each day of violation of an injunction prohibiting the...