Coleman, In re

• Citation: 526 P.2d 533,116 Cal.Rptr. 381,12 Cal.3d 568
• Decision Date: 20 September 1974
• Docket Number: Cr. 17387
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Parties: , 526 P.2d 533, 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2386, 75 Lab.Cas. P 53,503 In re Thomas COLEMAN et al., on habeas corpus. In Bank

Page 381

116 Cal.Rptr. 381

12 Cal.3d 568, 526 P.2d 533, 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2386,

75 Lab.Cas. P 53,503

In re Thomas COLEMAN et al., on habeas corpus.

Cr. 17387.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Sept. 20, 1974.

Levy, Van Bourg & Hackler, Victor J. Van Bourg and Stewart Weinberg, San Francisco, for petitioners.

Severson, Werson, Berke & Melchior, Nathan R. Berke and J. Mark Montobbio, San Francisco, for respondents.

MOSK, Justice.

In this proceeding for a writ of habeas corpus we issued an order to show cause in response to allegations that petitioners had been adjudged in contempt of court for violating a temporary restraining order without sufficient evidence to support such a finding. Upon a thorough review of the record, we conclude the judgment was warranted as to certain petitioners, but not as to others.

Petitioners are the Service Employees International Union Local 22, AFL-CIO, also known as the Hospital and Institutional Workers Union Local 22; Thomas Coleman, secretary and chief executive officer of the union's local chapter; William Flagg, local business representative of the union; Gail Zadakis, member of the union; and Sandra LaFoon, employed by the union as a picket.

The hospital workers union involved herein has negotiated employment contracts on behalf of the workers at the Chico Convalescent Hospital since 1962. In June 1972 the hospital was purchased by the partnership of Evison and Doris Dent. Soon thereafter, the Dents proceeded to institute certain abrupt and unilateral changes in the terms and conditions of employment at the hospital, many of which the union suspected were contrary to the collective bargaining agreement then in force. The union responded by filing unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board ¹ and by commencing a strike against the hospital.

The hospital continued to function throughout the strike. Normal operations, however, were hampered by continual outbreaks of violence between striking and nonstriking employees and by considerable physical damage to the hospital itself. As a result, on August 24, 1972, the Dents obtained a temporary restraining order which enjoined the union and its officers, members, and agents from posting more than two pickets at each of the three entrances to the hospital and from committing any acts of harassment or intimidation against those persons who continued to deal with the hospital.

Despite the temporary restraining order, the atmosphere of violence persisted and mass picketing occurred on a daily basis. Threats and insults were freely exchanged and led to frequent skirmishes. The hospital was subjected to stink bombs and broken windows, words and signs were painted on its exterior walls, and black dye was poured into the lobby.

On September 15, 1972, the Dents obtained a preliminary injunction and an order to show cause why the union and several of its officers, members, and employees should not be held in contempt of court for violating the temporary restraining order. A hearing followed in December 1972, and petitioners herein were found guilty of contempt. (Code Civ.Proc., § 1218.)

Each petitioner was held responsible for 22 separate acts of mass picketing which occurred subsequent to the issuance of the temporary restraining order. In addition, the union and its officers, Coleman and Flagg, were found to have encouraged or participated in numerous acts of violence and intimidation at the site of the picketing. Flagg was found to have committed fix further violations of the restraining order, including incidents of throwing ice and paint, spitting on various hospital representatives, and tailgating the vehicle of a nonstriking hospital nurse. Zadakis was found to have shouted an obscenity at a hospital security guard, and LaFoon was found to have initiated a fight with a nonstriking employee and to have harassed Doris Dent while she was driving her automobile.

The union was ordered to pay a fine of $4,400 for the 22 acts of mass picketing. ² Flagg was sentenced to serve 90 days in county jail and ordered to pay fines of $2,200 for his role in the mass picketing and $2,000 for the 6 additional violations of the restraining order. Coleman was setenced to 30 days in jail and fined $2,200 for the mass picketing. LaFoon was sentenced to serve 30 days and fined $500 for the picketing and $200 for the 2 independent infractions. Zadakis was sentenced to 30 days and fined $250 for the picketing and $50 for the separate violation. ³

Petitioners preliminarily challenge the temporary restraining order on its face as unconstitutionally vague and overly broad. They direct their attack at the order's prohibition of more than two pickets 'at or about' the three entrances to the hospital. Because the precise perimeters of the protected area are not more explicitly detailed in the order, petitioners allege they were never sufficiently warned of what acts might constitute a violation. We believe, however, that the limitation of pickets 'at or about' the entrances to the hospital may be reasonably interpreted so as to have provided adequate notice of the proscribed area and conduct.

Because of the penalties imposed, a proceeding to punish an accused for contempt is criminal in nature, and guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. (Bridges Superior Court (1939) 14 Cal.2d 464, 485, 94 P.2d 983.) Petitioners jointly contend the evidence adduced at the hearing in this case was insufficient to support the judgment of contempt. The power to weigh evidence, however, rests exclusively with the trial court. (In re (Bridges v. Superior Court (1939) 14 Cal.Rptr. 121, 514 P.2d 1201; In re Ciraolo (1969) 70 Cal.2d 389, 394, 74 Cal.Rptr. 865, 450 P.2d 241.) Accordingly, it is well settled that our responsibility upon review is merely to ascertain whether there existed any substantial evidence to sustain the jurisdiction of the trial court. (In re Buckley (1973) supra; In re Ciraolo (1969) supra; Arthur v. Superior Court (1965) 62 Cal.2d 404, 409, 42 Cal.Rptr. 441, 398 P.2d 777; Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court (1940) 15 Cal.2d 99, 115, 98 P.2d 1029; Bridges v. Superior Court (1939) supra; In re Bongfeldt (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 465, 474, 99 Cal.Rptr. 428; Oil Workers Intl., Union v. Superior Court (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 512, 527--528, 230 P.2d 71.)

In applying this standard to the record before us, we find considerable substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the union and its business representative Flagg were directly responsible for those acts of contempt with which they were charged. The testimony and affidavits of the Dents and several witnesses appearing on their behalf convincingly indicate that various union officials,...