Brown v. Garman

• Decision Date: 20 March 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-375,84-375
• Citation: 364 N.W.2d 566
• Parties: 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2773, 116 Lab.Cas. P 56,364 John A. BROWN, Appellant, v. Leroy GARMAN, Defendant, and John R. Baker, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 566

364 N.W.2d 566

121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2773, 116 Lab.Cas. P 56,364

John A. BROWN, Appellant, v. Leroy GARMAN, Defendant and John R. Baker, Appellee.

No. 84-375.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

March 20, 1985.

Thomas S. Mann, Jr., Des Moines, for appellant.

Charles E. Gribble and Becky S. Knutson of Sayre & Gribble, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.

Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and McGIVERIN, SCHULTZ, CARTER and WOLLE, JJ.

WOLLE, Justice.

This interlocutory appeal presents the threshold jurisdictional question whether federal labor relations laws preempt damage claims asserted by a union member against union officials for (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (2) intentional interference with contractual relations and employment opportunities. The district court dismissed both claims on the ground that the preemption doctrine deprives the state court of jurisdiction to decide them. We conclude that federal law preempts only the claim of interference with contractual and employment opportunities, not the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

I. The Pleaded Facts.

The pleadings disclose a long-standing conflict involving a union, two of its officers, and its only black member. Local No. 55 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (the union) bargains collectively with employers to secure agreements on behalf of its members concerning wages, working conditions, and terms of employment. Because the internal regulations of the union specify that it shall serve as "the sole and exclusive source of referral of applicants for employment," members may not independently solicit jobs. Instead, unemployed members seeking employment must register with the union each month, and the union then refers them to available jobs based on their position on the referral list. Defendant John R. Baker (Baker) was the business manager of the union, and defendant Leroy Garman (Garman) its assistant business manager and executive board chairman, during all times pertinent to this case.

Plaintiff John A. Brown (Brown), the sole black member of the local union, brought this action to recover damages from Baker and Garman. Brown's petition alleges that he initially lost his job as an electrician in February of 1982 and immediately sought assistance from the union in securing new employment. He contends that he was not advised of the required referral procedure until September of 1982, even though he regularly visited union headquarters, and that after he registered he was still not referred to jobs. After discovering that Garman had referred himself to a job without first placing himself on the referral list, Brown requested and obtained permission to review the union records. He alleges that those records revealed that between November of 1982 and May of 1983 union officials passed over him more than 34 times, impermissibly referring not Brown but other individuals who had either registered after Brown or had entirely failed to register.

Brown initially filed a formal complaint with the union alleging violations of union rules and procedures. A union appeals committee heard the matter and determined that union officials had discriminated against Brown in implementing the referral system. The appeals committee awarded him $4000 as well as the right to secure a referral to the first appropriate job. Brown subsequently initiated a proceeding against the union before the Iowa Civil Rights Commission. The union agreed to pay Brown $6000 in settlement of that civil rights claim in return for dismissal with prejudice of the complaint filed with the agency and execution of a release. The release expressly left open recourse against union officials.

Brown then filed his three-count petition in district court seeking to recover damages from Baker and Garman. His first count alleged that Garman and Baker racially discriminated against him by denying him the right to enforce his contractual relationship with the union, in violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1981. Neither defendant has requested interlocutory review of the district court's refusal to dismiss that count, so we are not here concerned with the section 1981 claim.

The second count of Brown's petition alleged that the defendants had intentionally interfered with his contractual relationship with the union and prospective employment opportunities, and the third count alleged intentional infliction of mental and emotional distress. Although defendant Garman merely answered without challenging the court's jurisdiction, defendant Baker by motion to dismiss contended that the state causes of action were preempted by the National Labor Relations Act and also that a separate federal labor statute, section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, exempted union officials from damage suits arising out of collective bargaining agreements. Although the district court ruled against Baker on his section 301 defense, it granted Baker's motion to dismiss the second and third counts on the preemption ground.

Preemption is a jurisdictional issue concerning the power of the state court to decide certain issues. It may be raised at any time and may but need not be raised by a special appearance. Iowa R.Civ.P. 104(a). The question was submitted to the district court at the time of the hearing on Baker's motion to dismiss, without an evidentiary hearing. We accept as true the well-pleaded allegations of Brown's petition, read in the light most favorable to him. The burden of sustaining jurisdiction is upon the plaintiff, but once the well-pleaded facts establish a prima facie jurisdictional basis for the plaintiff's claims, the burden shifts and the defendant may offer evidence to overcome that prima facie showing. See Walles v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 252 N.W.2d 701, 708 (Iowa 1977) (district court should have declined jurisdiction because pleaded facts established that claim was preempted by federal labor law); Langrehr v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local 772, 236 N.W.2d 339, 343-44 (Iowa 1975) (plaintiff failed to meet burden of proving facts supporting exception to preemption doctrine).

This case, like other Iowa cases deciding similar preemption questions, turns less on disputed facts than on the legal consequences of the allegations of plaintiff's petition. See, e.g., Hollander v. Peck, 261 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Iowa 1978) (petition for damages stated arguable unfair labor practice and therefore was preempted by federal law); Dugdale Construction Co. v. Operative Plasterers & Cement Masons International Association, 257 Iowa 997, 1001-03, 135 N.W.2d 656, 659-60 (1965) (pleadings showed injunction action preempted but contract action not preempted).

II. Application of Preemption--The Rule and its Exceptions.

Preemption in the labor law arena is often referred to as the Garmon preemption doctrine because it was first authoritatively defined in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959). There, the United States Supreme Court set aside a state court injunction and damage award which an employer had obtained against picketing unions, holding:

When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that State jurisdiction must yield. To leave the States free to regulate conduct so plainly within the central aim of federal regulation involves too great a danger of conflict between power asserted by Congress and requirements imposed by state law.

Id. at 244, 79 S.Ct. at 779, 3 L.Ed.2d at 782. In Amalgamated Association of Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 288, 91 S.Ct. 1909, 1918, 29 L.Ed.2d 473, 483 (1971), the first of many cases in which the Court has refined Garmon principles, the Court explained why the National Labor Relations Board ordinarily has primary jurisdiction over labor disputes:

The rationale for preemption, then, rests in large measure upon our determination that when it set down a federal labor policy Congress plainly meant to do more than simply to alter the then-prevailing substantive law. It sought as well to restructure fundamentally the processes for effectuating that policy, deliberately placing the responsibility for applying and developing this comprehensive legal system in the hands of an expert administrative body rather than the federalized judicial system.

Consequently, state causes of action are presumptively preempted if they concern conduct that is actually or arguably prohibited or protected by the National Labor Relations Act. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245, 79 S.Ct. at 779, 3 L.Ed.2d at 782. As federal and state courts since Garmon have shaped preemption, they have recognized that the general rule--deferral to the NLRB--is subject to important exceptions. See, e.g., Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 591, ----, 103 S.Ct. 3172, 3177, 77 L.Ed.2d 798, 816 (1983) (excepting from preemption state claim of strike replacements against employer based on misrepresentation and breach of promise); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 200, 98 S.Ct. 1745, 1759, 56 L.Ed.2d 209, 227 (1978) (excepting from preemption employer's trespass action against picketers); Hollander v. Peck, 261 N.W.2d at 509-10 (discussing three exceptions and finding none applicable); Bebensee v. Ross Pierce Electric Corp., 400 Mich. 233, 241-44, 253 N.W.2d 633, 637-39 (1977) (discussing several exceptions to preemption and citing numerous pertinent articles by commentators).

Baker urges us to apply the general preemption rule and uphold the district court's ruling that it lacked jurisdiction over Brown's second and third causes of action. Baker argues that the district court could...