BROWN v. Idaho PAROLE Comm'n
| Decision Date | 28 March 2011 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 37785,2011 Unpublished Opinion No. 417 |
| Parties | KEVIN BROWN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. IDAHO PAROLE COMMISSION, Respondent. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Daniel C. Hurlbutt, District Judge.
Orders dismissing petition for writ of habeas corpus, denying appointment of counsel, and denying motion to reconsider denial of counsel, affirmed.
Kevin Brown, Boise, pro se appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; William M. Loomis, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
Kevin Brown, an inmate, appeals pro se from the district court's orders dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, denying his motion for appointment of counsel, and denying his motion to reconsider denial of appointment of counsel.
On February 19, 2010, Brown filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petition alleged that Brown was entitled to credit against his sentence for 459 days that he served on parole prior to revocation of his parole. The petition asserted that a provision of Idaho Code § 20-228 calling for forfeiture of time spent on parole unless the Commission of Pardons and Parole, in its discretion, grants credit against the sentence, violates constitutional provisions relating to double jeopardy, equal protection, and due process. Brown also moved for appointment of counsel. The district court denied Brown's motion for appointment of counsel on March 1, 2010. On March 23, 2010, the Commission filed a motion to dismiss Brown's petition. Brown was given thirty days to respond to the Commission's motion to dismiss, but he filed no response. On May 10, 2010, the district court entered an order dismissing Brown's habeas corpus petition, concluding that all of Brown's claims failed as a matter of law.
After receiving from the district court a copy of the court's register of actions for this case on May, 7, 2010,1 Brown filed a motion and affidavit for reconsideration of appointment of counsel on May 13, 2010. Brown's May 13, 2010, motion for reconsideration was identical to his original motion for appointment of counsel except for the addition of one line generally indicating that he was having problems receiving his legal mail and his attachment of an Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) concern form and a May 7, 2010, mail log. On the IDOC concern form, Brown indicated he had not received any legal mail since January 25, 2010. Brown's mail log lists two items of received mail, one from the district court on January 25, 2010, and one from the Parole Commission on April 1, 2010. After ruling that Brown had not shown any extraordinary circumstances necessitating the appointment of counsel, the district court denied Brown's motion for reconsideration on May 24, 2010.
On appeal, Brown argues that several constitutional rights were violated when the Commission refused to grant him credit for time served on parole. He also contends that the district court erred by denying his motion for appointment of counsel and by denying his motion for reconsideration of his request for counsel because of the particular complexities of his case and because of prison officials' interference with Brown's legal mail.
A writ of habeas corpus is a proper mechanism for challenging an unlawful confinement and is a constitutionally-provided remedy. See Idaho Const. art. I, § 5; Idaho Code § 19-4201, et seq.; Mahaffey v. State, 87 Idaho 228, 231, 392 P.2d 279, 280 (1964); Dopp v. Idaho Comm 'n of Pardons & Parole, 144 Idaho 402, 404, 162 P.3d 781, 783 (Ct. App. 2007); Drennon v. Fisher, 141 Idaho 942, 944, 120 P.3d 1146, 1148 (Ct. App. 2005). As habeas corpus proceedings are civil in nature, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure generally apply. Idaho Code § 19-4208; Quinlan v. Idaho Comm 'n for Pardons & Parole, 138 Idaho 726, 729, 69 P.3d 146, 149 (2003); Hoots v. Craven, 146 Idaho 271, 275, 192 P.3d 1095, 1099 (Ct. App. 2008); Lopez v. State, 128 Idaho 826, 827, 919 P.2d 355, 356 (Ct. App. 1996). An appellate court will affirm a trial court's grant of an I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a habeas corpus petition where the record demonstrates that no genuine issues of material fact exist and the case was decided as a matter of law. Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 398, 987 P.2d 300, 310 (1999); Gibson v. Bennett, 141 Idaho 270, 273, 108 P.3d 417, 420 (Ct. App. 2005). When reviewing a dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the nonmoving party is entitled to have all inferences from the record and pleadings viewed in his or her favor. Gibson, 141 Idaho at 273, 108 P.3d at 420. The issue is not whether the petitioner will ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 126 Idaho 960, 962, 895 P.2d 561, 563 (1995).
Brown's habeas corpus claims turn upon the application in his case of the provision in I.C. § 20-228 that following revocation of parole, the prisoner "must serve out the sentence, and the time during which such prisoner was out on parole shall not be deemed a part thereof; unless the Commission, in its discretion, shall determine otherwise . . . ." We consider first Brown's contention that the Commission's refusal to credit to his sentence 459 days he spent on parole subjected him to multiple punishments for the same offense. Whether a defendant's prosecution or punishment complies with the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is a question of law over which we exercise free review. State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 63, 14 P.3d 378, 383 (Ct. App. 2000).
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const. amend. V. This guarantee includes protection against multiple criminal punishments for the same offense. Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 229 (1994); State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho 619, 622, 38 P.3d 1275, 1278 (Ct. App. 2001). In Gibson, this Court rejected the same double jeopardy argument now advanced by Brown. We explained:
[R]evocation of probation does not impose an additional punishment for the originating crime because it involves only the enforcement of conditions already imposed.
The revocation of Gibson's parole constituted enforcement of a statutorily authorized condition of parole--that the time spent on parole would not count towards the completion of the judicially imposed sentences. See I.C. § 20-228 similar to probation revocation, the reincarceration resulting from the violation of the terms of parole is not a separate punishment for Gibson's underlying criminal offenses. Accordingly, Gibson's double jeopardy claim fails as a matter of law.
Id. at 276, 108 P.3d at 423 (citations omitted). For the same reasons, the district court correctly concluded that Brown's double jeopardy claim fails as a matter of law.
Brown's argument that he was denied equal protection of the law as a result of the Commission's forfeiture of his time served while he was on parole also fails because Brown has not shown that he was treated any differently than any other similarly situated parolee subject to forfeiture of time served under I.C. § 20-228. The Equal Protection Clause is designed to assure that those persons similarly situated with respect to governmental action are treated similarly. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985); State v. Missamore, 119 Idaho 27, 33, 803 P.2d 528, 534 (1990); State v. Hayes, 108 Idaho 556, 560, 700 P.2d 959, 963 (Ct. App. 1985). See also Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 401, 973 P.2d 749, 753 (Ct. App. 1999) (). Selective or discriminatory enforcement or application of a statute may amount to an equal protection violation under the Idaho or United States Constitution if the challenger shows a deliberate plan of discrimination based on some unjustifiable classification. Anderson v. Spalding, 137 Idaho 509, 514, 50 P.3d 1004, 1009 (2002); Henson v. Dep't of Law Enforcement, 107 Idaho 19, 23, 684 P.2d 996, 1000 (1984); Hayes, 108 Idaho at 560, 700 P.2d at 963. Alternatively, a "class of one" may state an equal protection claim if he or she was intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); Viking Const., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Irr. Dist., 149 Idaho 187, 198-99, 233 P.3d 118, 129-30 (2010); Anderson, 137 Idaho at 514, 50 P.3d at 1009. Brown has not alleged facts to demonstrate that in applying I.C. § 20-228, the Commission treated him differently than any other similarly situated parolee or effectuated any deliberate plan of discrimination based on an arbitrary or unjustified classification. Thus, the district court was correct in concluding that Brown's equal protection claim fails as a matter of law.
Brown's final challenge to I.C. § 20-228 is that it violates due process2 by allowing the Commission to forfeit 459 days he spent on parole rather than credit this time against his sentence. According to Brown, he possessed a liberty interest in receiving such credit against his sentence that was not protected during the Parole Commission's proceedings. Like the district court, we find this assertion to be without merit.
An inmate has a limited liberty interest in continuing parole, and is therefore entitled to due process before parole may be revoked. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482-83 (1972...
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