Lopez v. State

• Decision Date: 16 May 1996
• Docket Number: No. 22154,22154
• Citation: 919 P.2d 355,128 Idaho 826
• Parties: Alex LOPEZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 355

919 P.2d 355

128 Idaho 826

Alex LOPEZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent.

No. 22154.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

May 16, 1996.

[128 Idaho 827] Alex Lopez, Boise, pro se.

Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Timothy R. McNeese, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

LANSING, Judge.

This is an appeal from a district court's appellate decision upholding a magistrate's order that denied a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The pro se petition was filed by Alex Lopez, an inmate at the Idaho State Correctional Institution (ISCI). ¹ Lopez alleges that he was denied due process in connection with a prison disciplinary proceeding at which he was found guilty of misconduct. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the decision of the magistrate.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Lopez received a disciplinary offense report charging that he had disobeyed orders to report for work at the prison dining facility on a day that otherwise was one of Lopez's days off. Following a hearing, Lopez was found guilty of the charged misconduct, and a penalty of thirty days' disciplinary segregation was imposed.

Because Lopez's first language is Spanish, prior to the hearing he submitted a written request for a staff representative to serve as an interpreter and to "investigate statements made by staff." A bilingual staff member, Pete Rodriguez, was assigned as Lopez's staff representative. Lopez complains that although Rodriguez did act as an interpreter during the disciplinary hearing, he did not interview any witnesses in advance of the hearing and made no argument that the penalty imposed at the conclusion of the hearing was too harsh. ²

Lopez thereafter filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, alleging that he was deprived of due process in connection with the hearing. Lopez sought release from disciplinary segregation and expungement of the disciplinary offense report from his record. The State moved for summary judgment, and the magistrate granted the State's motion. On interim appeal, the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision.

ANALYSIS

When reviewing a decision of a district court that has conducted an appellate review of a magistrate's ruling, we examine the record of the proceedings before the magistrate independently, but with due regard for the decision of the district court. Craig v. State, 123 Idaho 121, 123, 844 P.2d 1371, 1373 (Ct.App.1992). A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a pleading analogous to a complaint, Freeman v. State Dept. of Corrections, 115 Idaho 78, 79, 764 P.2d 445, 446 (Ct.App.1988), and habeas corpus proceedings are subject to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Jacobsen v. State, 99 Idaho 45, 50, 577 P.2d 24, 29 (1978); Sivak v. Ada County, 118 Idaho 193, 196, 795 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct.App.1990). Therefore on appeal from a summary judgment in such an action, we adhere to the standard of review applicable to summary judgments generally. We examine the record to determine whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact and whether the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Mitchell v. Siqueiros, 99 Idaho 396, 398, 582 P.2d 1074, 1076 (1978).

When an inmate possesses a recognized liberty interest that may be infringed by state administrative proceedings, due process standards must be observed. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); Balla v. Murphy, 116 Idaho 257, 775 P.2d 149 (Ct.App.1989). Under decisional law existing when this case was before the magistrate, a liberty interest implicating a right to due process for state prisoners could arise from two sources--the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and state laws or regulations. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). The United States Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause does not create a liberty interest in freedom from state action taken within the scope of an inmate's sentence. Id. at 466-68, 103 S.Ct. at 868-70. Consequently, the Due Process Clause does not confer upon an inmate a liberty interest in remaining in the general inmate population rather than being confined in administrative segregation. Id. at 468. However, Hewitt established that state laws and regulations could be the source of a liberty interest if the state enactment "used language of an unmistakably mandatory character" requiring that certain procedures be followed and provided that a liberty infringement would not occur "absent specified substantive predicates." Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 471-72, 103 S.Ct. at 871-72.

It is this state law source of liberty interests upon which Lopez predicates his claim. He asserts that a protected liberty interest arises from a section of the Idaho Department of Correction Policy and Procedure Manual which provides that a staff representative shall always be appointed for an inmate who is subject to disciplinary proceedings where, in the opinion of the disciplinary hearing officer, the inmate would suffer from an inability to gather evidence, or an interpreter is required. ³ He claims that this regulation gave him a due process right to assistance of a staff representative who would act as an advocate and an investigator, not merely as an interpreter.

During the pendency of this appeal, however, the United States Supreme Court adopted a new approach to determining whether state law creates a protected liberty interest for inmates. In Sandin v. Conner, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), the Court shifted the inquiry away from the language used in state regulations and toward the nature of the deprivation involved. The Court criticized and abandoned the Hewitt approach, stating:

By shifting the focus of the liberty interest inquiry to one based on the language of a particular regulation, and not the nature of the deprivation, the Court [in Hewitt ] encouraged prisoners to comb regulations in search of mandatory language on which to base entitlements to various state-conferred privileges.

....

Hewitt has produced at least two undesirable effects. First, it creates disincentives for States to codify prison management procedures in the interest of uniform treatment.... States may avoid creation of "liberty interests" by having scarcely any regulations, or by conferring standardless discretion on correctional personnel.

Second, the Hewitt approach has led to the involvement of federal courts in the day-to-day management of prisons, often squandering judicial resources with little off-setting benefit to anyone.

Id., --- U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2299. The Court therefore replaced the Hewitt analysis with one which focuses upon the hardship for the inmate resulting from the prison's action as that hardship compares to the normal conditions of prison life. The Court stated:

Following Wolff [v. McDonnell, supra ], we recognize that States may under certain circumstances create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause. But these interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.

Sandin, --- U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2300 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

Consequently, in considering an inmate's claim of a due process right in disciplinary proceedings based upon state law, courts must now examine whether the punishment imposed upon the inmate fell within the ordinary conditions experienced by those serving a prison sentence or whether the punishment represents a dramatic departure from the circumstances normally attending imprisonment. See Sandin, --- U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2301; Williams v. Ramos, 71 F.3d 1246, 1249-50 (7th Cir.1995); Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 533 (7th Cir.1995).

In Sandin, the disciplinary action at issue was placement of the inmate in disciplinary segregation. From the record, the Supreme Court determined that, at the time of the inmate's punishment, disciplinary segregation involved essentially the same conditions imposed upon inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody, and therefore the disciplinary detention in segregated confinement "did not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest." Sandin, --- U.S. at ----, 115...