Brown v. Jarvis

• Decision Date: 24 May 1927
• Docket Number: 1407
• Citation: 36 Wyo. 406,256 P. 336
• Parties: BROWN v. JARVIS, Chief of Police. [*]
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

256 P. 336

36 Wyo. 406

BROWN v. JARVIS, Chief of Police. ^[*]

No. 1407

Supreme Court of Wyoming

May 24, 1927

APPEAL from District Court, Natrona County; BRYANT S. CROMER, Judge.

Habeas corpus proceedings by Guy Brown against George Jarvis, Chief of Police of the City of Casper, for release from custody after conviction in the police court of the City of Casper for unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Kenneth McDonald, for appellant.

The jurisdiction of municipal courts is governed by the provisions of special charters, the general law under which the city or town is incorporated, or by general law of the state; Sec. 1176 C. S. Cities of first class may exercise general powers by ordinances; Sec. 1868 C. S. The jurisdiction of police justices is prescribed by Sec. 1902 C S., and offences against ordinances may be punished as described by ordinances; Sec. 1912 C. S. Ordinances must not conflict with state laws; St. Louis v. De Lassus, 205 Mo. 578, 104 S.W. 12; Montgomery v. Taxi Co. (Ala.) 82 So. 117. Police magistrates, in cities of the first class, are given power to inflict either a money fine or imprisonment; Ch. 126 C. S. The trial court erred in holding that cities of the first class are without power to impose a jail sentence by ordinance; Sections 1902, 1912 C S. Section 1868 C. S. is not a restrictive statute; the jail sentence is the most powerful deterrent of crime in the hands of the police court.

M. F. Ryan, for respondent, filed no brief.

BLUME, Chief Justice. POTTER, J., and KIMBALL, J., concur.

OPINION

BLUME, Chief Justice.

The city of Casper belongs to that class of municipalities defined under the laws of this state as cities of the first class. Guy Brown was convicted in the Police Court of said city of the crime of unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor, in violation of the ordinances of said city. No fine was assessed against him and the only sentence imposed upon him was that he be confined in the city jail for the period of thirty days. Having been taken into custody, he instituted proceedings for habeas corpus in the District Court of Natrona County, Wyoming, and that court released him from custody, holding that the laws governing cities of the first class do not authorize imprisonment except only for the non-payment of fine. The sole question on this appeal, taken by said city, is whether the ruling of the court so made is correct.

In considering this question, we must not forget that penal provisions are strictly construed (36 Cyc. 1183; 16 C. J. 1360); that they must be construed most favorably to the individual (People v. Sloan, 98 A.D. 450; 90 N.Y.S. 762), and that where the law governing a city prescribes the particular manner in which its ordinances are to be enforced, that method is exclusive. Dillon on Municipal Corporations, (4th ed.) sec. 369; 28 Cyc. 781; Blanchard v. Bristol, 100 Va. 469, 41 S.E. 948; State v. Ferguson, 33 N.H. 424.) With these rules in mind, we shall trace the history of legislation defining and relating to cities of the first class. The first act of the legislature relating to cities of that class was chapter 80 of the Session Laws of 1895, subsequently embodied in sections 1587 to 1672, both inclusive, of the Revised Statutes of 1899. The provisions pertinent herein are subdivision 58 of section 1637, and sections 1657, 1671 and 1672, Revised Statutes of 1899. These provisions are as follows:

Section 1637, subdivision 58:

(Such cities shall have power) "To make all such ordinances, by-laws, rules, regulations and resolutions not inconsistent with the laws of the state, as may be expedient, in addition to the special powers in this section granted, maintaining the peace, good government and welfare of the city, and its trade, commerce and manufactures, and to enforce all ordinances, by inflicting penalties for the violation thereof not exceeding one hundred dollars for any offense, recoverable with costs, together with judgment of imprisonment, until the amount of said judgment and costs shall be paid."

Section 1657:

"The police justice shall have exclusive jurisdiction over, and it shall be his duty to hear and determine all offenses against the ordinances of the city, and of misdemeanors under the laws of the state, arising within the limits of the city, when the fine which may be imposed does not exceed two hundred dollars, or the imprisonment three months; and he shall also have jurisdiction for the examination of offenders against the laws of the state for offenses arising within the city limits."

Section 1671:

"Any person convicted before the justice of any offense under the ordinances of the city shall be punished by such fine or imprisonment as may be regulated by ordinance."

Section 1672:

"Whenever the defendant is sentenced to imprisonment for the violation of a city ordinance, he shall be put to work for the benefit of the city, under the direction of the mayor, for the term of his imprisonment, and when committed for the non-payment of a fine, or costs, for the violation of any ordinance, he shall also be put to work for the benefit of the city, and shall be credited on such fine and costs, one dollar and fifty cents per day for each day he shall work."

Subdivision 58 of section 1637, supra, alone gave the city the direct power to enforce its ordinances, and provided the specific method by which that should be done. It authorized the imposition of a fine, limited to the sum of one hundred dollars, and further empowered the city to imprison a defendant until the fine and costs imposed should be paid. Imprisonment, therefore, for any purpose other than to enforce the payment of a fine was not authorized. Bailey v. State, 30 Neb. 855, 47 N.W. 208. And unless the contrary clearly appears from other portions of the law, the method so pointed out must be held to have been intended as the exclusive method for the enforcement of the ordinances of such city. State v. Ferguson, supra. Section 1657, supra, has no bearing on this point. Section 1671, supra, provided that the person convicted before the police justice might be punished by fine and imprisonment as regulated by ordinance. It will be noted that no limit whatever was fixed as to the amount of the fine or the imprisonment, and it seems incredible that the legislature intended to give the city authority to imprison for an unlimited time, as might be fixed by ordinance. Hence, the only reasonable construction of that section can be, that it refers back to subdivision 58, supra, which specifically limits the extent of the fine and imprisonment and specifically provides that the imprisonment can be imposed only in case of non-payment of fine. In other words, the imprisonment mentioned in section 1671, supra, must be held to mean the imprisonment referred to in subdivision 58, supra. Section 1672, supra (which is now sec. 1919, W. C. S. 1920), mentions imprisonment as an alternative and separate penalty, as well as imprisonment for non-payment of fine. But the imprisonment there mentioned means, of course, imprisonment lawfully inflicted. The section itself does not provide or purport to provide for or create imprisonment as an alternative and separate punishment, and authority therefor must be found, if at all, in some other provision; but no such other provision has been discovered. It cannot be said that the section just mentioned impliedly provides for the penalty mentioned, for it seems to be the established rule that a penalty cannot arise by implication, but must be expressly imposed. 28 Cyc. 781; Fire Department v. Braender, 14...