Brown v. JC Penney Corp.

• Decision Date: 20 February 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-707-CIV-MARCUS.,95-707-CIV-MARCUS.
• Citation: 924 F. Supp. 1158
• Parties: Ross BROWN, Plaintiff, v. J.C. PENNEY CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

924 F. Supp. 1158

Ross BROWN, Plaintiff, v. J.C. PENNEY CORPORATION, Defendant.

No. 95-707-CIV-MARCUS.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

February 20, 1996.

Miguel M. de la O, Miami, Florida, for Plaintiff.

G. Thomas Harper, Jacksonville, Florida, for Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MARCUS, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed December 15, 1995. After a thorough review of the record and pleadings, and having considered the argument of counsel, the Defendant's motion for summary judgment must be and is GRANTED.

I.

The Defendant, J.C. Penney Company, Inc., is major retailer that operates a store at the Dadeland Mall in Miami, Florida. The Plaintiff, Ross Brown, worked as a Customer Service Supervisor at the Dadeland Mall store. In late July, 1994, the Plaintiff requested a leave of absence pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2612, et seq. ("FMLA"). Brown sought this leave to care for his terminally ill father in New Jersey. The Plaintiff requested a twelve (12) week leave, but indicated on his FMLA leave application that his absence might end sooner than that. The Plaintiff's last day of work prior to his leave was Sunday, July 24, 1995. On September 11, 1994, while Brown was still on leave, the Defendant placed Sonia Cannon in Brown's position of Customer Service Supervisor.

The Plaintiff's father died on September 23, 1994; however, Brown did not contact the Defendant's management personnel about this occurrence. The Plaintiff reported in person to the Dadeland Mall store on October 22, 1994. At that time, the Defendant informed Brown that he would not be given his old job, and instead had been assigned to a position as a Sales Associate in the Men's Sportswear Department at his former rate of pay. Brown refused to accept this position, and the Defendant proceeded to terminate him.

The Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on March 15, 1995, alleging a violation of the FMLA. According to Brown, J.C. Penney had an obligation to restore him to his former position as Customer Service Supervisor, or provide him with a job of comparable stature. The Defendant filed an answer on April 10, 1995, and the instant motion for summary judgment on December 15, 1995. According to J.C. Penney, the Plaintiff relinquished his rights under the FMLA by failing to return to work after his father's death on September 23, 1994. In the alternative, J.C. Penney insists that the statutory maximum of twelve weeks of leave expired on October 17, 1994 — five days before the Plaintiff reported in person to resume his duties at the Dadeland Mall store. The Plaintiff filed a response to the Defendant's motion on January 26, 1996, and the Defendant replied on February 12, 1996.¹

II.

The standard to be applied in reviewing summary judgment motions is stated unambiguously in Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

It may be entered only where there is no genuine issue of material fact. Moreover, the moving party has the burden of meeting this exacting standard. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970).

In applying this standard, the Eleventh Circuit has explained:

In assessing whether the movant has met this burden, the courts should view the evidence and all factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 157, 90 S.Ct. at 1608; Environmental Defense Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983 at 991 (5th Cir.1981) . All reasonable doubts about the facts should be resolved in favor of the non-movant. Casey Enterprises v. Am. Hardware Mutual Ins. Co., 655 F.2d 598, 602 (5th Cir.1981). If the record presents factual issues, the court must not decide trial. Marsh, 651 F.2d at 991; Lighting Fixture & Elec. Supply Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 420 F.2d 1211, 1213 (5th Cir.1969). Summary judgment may be inappropriate even where the parties agree on the basic facts, but disagree about the inferences that should be drawn from these facts. Lighting Fixture & Elec. Supply Co., 420 F.2d at 1213. If reasonable minds might differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then the court should deny summary judgment. Impossible Electronic Techniques, Inc. v. Wackenhut Protective Systems, Inc., 669 F.2d 1026 at 1031 (5th Cir.1982) ; Croley v. Matson Navigation Co., 434 F.2d 73, 75 (5th Cir.1970).

Moreover, the party opposing a motion for summary judgment need not respond to it with any affidavits or other evidence unless and until the movant has properly supported the motion with sufficient evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. at 160, 90 S.Ct. at 1609-10; Marsh, 651 F.2d at 991. The moving party must demonstrate that the facts underlying all the relevant legal questions raised by the pleadings or otherwise are not in dispute, or else summary judgment will be denied notwithstanding that the non-moving party has introduced no evidence whatsoever. Brunswick Corp. v. Vineberg, 370 F.2d 605, 611-12 (5th Cir.1967). See Dalke v. Upjohn Co., 555 F.2d 245, 248-49 (9th Cir.1977).

Clemons v. Dougherty County, 684 F.2d 1365, 1368-69 (11th Cir.1982); see also Amey, Inc. v. Gulf Abstract & Title, Inc., 758 F.2d 1486, 1502 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1107, 106 S.Ct. 1513, 89 L.Ed.2d 912 (1986).

The United States Supreme Court has recently provided significant additional guidance as to the evidentiary standard which trial courts should apply in ruling on a motion for summary judgment:

The summary judgment standard mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), which is that the trial judge must direct a verdict if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict. Brady v. Southern R. Co., 320 U.S. 476, 479-80, 64 S.Ct. 232, 234, 88 L.Ed. 239 (1943).

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The Court in Anderson further stated that "the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the nonmovant." Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512. In determining whether this evidentiary threshold has been met, the trial court "must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden" applicable to the particular cause of action before it. Id. at 254, 106 S.Ct. at 2513. If the nonmovant in a summary judgment action fails to adduce evidence which would be sufficient, when viewed in a light most favorable to the non-movant, to support a jury finding for the non-movant, summary judgment may be granted. Id. at 254-55, 106 S.Ct. at 2513-14.

In another recent case, the Supreme Court has declared that a non-moving party's failure to prove an essential element of a claim renders all factual disputes as to that claim immaterial and requires the granting of summary judgment:

In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment ... against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law" because the non-moving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (emphasis added). We measure the Defendant's motion for summary judgment against these standards.

III.

The Defendant's first ground for summary judgment is based on the undisputed fact that Brown failed to return to work until almost a month after his father's death on September 23, 1994. According to the Defendant, "Plaintiff's approximate one month absence from work subsequent to September 23rd was no longer covered as FMLA leave because he no longer satisfied the criteria for covered leave" under the statute. As a result, the Defendant maintains, its alleged refusal to restore Brown to his former position (or a comparable position) upon his return on October 22, 1994 did not violate the FMLA. We agree.

The FMLA provides that an "eligible employee shall be entitled to a total of twelve (12) workweeks of leave ... in order to care for ... a ... parent ... if such ... parent has a serious health condition." 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) (emphasis added). The Plaintiff's application for FMLA leave was to "care for an immediate family member with a serious health condition." See Plaintiff's dep., exh. 1 and 2. The parties agree that Brown's father suffered from a serious health condition within the meaning of the statute from the date the Plaintiff commenced his leave to the date of his father's death. The parties disagree, however, over whether the term "serious health condition" encompasses the month after Charles Brown's death. J.C. Penney insists that the "serious health condition" justifying the Plaintiff's FMLA leave ended when Brown's father died. The Plaintiff suggests otherwise in his response:

After September 23, 1994, it is undisputed that Brown continued to care for his father due to the death caused by that serious health condition. Brown took care of all his father

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