Brown v. Missouri Pacific R. Co.
| Decision Date | 18 November 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 68347,68347 |
| Citation | 720 S.W.2d 357 |
| Parties | 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2430, 106 Lab.Cas. P 55,718, 2 IER Cases 220 Cletus BROWN, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
William G. Guerri, Albert E. Schoenbeck, St. Louis, I. Michael Greenberger, Washington, D.C., for defendant-appellant.
Don B. Sommers, Prudence W. Kramer, St. Louis, for plaintiff-respondent.
The plaintiff, a long-time employee of the defendant railroad, was injured in a fall. He sued and recovered damages under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. He then filed suit in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis charging that the defendant, through its supervisory employees and claims agents, had undertaken systematic retaliatory harassment by threatening him with discharge if he filed suit and then holding him out of service pending an unneeded physical examination after he recovered judgment. The action was characterized as one in "prima facie tort." The plaintiff recovered a large judgment for actual and punitive damages. The Court of Appeals, Eastern District, transferred the case here without express resolution, because of uncertainty as to whether the plaintiff's claim was preempted by the Railway Labor Act. We take the case on original appeal and reverse outright, concluding (1) that the action is preempted by the Railway Labor Act and is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate division of the National Railroad Adjustment Board, established by that act, and, (2) that the plaintiff has failed to plead and prove a cognizable claim in prima facie tort under Missouri law.
The plaintiff characterizes his action as one in prima facie tort. The evidence showed that, after the plaintiff was injured, he was repeatedly told by a claim agent that he would never work another day for the railroad if he retained a lawyer and filed suit to recover for his injury. A supervisor told other employees that the plaintiff would be fired if he sued. The plaintiff nevertheless retained a lawyer, and the claim agent told the lawyer over the telephone that the plaintiff would be discharged if he did not settle with him. The most that was offered him was $3000 plus lost wages. His suit proceeded to trial and he recovered a judgment of $175,000, which was quickly paid. Following the trial, the plaintiff was held out of service without explanation and was treated as though he was going to be fired. He had difficulty in obtaining an explanation, but was belatedly told that the railroad wanted a further physical examination because of his trial testimony, in which he had said that he sometimes dropped tools because of the injury to his wrists. The plaintiff got in touch with his union representative and filed a grievance for lost wages for the period during which he was held out of service. The railroad finally scheduled an examination by an orthopedic surgeon of its choice, who cleared the plaintiff for return to work. The plaintiff was allowed to return and all lost wages were restored him. The grievance before the National Railroad Adjustment Board was abandoned. The plaintiff made no attempt at trial to prove any tangible damages, by his own testimony or otherwise.
The plaintiff's verdict director read as follows:
Your verdict must be for plaintiff, if you believe:
First, employees of defendant acting within the scope and course of their employment by defendant threatened to discharge plaintiff if he sued defendant for injuries and withheld him from his employment after the trial of his lawsuit, and;
Second, defendant's employees intended to cause injury to plaintiff, and;
Third, plaintiff was injured, and;
Fourth, there was no justification or an insufficient justification for the acts of defendant's employees.
Acts were within the 'scope and course of employment' as that phrase is used in this instruction even though not specifically authorized by Missouri Pacific Railroad if:
1. they were done by the employees to further the interests of Missouri Pacific Railroad under the general authority and direction of Missouri Pacific Railroad, and
2. they naturally arose from the performance of the employees' work.
The jury returned a verdict for $75,000 actual damages and $7,500,000 punitive damages. The trial judge overruled post-trial motions, accompanying his order with an opinion explaining the basis for his rulings for the guidance of appellate courts. The defendant appealed, raising numerous points. We find it necessary to consider only two of these.
Labor relations in the railroad industry are strongly impacted by special federal legislation. Injuries are covered by the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982), to the exclusion of state workers' compensation statutes. Representation and collective bargaining are regulated by the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982), and the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187 (1982), has no application.
The Railway Labor Act allows employees to select their own collective bargaining representatives. Employers are obliged to bargain, and the results of bargaining must be memorialized in formal agreements. The act provides methods of dispute resolution. The caselaw employs unfortunate terminology in classifying disputes into "major" disputes, relating to contract negotiations over "wages, hours and working conditions," and "minor" disputes, which relate to the interpretation and application of collective bargaining agreements in defining the rights of individual employees. A compulsory arbitration tribunal, the National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB), is established for the resolution of these minor disputes, so that there will be no interruption of service. The entire process is described in detail in opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States. 1
The sole remedy for discharge is before the NRAB. 2 Cases consistently hold that even a discharge in retaliation for the filing of an FELA claim is within the jurisdiction of that board, and may not be made the subject of an independent civil action. 3 The defendant argues from these holdings that the plaintiff's contentions constitute a minor dispute which may not be made the subject of a common law action.
The plaintiff makes it clear that he is not seeking a monetary award for discharge, or even for suspension, but rather is seeking damages for harassment for which, he asserts, no remedy is available before the NRAB. He admits that any claim for discharge, or for loss of wages, would be preempted by the Railway Labor Act.
The Court of Appeals observed that Missouri courts have invariably sustained claims of federal preemption when attempts have been made to sue for damages arising out of disputes between railroad employers and their employees. 4 It transferred the case here because of several recent cases adduced by the plaintiff which suggest that the state courts might have a broader role than has been indicated in the past. These cases bear careful consideration.
Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 430 U.S. 290, 97 S.Ct. 1056, 51 L.Ed.2d 338 (1977), was an action by a craftsman against a union for "intentional infliction of emotional distress," involving "outrageous conduct". The case had nothing to do with the railroad industry, but it was argued that it was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board because the plaintiff's complaint included charges of discrimination in hiring hall referrals which might have been the subject of an unfair labor practice charge under that act. The court held that the plaintiff could proceed in the state court, because the National Labor Relations Act provided no remedy for the claim of outrageous conduct. The case does not give a complete answer to the contentions before us because the National Labor Relations Act is much less impacting than the Railway Labor Act. 5 The plaintiff in this case introduced no evidence of intentional infliction of emotional distress or outrageous conduct, and did not submit either of these theories to the jury.
The plaintiff places strong reliance on two state cases involving employees covered by the Railway Labor Act. DeTomaso v. Pan American World Airlines, Inc., 220 Cal.Rptr. 493 (Cal.App.1985) now pending before the Supreme Court of California, held that an employee could proceed in state court against his employer (an airline, subject to the Railway Labor Act), on a claim containing elements of defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress and breach of warranty of title. The employee had purchased a salvage lot from the employer. He was accused of theft and discharged from his job when it was discovered that the lot included property of the carrier which had not been lost or abandoned. The case is not very close to this one. It had its origin in an activity of the employee which was not related to his employment. He had his remedy before the Adjustment Board for wrongful discharge, and was ordered reinstated. The balance of his claim was of a nature which was quite appropriate for tort action.
Pikop v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 390 N.W.2d 743 (Minn.1986) involved two consolidated appeals for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a tort recognized by Minnesota law. One of the plaintiffs, a woman, claimed that employees, with the employer's acquiescence, harassed her through sexually oriented expletives, displayed rat carcasses in her presence, and otherwise inflicted indignities upon her, causing emotional problems which required psychiatric treatment. She combined her state claim with a suit under FELA. The other plaintiff alleged a constant course of harassment, also by employees with the employer's indifference, through...
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