Brown v. Oneida Cnty.
| Decision Date | 16 May 1899 |
| Citation | 79 N.W. 216,103 Wis. 149 |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
| Parties | BROWN v. ONEIDA COUNTY (THREE CASES). BROWN BROS. LUMBER CO. v. ONEIDA COUNTY (THREE CASES). BROWN & ROBBINS LUMBER CO. v. ONEIDA COUNTY (THREE CASES). RIB RIVER LUMBER CO. v. ONEIDA COUNTY (THREE CASES). |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from circuit court, Oneida county; Charles V. Bardeen, Judge.
Actions by W. E. Brown, Brown Bros. Lumber Company, Brown & Robbins Lumber Company, E. O. Brown, Rib River Lumber Company, and A. W. Brown against Oneida county. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff in each action, defendant appeals. Affirmed.A. W. Shelton, for appellant.
Alban & Barnes and Miller & McCormick, for respondents.
These six several actions were brought by the respective plaintiffs to set aside the taxes for the year 1896 on the several parcels of real estate in Rhinelander, described in the several complaints, on the sole ground that the assessment was illegal. Each of the six complaints alleged, in effect, that it was the general plan and purpose of the assessor to assess all the property in the city at not to exceed its full cash value, but that as to all of the properties in the suit (except the E. O. Brown residence) they were assessed for a value largely in excess of their actual value; that the E. O. Brown residence is alleged to have been assessed at the actual value; that in all of the other cases the overvaluation by the assessor is alleged to have been willful and fraudulent; that the board of review, without hearing evidence, raised the assessor's value on all and singular of the properties in suit, to wit, on the W. E. Brown residence $1,000, on Brown Bros. Lumber Company's plant $7,000, on Brown & Robbins Lumber Company's plant $4,500, on the E. O. Brown sawmill $2,000, on the E. O. Brown planing mill $1,000, on the E. O. Brown residence $2,000, on the Rib River Lumber Company planing mill $1,000, on the A. W. Brown residence $1,000; that thereafter the plaintiffs, respectively, appeared before the board, and offered testimony showing that the property in each case was of the value alleged in the complaint, and no more, and that no competent testimony was offered to the contrary, and that the board of review nevertheless refused to recede from its value before fixed, except in the case of E. O. Brown's sawmill and the E. O. Brown planing-mill properties, and as to these two properties the board reduced their own valuation on the planing-mill property $500, and reduced their own valuation on the sawmill property $2,000, to the amount fixed by the assessor; that such action of the board was willful and corrupt, with full knowledge that the values were excessive, and with intent to make the plaintiffs, respectively, pay more than their just share of the taxes, and that such was the result of their action; that the several amounts of taxes against the several properties are set out in the respective complaints, together with the fact that they had been sold for the taxes, and that the county held the several certificates. The several answers are each to the effect that the defendant admits that the valuation originally fixed by the assessor upon the lands in and by the assessment was the sum alleged in the complaint; that the valuation as finally fixed and determined by the board of review was the sum alleged in the complaint; that the amount of taxes charged against the lands upon the tax roll of the city for that year in accordance with the assessment was the sum alleged in the complaint; that the taxes were not paid, but were returned as delinquent and unpaid to the county treasurer; that the lands were sold by the treasurer for such unpaid taxes, with interest and lawful charges, at the regular tax sale in May, 1897; that the county became the purchaser at such sale, and was still the holder of the certificates issued upon such sale; that the assessor, in making his assessment of property in the city for that year, valued and assessed the taxable property in the city, including the property described, at the full value which could ordinarily be obtained therefor at private sale, according to the best of his judgment, and not otherwise, and that such was the general plan and purpose of the assessor in making the assessment; that the defendant denies that the board of review changed the valuations fixed by the assessor upon the plaintiff's lands without hearing testimony, or without legal evidence, or without notice, and alleges that before final determination of the values to be fixed to the plaintiff's lands the board of review (being informed that the assessor's valuations of the lands were too low) gave to the plaintiff due notice that the board contemplated the raising of the assessment, and to appear and be heard in relation thereto; that the plaintiff did appear pursuant to such notice, and the board did thereupon take and hear testimony and all testimony offered in relation thereto, including testimony offered on behalf of the plaintiff, and, after consideration of all such testimony, and upon and in accordance therewith, and not otherwise, the board finally fixed and determined the valuation of the plaintiff's lands at the sum stated, which valuationwas the full value which could ordinarily be obtained therefor at private sale, and no more, and was in proportion to the valuation fixed upon other property in the city, in the judgment of the board; that the valuations so fixed and determined by the board of review upon the plaintiff's lands were in fact not more than the full value which could ordinarily be obtained therefor at private sale, and not greater in proportion to the actual value thereof than the values affixed to the other taxable property in the city; that the defendant denies that the board of review, in dealing with the assessment, acted wrongfully or arbitrarily, or with any intention on its part to require the plaintiff to pay more than his just proportion of the taxes to be raised in the city for the year 1896, or to do the plaintiff any injustice in any manner whatever. All six cases were tried at the same time, and there is but one bill of exceptions for all of them. At the close of the trial the court made findings of fact and conclusions of law in each of such cases, which, with the admissions in the answer, are to the effect that the plaintiff owned the premises described during 1896, and the same were liable to taxtion; that they were assessed by the assessor that year at the amount stated; that such valuation so fixed by the assessor was in no case less than the actual value which could ordinarily be obtained for the same at private sale; that the board of review, ignoring the testimony taken by it, and acting solely upon impressions and information received by individual members of the board outside of and prior to the taking of such testimony, arbitrarily, unjustly, and wrongfully raised and increased such valuation, except in one case mentioned, and hereinafter explained; that the percentage of taxation in the city for that year was fixed at 2.19 per cent., and that such per cent. upon the valuation of the plaintiff's lands, as so fixed by the board of review, was finally carried out against and assessed upon the same;...
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