Brown v. Pitchess
| Decision Date | 25 February 1974 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Edward BROWN et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Peter J. PITCHESS et al., Defendants and Appellants. Civ. 41789. |
John H Larson, County Counsel, Michael H. Dougherty, Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, for defendant and appellants.
Terry L. Smerling, San Pedro, and Richard A. Weisz, Long Beach, for plaintiffs and respondents.
Plaintiffs Edward Brown, Charles Davis and Elmer Davis, on behalf of themselves and 'all County Jail prisoners who are, or will be, defending themselves . . . in criminal actions' sought declaratory relief and to enjoin certain jail administration practices of the defendant, Sheriff Peter Pitchess and Sheriff's Captain Max Krukow, charged with the responsibility of the administration of the county jail, the County of Los Angeles, and (by stipulation) the Los Angeles County law library. The trial court made two injunctive orders and denied the plaintiffs relief in all order respects. The defendants appeal the decision.
From the pleadings and declarations made on behalf of the parties, it appears that the three named plaintiffs were, at the time of the filing of the complaint, prisoners held at the county jail located at 441 Bauchet Street in Los Angeles, awaiting trial on criminal charges. Each named plaintiff filed a declaration alleging indigency; each was representing himself with respect to the pending criminal charges. While the county jail houses both unsentenced prisoners awaiting trial and those who have been convicted and are serving sentences, those prisoners, including the plaintiffs, who are representing themselves ('pro pers') are separately housed from all other inmates in module 2500b, located near the jail's law library.
Plaintiffs complained of a wide range of administrative practices at the jail. They claimed that they are treated differently than members of the general prison population solely because of their 'pro per' status, that they are housed separately, required to eat and bathe separately and are actively discouraged by jail personnel from associating with other prisoners. 'Pro pers' are not allowed to leave module 2500b without a deputy sheriff as escort; they are searched frequently and are required to wait long periods of time in holding areas for these searches. The prisoners further charged that the law library at the jail is inadequate to assist them in preparing their defense; that they are unable to freely borrow necessary materials from the county law library, and that the hours available to them for use of the jail library are insufficient. Another area of concern on the part of the prisoners revolved around the regulations at the jail concerning the service of subpoenas; subpoenas are served through the sheriff's department and the prisoners claimed that in practice they are denied the power to subpoena witnesses necessary for their pending criminal trials.
Plaintiffs brought to the trial court's attention 'the Los Angeles Superior Court Policy Memorandum Re Inmate Pro Per Privileges,' a document setting forth regulations of that status in the jail; the memorandum clearly prohibits 'pro per' prisoners from assisting other prisoners in legal matters. It characterizes the law library as 'adequate' and specifically limits its use to certain hours every day.
Plaintiffs charged that the practices of which they complain violate constitutional guarantees of free speech and association, access to the courts, and constitute discrimination violating the equal protection clause of the Constitution. They sought injunctive relief on the ground that irreparable injury was being caused by the enumerated practices which could not be compensated by money damages, and requested that such practices be terminated.
The defendant did not, nor do they now, dispute that there is systematic isolation of the 'pro pers' in the jail; they contend that the administrative regulations and practices in force are necessary to insure jail security. They claim that the 'pro per' prisoners are more dangerous than other inmates and have a propensity toward escape from confinement; searches of the 'pro per' prisoners, and of the jail library to which they have access, have often resulted in the discovery of weapons. The practices of which plaintiffs complain are characterized as reasonable, necessary, and not constituting a hindrance to the plaintiffs' ability to represent themselves in court. As indicated previously, the trial court granted certain limited injunctive relief, and this appeal followed.
In their reply brief, defendants have raised for the first time the issue of the trial court's jurisdiction over the subject of this dispute, i. e., the civil rights of prisoners in a local jail. It appears that we must consider and resolve this question, as it is well settled that a jurisdictional issue may be raised for the first time at the appellate level. (Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Theatrical State Employees Union, 69 Cal.2d 713, 721, 73 Cal.Rptr. 213, 447 P.2d 325; Costa v. Banta, 98 Cal.App.2d 181, 182, 219 P.2d 478.)
Defendants contend that plaintiffs' action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 1 seeks an exclusive federal remedy and thus plaintiffs could bring such action only in the federal court. We find no merit in this contention.
A state court determines whether it has jurisdiction to enforce rights created by a federal statute by interpreting the intention of the federal Congress to provide for exclusive federal jurisdiction, as opposed to concurrent state and federal jurisdiction. (Gerry of California v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.2d 119, 121, 194 P.2d 689.) In the area of civil rights litigation, the issue has generally been considered in the context of a claim that state, rather than federal remedies should have been sought because they were adequate to deal with the particular problem or had not been exhausted prior to bringing a federal suit. This was a central issue in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492, and gave rise to a discussion therein of the objectives envisioned by Congress in enacting section 1983. One such objective mentioned was the supplementary nature of federal intervention in local civil rights matters vis-a-vis state action. As far as we can discover, section 1983 has never been characterized by the federal courts as a statute creating rights that could be enforced only in federal courts. On the contrary, federal district courts have referred with approval to the concept of concurrent federal and state jurisdiction in this area. (See Kostohyrz v. Hursh, 329 F.Supp. 319 (D.C. Minn.1971) and United States ex rel. Hill v. Johnston, 321 F.Supp. 818 (D.C.N.Y. 1971). In Hancock v. Avery, 301 F.Supp. 786, 790 (D.C.Tenn.1969) the court observed:
We conclude, therefore, that the trial court did have the requisite jurisdiction to consider and decide the issues raised below.
Defendants next contend that the trial court was in error when it issued an injunction requiring that the defendants employ or assign one full time attorney, a member of the California State Bar, to assist those sentenced prisoners who are held in Los Angeles county jails and who wish help in the preparation of petitions challenging the legality of their confinement.
In Johnson. v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969) the United States Supreme Court held that prisoners have a constitutionally protected right, after conviction, to gain access to the courts for post-conviction relief, and that unless a state provides a reasonable alternative to inmate assistance it may not validly enforce a jail regulation prohibiting any form of legal assistance from one inmate to another. The...
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Cooper v. Morin
...provisions are generally applicable to the action. See Holt v. City of Troy, 78 Misc.2d 9, 355 N.Y.S.2d 94; Brown v. Pitchess, 37 Cal.App.3d 501, 112 Cal.Rptr. 350. Defendants here did not plead a defense of good faith. If it is in fact an affirmative defense, CPLR 3018(b) might preclude de......