Brown v. Plowden Co.
| Decision Date | 14 December 1949 |
| Docket Number | 16294. |
| Parties | BROWN et al. v. PLOWDEN CO. et al. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Wise Whaley & McCutchen, Columbia, for appellants.
Norbert A. Theodore, Columbia, for respondents.
The insurance carrier in this compensation case is paying to Annie Mae Brown, a colored widow, quoting from the award of the Industrial Commission dated Sept. 2, 1948, 'for her use and the use of her minor daughter Patricia Ann Brown,' $21.00 per week for 350 weeks, not to exceed $6,000 inclusive of funeral expenses, on account of the compensable accidental death of her husband, Otis Brown while in the employ of Plowden Company on July 4, 1948. Patricia, aged two years, was the only child. Shortly after the award the widow employed counsel and applied for commuted, lump sum settlement upon the following quoted apparently unverified statement: 'I have considerable obligations that I wish to pay and I desire to purchase a home so that me and my child may have at least a home to live in.' There was filed an appraisal by three persons, said in the record to be reputable white real estate brokers, of the premises at 818 Washington Street, Columbia, of the value of $2000, proposed to be purchased. A hearing was held on Dec. 2, 1948 at which an attorney for the carrier appeared for it and the employer and objected to the lump sum award because of the infancy of Patricia who was without a guardian. Having heard only the arguments of the adversary attorneys, the hearing commissioner ordered lump sum payment to the widow.
The employer and carrier appealed to the full commission upon the following grounds: By formal opinion the majority of the commission sustained the hearing commissioner, whereupon the employer and carrier appealed to the court of common pleas upon grounds substantially the same as they assigned for review by the commission. The court affirmed and this appeal was prosecuted upon exceptions which fairly raise the questions which will be discussed.
The record does not expressly state the commuted value in controversy but it was said by a counsel at the oral argument, undisputed by the other, that the commuted amount would be about $4500. There is no doubt of vital interest of the employer and carrier in the controversy. In Gilliard v. Victor Monaghan Co., 211 S.C. 68, 44 S.E.2d 109, the carrier had to pay over again for lack of the appointment of a guardian.
It is obvious that the commission failed to heed our judgment in Ashley v Ware Shoals Mfg. Co., 210 S.C. 273, 42 S.E.2d 390, 396, where the court at great pains and length stated the requisite procedure before the commission upon the question of lump sum settlement. Full reference should be had to the opinion in that case but the following quotations demonstrate the disregard of it by the commission in this proceeding:
'If the foregoing requirements are met, it does not necessarily follow that the Commission should commute periodical payments into a lump sum payment. It must further appear that there are unusual circumstances which would make a departure from the principle of periodical payments 'to the best interests of the employee or his dependents.' Here again no inflexible rule can be laid down but there should be something taking the case out of the ordinary rule to justify the Commission in ordering a lump sum settlement. It was the purpose of the statute to provide for particular and exceptional instances. * * *
'In the light of the foregoing principles, did the Industrial Commission abuse its discretion in granting the application of respondent for a lump sum settlement? The reasons set forth in the application for desiring such a settlement are as follows: 'To pay miscellaneous obligations which accrued during my illness and for which compensation has been insufficient to cover, and to pay attorney's fees.' No testimony was offered to support these statements. There is nothing to show the character of these obligations. As a general rule the desire to pay debts is not regarded as a sufficient ground to justify commutation of compensation payments. Annotation 69 A.L.R. page 547. Of course, the nature of the obligation and the purpose for which incurred may be such as to create an exception. Under the terms of Section 7035-24, compensation under our Act is 'exempt from all claims of creditors and from taxes.' * * *
'Although the burden of showing facts sufficient to justify a lump sum settlement was on respondent, he made no effort to comply with any of the requirements that we have laid down as necessary to justify a commutation of an award.'
The security of property and rights of infants has ever been the concern of the courts. The principle is axiomatic in the law. This case presents a patent violation. The caption of it is completely misleading. Patricia, an infant of the tender age of two, is styled a respondent, whereas she and her rights have received scant, if any, consideration and she is legally unrepresented. It was not provided that she should have any interest in the proposed $2000 real estate purchase and there was no evidence that she would in anywise benefit from the additional, even greater amount which was ordered to be paid to her mother in one sum. In Gilliard v. Victor Monaghan Co., supra, the award was commuted by the commission in part purpose to buy a farm which apparently was never purchased although the lump sum was paid to the minor claimant's father.
Sec. 7035-42 of the compensation act plainly provides as follows: 'The widow or widower, and all children of deceased employees, shall be conclusively presumed to be dependents of deceased and shall be entitled to receive the benefits of this article for the full periods specified in the...
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