Ashley v. Ware Shoals Mfg. Co.

• Decision Date: 16 April 1947
• Docket Number: 15937.
• Parties: ASHLEY v. WARE SHOALS MFG. CO. et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

42 S.E.2d 390

210 S.C. 273

ASHLEY v. WARE SHOALS MFG. CO. et al.

No. 15937.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

April 16, 1947

Osborne, Butler & Moore, of Spartanburg, for appellants.

W. K. Charles, of Greenwood, for respondent.

OXNER, Justice.

On September 7, 1943, claimant-respondent sustained an injury by accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment. Compensation for total disability at the rate of $17.65 per week was paid from the date of the injury to December 11, 1944, at which time a controversy arose as to the continuance and extent of claimant's disability. Several hearings were had which culminated in an award by the hearing Commissioner on April 5, 1946, directing that 'compensation at the compensable rate of $17.65 per week be paid to Willie Wesley Ashley from September 7, 1943, and thereafter as provided by Section 7035-32 of the South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Law, the Carrier taking credit for any and all compensation paid.' This award was affirmed by a majority of the full Commission on June 25 1946. The insurance carrier thereupon resumed payment of compensation and has since continued to pay same.

While compensation was being paid under the terms of the foregoing award, claimant, on July 25, 1946, filed an application asking that future installments be commuted and paid to him in a lump sum. On August 3, 1946, without notice to the employer or carrier, this application was approved by three members of the Industrial Commission. On August 5, 1946, the Commission, through its claims examiner, wrote a letter to the carrier, stating that application for a lump sum settlement had been made by claimant and notifying the carrier that unless objections were filed within fourteen days, lump sum settlement would be ordered. Written objections were filed by the carrier and employer on August 15th. A hearing on the application for a lump sum settlement was held on September 9, 1946. No testimony was offered by any of the parties. The Commission heard oral arguments and thereafter on September 13, 1946, an award was filed in which it was stated 'that the lump sum payment approved by three Commissioners on August 3, 1946, is hereby approved by the majority (of the) Commission.' The employer and carrier appealed to the Circuit Court. That Court overruled all exceptions and affirmed the order of the Commission directing a lump sum settlement. This appeal is by the carrier and employer from the order of the Circuit Court.

The first question for determination is whether the Industrial Commission is empowered to commute future installments payable under an award for total disability.

The only authority given to the Industrial Commission to accelerate or commute weekly payments is contained in Section 7035-47 of the 1942 Code. This section as originally enacted (Section 44 of Act No. 610 of the Acts of 1935, 39 St. at L. page 1231) was as follows:

'Whenever any weekly payment has been continued for not less than six weeks, the liability therefor may, in unusual cases, where the parties agree and the Industrial Commission deems it to be to the best interests of the employee or his dependents or where it will prevent undue hardships on the employer or his insurance carrier, without prejudicing the interest of the employee or his dependents, be redeemed, in whole or in part, by the payment by the employer of a lump sum which shall be fixed by the Commission, but in no case to be less than ninety (90%) per cent of, nor to exceed the commutable value of the future installments commuted at six (6%) per cent. per annum which may be due under this Act. The Commission, however, in its discretion, may at any time in the case of a minor who has received permanently disabling injuries, either partial or total, provide that he be compensated, in whole or in part, by the payment of a lump sum, the amount of which shall be fixed by the Commission but in no case to be less than ninety (90%) per cent. of, nor to exceed the commutable value of the future installments which may be due under this Act.' (Italics ours.)

In 1937, the above quoted section was amended so as to read as follows (40 St. at L. 613, 620):

'Whenever any weekly payment has been continued for not less than six weeks, the liability therefor may, in the usual cases, where the employees applies and requests, and the Industrial Commission deems it to be to the best interests of the employee or his dependents, or where it will prevent undue hardships on the employer or his insurance carrier, without prejudicing the interest of the employee or his dependents be redeemed in whole or in part, by the payment by the employer of a lump sum which shall be fixed by the Commission, but in no case to be less than ninety (90%) per cent of, nor to exceed the commutable value of the future installments commuted so as not to exceed six (6%) per cent nor to be less than two (2%) per cent. The Commission, however, in its discretion, may at any time in the case of a minor who has received permanently disabling injuries, either partial or total, provide that he be compensated, in whole or in part, by the payment of a lump sum, the amount of which shall be fixed by the Commission but in no case to be less than ninety (90%) per cent of, nor to exceed the commutable value of the future installments which may be due under this Act.' (Italics ours.)

It will be observed that the changes made consisted in striking out the words which we have italicized in quoting the original section and inserting in lieu thereof those italicized in quoting the amendment. This section, in the form in which it was amended, is now incorporated in the 1942 Code as Section 7035-47.

Before entering into a discussion of the power of the Industrial Commission to order weekly installments for total disability paid in a lump sum, it is necessary to determine the effect of the 1937 amendment to Section 44 of the original act. Appellants contend that the use of the word 'usual' in the amending act of 1937 and in the 1942 Code is a clerical error and should be read 'unusual' to give effect to the obvious legislative intent. Such a contention necessitates a brief review of the purpose and general plan of this legislation as disclosed by other portions of the act.

Section 7035-21 is in part as follows: 'Compensation under this article shall be paid periodically, promptly, and directly to the person entitled thereto, unless otherwise specifically provided.' Following this section, provision is made for the payment of compensation in weekly installments to any employee who becomes totally or partially disabled as the result of an accident and for the payment of weekly compensation to his dependents in the event of his death from such accident. A careful examination of this statute reveals a primary purpose and general scheme to pay compensation at intervals corresponding to the time the employee would have received his wages had he not been injured. Undoubtedly it was intended that periodical payments should be the rule and lump sum settlements the exception. The principle involved in the compensation acts is that the benefits received are a substitute for the wages of the injured employee, and with this theory in mind almost all of the legislative bodies of the various States have provided for the payment of compensation in regular installments. The purpose of this method is to prevent an imprudent employee or dependent from wasting the means for his support and thereby becoming a burden upon society.

It was manifestly not the intention of the Legislature in amending this section to authorize the redemption of the liability for weekly compensation in the 'usual cases' and thereby destroy the general scheme of the statute establishing periodical payments. Moreover, the context of this section does not admit of the use of the word 'usual.' Similar sections in the workmen's compensation acts of North Carolina, Virginia and numerous other States only permit commutation in 'unusual cases.' Our attention has not been called to any act where the word 'usual' was used in this connection. We think it is clear that the only purpose of the 1937 amendment was to substitute the words 'where the employee applies and requests' for the words 'where the parties agree' as contained in the original section, and to change the rate of discount to be used in arriving at the commuted value of future payments; and the no other changes in the original section were contemplated.

'Courts are not always confined to the literal meaning of a statute; the real purpose and intent of the lawmakers will prevail over the literal import of the words. * * * A statute as a whole must receive a practical, reasonable and fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design and policy of the lawmakers. * * * It is also an old and well-established rule that words ought to be subservient to the intent, and not the intent to the words.' Greenville Baseball Inc. v. Bearden, Sheriff, et al., 200 S.C. 363, 20 S.E.2d 813, 815. 'While it is an elementary rule of construction that words used in a statute should be given their plain and ordinary meaning, this, as all other rules, is subject to the prime object of ascertaining and giving effect to the legislative intention.' State ex rel. Walker v. Sawyer, 104 S.C. 342, 88 S.E. 894, 895. Numerous cases will be found in which clerical errors have been corrected by the courts pursuant to this principle. As stated by that eminent jurist, Justice Woods, in Stackhouse v. County Board of Commissioners for Dillon County, 86 S.C. 419, 68 S.E. 561, 562:

'This rule has been followed in many cases in this and other jurisdictions. In Waring v. Cheraw etc. Ry. Co., 16 S.C. 416, the word 'hereinafter'...