Brown v. State

Decision Date12 September 2022
Docket Number1374-2021
PartiesROBERT J. BROWN v. STATE OF MARYLAND
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Circuit Court for Baltimore City Case No. 220255001

Zic Ripken, Raker, Irma S. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned) JJ.

OPINION [*]

Ripken, J.

A jury sitting in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City convicted Robert Brown ("Brown"), appellant, of one count of electronic harassment of Jeneen Hughes ("Hughes"). The court sentenced Brown to three years of incarceration, with all but two years suspended. On appeal, Brown argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to propound a question during voir dire that sought to uncover gender bias and by admitting pictures of unauthenticated text messages that Brown allegedly sent to Hughes.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Brown presents two questions for review:

I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to ask prospective jurors a voir dire question designed to reveal gender bias in a domestically related criminal case?
II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting improperly authenticated screenshots of text messages alleged to have been sent by Mr. Brown to Ms. Hughes?

Because the substance of the requested question that the court omitted from voir dire was fairly covered by other questions and there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that Brown authored the text messages sent to Hughes, we shall affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Between January 2 and 5, 2020, Brown sent Hughes a series of threatening text messages and made repeated calls to Hughes, despite her asking him to stop contacting her. On Sunday, January 5, Brown's threatening behavior culminated with Brown attempting to kick in the doors of Hughes's home and throwing a brick at her window. Brown was charged in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City with misuse of telephone facilities and equipment (count 1), electronic harassment (count 2), harassment (count 3), two counts of malicious destruction of property (counts 4 and 5), and fourth degree burglary (count 6). In October 2021, the case proceeded to trial.

During voir dire, the court asked the venire panel the following pertinent questions:

THE COURT: The State alleges the Defendant committed the following crimes, telephone misuse, malicious destruction of property, fourth degree burglary, and harassment. Do you have strong feelings about any of the crimes I just listed?
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Do you have strong feeling about domestically related crimes?
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Does any member of the panel have strong feelings about the Me Too movement, or any other social movement against sexual abuse or harassment of women?
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Would you give more or less weight to the testimony of witnesses called by the Defense than to witnesses called by the State? Alternatively, would you give more or less weigh[t] to the testimony of witnesses called by the State than to witnesses called by the Defense?
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Does any member of the panel hold any beliefs related to race, sex, color, religion, national origin or other personal attributes of the Defendant or other witnesses that would or might affect your ability to reach a verdict based only on the evidence and the law?

The court did not ask the following question that defense counsel requested ("Question 14"):

Would you give more or less weight to the testimony of a woman accusing a man of a domestically related crime than you would to the testimony of a man defending against a domestically related accusation?

Brown objected to the court's exclusion of Question 14. The court overruled the objection, and the jury was empaneled.

At trial, Hughes testified that she and Brown began a romantic relationship in 2014. A few months into their relationship, Brown became "controlling" such that "if [Hughes] told him no, he'd kind of break stuff, mess up [her] house [and] try to break in[.]" Prior to January 2020, Hughes had attempted to end her relationship with Brown.

According to Hughes, on January 2, 2020, she and Brown planned to spend time together. The plan was disrupted when Brown told Hughes that his son was in the hospital. Brown asked Hughes to go the hospital. Hughes declined and told Brown that she did not believe him. Brown became angry with Hughes. Hughes told Brown that their relationship was over, which angered Brown. Hughes further testified that Brown repeatedly called and texted Hughes and went to her house. Hughes blocked Brown's phone number. Each time Hughes blocked a phone number that Brown was using, Brown would begin calling or texting from a new number. Hughes testified that she knew it was Brown calling and texting her "Because I know his voice, and I know his texts[.]" Brown would call from different numbers and "ask [Hughes] why [she] won't talk to him or let him in[.]" Hughes again asked Brown to stop contacting her. Hughes indicated that she had kept screenshots of some of the text messages that Brown sent to her from January 2 through January 3.[1]

When the State asked Hughes about the screenshots, Brown objected on the basis that the text messages in the screenshots were neither relevant nor properly authenticated. The State responded that the text messages were relevant to show continuing conduct prior to January 5, and that it was laying a foundation for the screenshots to be admitted. The court overruled the objection. Hughes testified that the screenshots fairly and accurately depicted text message conversations between her and Brown from January 2 through January 3. The State then moved to admit the screenshots into evidence, and Brown again objected on the same grounds stated previously. The court ruled there was a sufficient basis to believe that the text messages in the screenshots were what the State purported them to be, and the court admitted them into evidence as State's exhibits 1-3.

Each exhibit contains text messages sent to Hughes from different, unnamed numbers. State's exhibit 1 depicts text messages sent to Hughes on the morning of January 2 with the following messages: "I'm a f****** try to kill you"-"I'm going to f*** you up"-"Bitch call me that again I'm going to try and kill u straight up." (Asterisks in original). Another reads: "Bye as soon as I get some leaving this hospital I'm coming to your house[.]" State's exhibit 2 depicts text messages sent to Hughes also on the morning of January 2, including a photograph of what appears to be a hospital bed. State's exhibit 3 depicts text messages sent to Hughes on the evening of January 3. One reads: "And we definitely done and when I do see u Imma spit in ur face[.]" Another reads "I don't give a fuck when u come back I bet if you don't hate me before then when we get done whether it's Sunday or Monday u gonna hate me."

Hughes testified that she was at home on January 5. While there, she observed Brown kicking her screen doors and front door, and she subsequently called the police. At trial, Hughes estimated that it would cost $500 to repair her front door.

The jury convicted Brown of electronic harassment and found him not guilty of misuse of telephone facilities and equipment and not guilty of one count of malicious destruction of property having a value less than $1,000.[2] The court sentenced Brown to three years in prison with all but two years suspended and three years of probation. The court further ordered that Brown complete the House of Ruth battery program, undergo a substance abuse evaluation, undergo a psychiatric evaluation, and complete an anger management program. Brown filed a timely appeal.

DISCUSSION

"An appellate court reviews for abuse of discretion a trial court's decision as to whether to ask a voir dire question." Pearson v. State, 437 Md 350, 356 (2014). We similarly review a trial court's determination as to the authenticity of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Darling v. State, 232 Md.App. 430, 456 (2017).

I. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Declining to Ask Brown's Proposed Question.

Brown argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by failing to ask the venire panel one of Brown's requested voir dire questions. Brown contends that the circuit court was required to ask his proposed question because no other question covered that specific focus of gender bias in domestically related crimes. The State responds that the voir dire as a whole adequately covered those topics.

Maryland "adhere[s] to[] limited voir dire." Washington v. State, 425 Md. 306, 312, 313 (2012) (quoting Dingle v. State, 361 Md. 1, 13-14 (2000)). "[T]he sole purpose of voir dire 'is to ensure a fair and impartial jury by determining the existence of [specific] cause for disqualification.'" Pearson, 437 Md. at 356 (first alteration in original) (quoting Washington, 425 Md. at 312). Causes for disqualification are "biases directly related to the crime[s], the witnesses, or the defendant[.]" Dingle, 361 Md. at 10.

Trial courts have "significant latitude in the process of conducting voir dire and the scope and form of questions presented to the venire." Collins v. State, 452 Md. 614, 622- 23 (2017). The court "reaches the limits of its discretion only when the voir dire method employed by the court fails to probe juror biases effectively." Id. at 623 (quoting Wright v. State, 411 Md. 503, 508 (2009)). "[T]he court need not ordinarily grant a particular requested [question] if the matter is fairly covered [elsewhere]." Burch v. State, 346 Md. 253, 293 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). See Stewart v. State, 399 Md. 146, 163 (2007), abrogated on other grounds by Kazadi v. State, 467 Md. 1 (2020) ("Questions should not be argumentative, cumulative, or tangential.").

On request, a trial court must ask a voir dire question "if and only if...

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