Brown v. State
Decision Date | 08 May 2019 |
Docket Number | A19A0197 |
Citation | 350 Ga.App. 104,828 S.E.2d 110 |
Parties | BROWN v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Clifford Louis Kurlander, for Appellant.
Joshua Bradley Smith, Henry Wayne Syms Jr., for Appellee.
A jury convicted Janay Marques Brown of armed robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and criminal attempt to commit armed robbery.1 She appeals the denial of her amended motion for new trial, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support her convictions and arguing that the trial court (1) erred in denying her motion to sever her trial from that of a co-defendant; (2) erred in admitting other act evidence; and (3) erred in its instruction to the jury on other act evidence. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
On appeal from a criminal conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and the defendant no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence; moreover, we neither weigh the evidence nor decide witness credibility, but determine only whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). We set out the evidence relevant to this appeal in an unpublished opinion in which we affirmed the conviction of Brown’s co-defendant Mario Mack as follows:
(Punctuation omitted.)
Mack v. State , 345 Ga. App. XXVI (May 11, 2018) (unpublished), certiorari denied, Case No. S18C1420 (decided January 7, 2019). Additional facts will be recited as necessary to consider Brown’s arguments.
1. In her first enumeration, Brown contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to sever her trial from that of Greene, who was dressed in prison inmate attire. Brown’s co-defendant Mack asserted the identical argument in his appeal, which we rejected. We reject Brown’s argument for the same reasons as those stated in Mack , supra:
(Punctuation omitted.) Mack , 345 Ga. App. XXVI.
2. In her second enumeration of error, Brown contends that the trial court erred in admitting pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) ("Rule 404 (b)") evidence that she had been planning a separate robbery the same day. She contends that the State violated the notice requirement of Rule 404 (b), and that the evidence was not intrinsic or relevant to all of the purposes for which it was admitted.
As noted previously, Brown’s co-indictee, Smith, pled guilty to all of the charges stemming from the incident. During trial, Smith testified that she lied when she told investigating officers that Dixon had set up the robbery, and testified that she had no idea who was involved in the robbery, and that she did not know that the robbery was going to occur.3 Smith testified, however, that she, Brown, and co-indictee Walton were supposed to commit another robbery in South Carolina earlier on the same day of the incident at issue in this case, but that it never happened: Smith testified that "Brian, Janay and Brittany" were involved in the planning process of the South Carolina robbery, and that "Janay Brown, Brittany, Brian, Jerome and Mario" were going to be involved in the South Carolina robbery.
(a) Brown contends the trial court erred in admitting this other act evidence because it was not intrinsic and not relevant "to proving the added purposes of ‘participation in the conspiracy,’ knowledge, opportunity, or identity." At the hearing, the State argued that the other act evidence "shows [Brown’s] intent and shows her motive and it does go to the overall crime spree where she conspired with the other five co-defendants to rob two victims." The trial court admitted the evidence under Rule 404 (b) "to show motive, preparation and planning and intent," but that it is "not an intrinsic act showing a continuous course of conduct." At two instances before the other act evidence was introduced at trial, the trial court gave limiting instructions that the jury could consider the evidence to show knowledge or intent, participation and plan, or preparation and motive.
Because Brown’s trial was held after January 1, 2013, Georgia’s new Evidence Code governs this issue. Bradshaw v. State , 296 Ga. 650, 655 (3), 769 S.E.2d 892 (2015). We review decisions to admit evidence for a clear abuse of discretion. Reeves v. State , 294 Ga. 673, 676 (2), 755 S.E.2d 695 (2014). Rule 404 (b), which tracks Federal Rule of Evidence 404 (b),4 governs the admissibility of evidence of other crimes or wrongs and provides:
Evidence of other...
To continue reading
Request your trial- Hamlett v. State
-
Parham v. State
...outweighed by unfair prejudice and that it meets the other requirements of OCGA § 24-4-403 (‘‘Rule 403’’). Brown v. State , 350 Ga. App. 104, 109 (2) (a), 828 S.E.2d 110 (2019) (citations and punctuation omitted). The crimes on trial and the other acts committed a few hours later were part ......
-
Geer v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., A19A0588
...for attorneys’ fees under OCGA § 50-18-73 (b). Nevertheless, we conclude that this case is completely controlled by our decision in 828 S.E.2d 110 Paulding County v. Morrison , 316 Ga. App. 806, 810-811, 728 S.E.2d 921 2012. In Paulding County , we held that the anti-SLAPP statute did not a......
-
Local Government Law
...316 Ga. App. 806, 810-11, 728 S.E.2d 921, 924-25 (2012)).215. 316 Ga. App. at 811, 728 S.E.2d at 925.216. Geer, 350 Ga. App. at 128, 828 S.E.2d at 110.217. Martin v. City of Coll. Park, 342 Ga. App. 289, 289, 802 S.E.2d 292, 293 (2017), cert. granted, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 31 (Ga. Jan. 16, 2018), ......
-
Local Government
...849 S.E.2d at 665 (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b)(2)). 113. . Id.114. Id. at 288, 849 S.E.2d at 666 (see Geer, 350 Ga. App. at 128, 828 S.E.2d at 110).115. 356 Ga. App. 274, 844 S.E.2d 846 (2020).116. Id. at 275, 279-80, 844 S.E.2d at 848, 851.117. Id. at 274-75, 844 S.E.2d at 848.118. Id. ......