Brown v. State, 4D01-440.
Decision Date | 16 April 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 4D01-440.,4D01-440. |
Citation | 848 So.2d 361 |
Parties | Joe BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Gary Caldwell, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Douglas J. Glaid, Assistant Attorney General, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
In a case involving theft of a purse, defendant was charged with strong arm robbery but convicted of robbery by sudden snatching. Because we find that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury and that, in any case, the evidence does not support the conviction, we reverse.
On the day in question, the victim sat on a park bench with a friend. The bench was partially bordered by bushes about three feet high. Victim placed her purse on the bench near her but apart from her person. Her friend noticed defendant riding a bicycle past them "a couple of times." Presently, they heard a rustling in the bushes. Her friend looked in that direction and saw defendant running away. Victim also turned and only then became aware that her purse had been taken. Her friend ran after defendant, who he noticed was carrying her purse. After an altercation, defendant was arrested at the scene.
With this evidence, the state rested. Defendant moved for judgment of acquittal on the strong arm robbery charge, arguing that victim had not been placed in fear, and was not herself the target of any violence, threat, or assault. The trial court granted the motion and reduced the charge to robbery by sudden snatching.1 Defendant objected, arguing that the purse was not on victim's person when stolen, but was placed instead next to her on the park bench. The court overruled the objection, stating that because the purse was within her reach, it was tantamount to being on her person.
During the charge conference, the trial court proposed to instruct the jury with the definition of "possession" from the standard jury instruction on possession of controlled substances. Defendant objected. The trial court overruled the objection and gave the following instruction:
"Actual possession means (A) that the thing is in the hands of or on the person, or (B) that the thing is in a container in the hands of or on the person, or (C) the thing is so close as to be within ready reach and is under the control of the person." [e.s.]
The jury convicted defendant of robbery by sudden snatching, and he now appeals.
The state argues that the text of the robbery by sudden snatching statute, section 812.131(1) (), does not require that the item be taken from the actual, physical possession of the victim. According to the state, the "from the victim's person" text requires only that the item be within the victim's reach and control. The state bases this argument on the doctrine "in pari materia." See Ferguson v. State, 377 So.2d 709, 710 (Fla.1979)
(). The contention is that the robbery by sudden snatching statute should be read in pari materia with the general robbery statute, which has been interpreted not to require actual, physical possession by the victim.2
The state emphasizes that legislative intent is the "polestar" for statutory interpretation. In this instance, the state argues, the Legislature has indicated an intent that the property suddenly snatched need not actually be on the victim's person. The state points out that the robbery by sudden snatching statute explicitly eliminates any requirement that the state prove that the offender used force in snatching the property or that the victim was injured or resisted the taking.3
The state's argument is invalid. In the first place, the "in pari materia" canon of statutory construction would be appropriate only if we found the statute ambiguous, and we do not. See McLaughlin v. State, 721 So.2d 1170 (Fla.1998)
( ); see also Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984) (same); A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141, 137 So. 157, 159 (1931) (same). Even if "in pari materia" were indicated—and we stress that it is not—it applies only when two different statutory provisions deal with the same specific subject or with subjects so connected that the meaning of the one informs the other. Here, one statute deals with robbery generally, but the other deals only with a specific form of robbery. Nothing about the "in pari materia" canon suggests that criminal statutes on a specific topic must necessarily be interpreted identically to statutes on a topic touching the same subject only generally.
Moving on from the canon of statutory construction, there is no basis for us to look to "polestars" when the ship of statutory interpretation is guided by clear text. That is to say, we look only to clear text for statutory meaning, not to the stars. The text of the specific crime of robbery by sudden snatching defines the offense differently than the general crime of robbery. The text pointedly omits any reference to the person's "custody," a term that would have indicated that a snatching might occur from nearby the person.
With the sudden snatching offense, the clear import of the statute's words is to require that the property be abruptly and unexpectedly plucked from the embrace of the person, not from that person's figurative biosphere. It also requires that the victim become aware of the sudden snatching while it is underway. The statute thus addresses the horror of a victim who is conscious of the startling seizure of something from her hand or person. It is not concerned with a surreptitious taking out from under the victim's senses. The erroneous instruction improperly allowed the jury to convict when the property snatched was not actually taken from the person of the victim.
Because the evidence shows that the property was not on the victim's person, and that in any event the victim herself made it obvious that she was...
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