Brown v. State

Decision Date08 September 2005
Docket NumberNo. 75878-6.,75878-6.
Citation119 P.3d 341,155 Wn.2d 254
PartiesJason BROWN, a Washington State voter, taxpayer, and a Federal Way School District teacher; Rebecca Fife, a Washington State voter, taxpayer, and a Federal Way School District teacher, Margo Campbell, a Washington State voter, taxpayer, and an Issaquah School District teacher; Suzanne Saylor, a Washington State voter, taxpayer, and an Issaquah School District teacher; Jim Gow, a Washington State voter, taxpayer, and a Lake Stevens School District teacher; Sheerie Slatton, a Washington State voter, taxpayer, and a Kettle Falls School District teacher; Mike Hymes, a Washington State voter, taxpayer, and a Moses Lake School District teacher; Steve Lindholm, a Washington State voter, taxpayer, and a Moses Lake School District teacher; Karle Warren, a Washington State voter, taxpayer, and a Clarkston School District teacher; and Washington Education Association, a Washington non-profit corporation, Respondents, v. STATE of Washington, Appellant, Federal Way School District No. 210, a Washington State Public School District; Issaquah School District No. 411, a Washington State Public School District; Lake Stevens School District No. 4, a Washington State Public School District; Kettle Falls School District No. 212, a Washington State Public School District; Moses Lake School District No 161, a Washington State Public School District; and Clarkston School District No. 250, a Washington State Public School District, Interested Parties.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Thomas Fitzgerald Ahearne, Alice M. Ostdiek, Ramsey E. Ramerman, Foster Pepper & Shefelman PLLC, Seattle, for Jason Brown, et al.

Rockie Ulrich Hansen, Rockie Hansen PLLC, Spokane, for Other Parties Clarkson School Dist. No. 250 and Kettle Falls School Dist. No. 212.

Lester Porter, Lance M. Andree, Dionne & Rorick, Seattle, for Other Party Federal Way School District No. 210, et al.

Christopher Lee Hirst, Philip Mosby Guess, Preston Gates & Ellis LLP, Seattle, for Other Party Issaquah School Dist. No. 411.

Michael W. Hoge, Perkins Coie, Seattle, for Other Party Lake Stevens School Dist. No. 4.

Craig Hanson, Hanson Law Offices, Olympia, for Other Party Moses Lake School Dist. No. 161.

CHAMBERS, J.

¶ 1 For many years, the legislature funded up to three optional learning improvement days for local school districts. After passage of Initiative 732 and in the wake of strained budgets, the legislature decided to fund a maximum of two learning improvement days for the 2002-03 school year.

¶ 2 We are asked to hold that this change was a violation of the State's paramount duty to provide for a general and uniform system of education. Const. art IX, §§ 1-2. Alternatively, we are asked to hold it effectively resulted in a cost of living increase lower than required by Initiative 732.

¶ 3 We conclude that learning improvement days are optional and are not necessarily a component of the basic education the State is obliged to provide to all children. Thus this change has not been shown to violate our constitution. We also hold that the legislature did not indirectly violate Initiative 732 when it eliminated one optional learning improvement day. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court.

I

¶ 4 We begin with first principles:

It is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its borders, without distinction or preference on account of race, color, caste, or sex.

The legislature shall provide for a general and uniform system of public schools.

CONST. art. IX, §§ 1-2. This constitutional provision is substantive and enforceable. See generally Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash.2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978). Almost 30 years ago, courts in this state reluctantly concluded that the legislature had not provided a general and uniform system of public schools as required by the constitution, because school funding largely relied on local levies which often failed rather than regular and dependable tax sources. Id. However, out of our respect for the constitution's delegation of responsibility and authority to the legislature to provide education, this court declined to impose specific substantive requirements at that time, leaving that task to the legislature. Id. at 518-19, 585 P.2d 71.

¶ 5 The legislature has chosen to discharge its responsibility to provide a general and uniform system of education through The Washington Basic Education Act of 1977 (Basic Education Act), RCW 28A.150.200 through .510. The Basic Education Act, among other things, requires school districts to offer certain minimum hours of instruction and mandates certain staffing ratios. RCW 28A.150.220, .260.

¶ 6 The State pays the base salaries of all teachers and staff it requires school districts to employ for all 180 instructional days that it deems necessary to provide a basic education. E.g., LAWS OF 2002, ch. 371, § 503(7). The Basic Education Act itself does not set forth salaries; the salary structure is set forth elsewhere in the title. See RCW 28A.400.200. The act does set out minimum staffing ratios1 which are statutorily designated as constitutionally required. RCW 28A.150.260. The amount that the State pays for teachers and staff it requires school districts to hire for the 180 day instructional year is called the "derived base salary," and is calculated according to schedules put forth in appropriation bills and an administrative document called the "LEAP 1S," with some exceptions not relevant here. See, e.g., LAWS OF 2001, 2d Spec. Sess., ch. 7, § 503.

¶ 7 The 1993 legislature authorized districts to assign non-instructional "learning improvement days." LAWS OF 1993, ch. 336, § 301; see also RCW 28A.655.130. On these days, teachers would receive additional training, among other things. RCW 28A.655.130(1). The decision to provide learning improvement days came out of a review of public education by the governor's counsel on education reform and funding in the early 1990s. During the pilot program stage, the legislature allowed school districts to apply for grants to fund these days. School districts were not required to take advantage of the program and the statute authorizing the pilot program explicitly said that it was not part of basic education. See LAWS OF 1993, ch. 336 § 301(8).

¶ 8 Whether or not to hold learning improvement days is and always has been at the discretion of the local school district, and school districts are not required to use as many as the legislature authorizes. RCW 28A.655.130. It appears the vast majority of school districts take advantage of this program. Now that the program has been made permanent, if districts elect to hold such days, then the State increases the amount of salary funds it makes available to the district according to a strict schedule. E.g., LAWS OF 2002, ch. 371, § 503(7). Specifically, the State supplements the salary allocation by 1/180th of the derived base salary for every learning improvement day the school district holds, producing a new total base salary allocation. Id. "Total base salary" and "derived base salary" are terms of art.

¶ 9 In November 2000, the people overwhelmingly adopted Initiative 732, which mandated that the State provide an annual cost-of-living increase for all teachers and school employees so their salaries could at least keep up with inflation. The amount of the raise was to be recalculated every year and based on the annual average consumer price index. RCW 28A.400.205(2).

¶ 10 In 2002, this state faced a significant budget deficit. The legislature elected to balance the budget by reducing, among other things, the number of learning improvement days from three to two. See LAWS OF 2002, ch. 371, § 503(7) (ESSB 6387). That same year, for the first time since the pilot program days (in an uncodified appropriation bill), the legislature said explicitly that learning improvement days "shall not be considered part of basic education." LAWS OF 2002, ch. 371, § 503(7).

¶ 11 For those school districts consistently electing to hold the maximum number of learning improvement days, that effectively meant instead of a 2002/03 salary based on a 183 day work year with a 3.6 percent cost of living adjustment, employees were compensated for a 182 day work year with a 3.6 percent cost of living adjustment. For many employees, it effectively meant the loss of one day's pay, representing about one-half of one percent reduction in pay in comparison to what they would have received had the legislature kept to tradition and authorized three learning improvement days.

¶ 12 A coalition of school districts, teachers, and private citizens did not think that the effective one day reduction in pay was right and sued. Plaintiffs include lead plaintiff, Federal Way first grade teacher Jason Brown. Collectively, we will refer to the challengers as Brown. Brown asserts that this reduction in the number of learning improvement days was improper for two reasons. He contends that learning improvement days had become part of constitutionally required basic education, and that the legislature lacks the power to reduce anything deemed basic education without an established educational reason to do so. He also argues that the change indirectly violated Initiative 732, on the theory that it worked a reduction in the cost-of-living adjustment.

¶ 13 Both sides moved for summary judgment. After concluding that the term "salary base" in Initiative 732 is ambiguous, the trial court ruled that the average informed voter would have believed the phrase in the initiative, "state-funded salary base used in state funding formulas for teachers and other school district employees," I-732 § 2(1)(a), in context referred to the actual wages received in the prior year, not the current derived base salary. The trial court thus...

To continue reading

Request your trial
14 cases
  • State v. Ollivier
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 31 Octubre 2013
    ...of denial of constitutional rights de novo. State v. Iniguez, 167 Wash.2d 273, 280, 217 P.3d 768 (2009) (citing Brown v. State, 155 Wash.2d 254, 261, 119 P.3d 341 (2005)). ¶ 96 In addition to the speedy trial right, an accused has another important constitutional right at stake, the right t......
  • State v. Iniguez
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 8 Octubre 2009
    ...Wash. App. 97, 105, 151 P.3d 249 (2007). And we review de novo a claim of a denial of constitutional rights. See Brown v. State, 155 Wash.2d 254, 261, 119 P.3d 341 (2005); see also United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1469 (9th Cir.1988) (a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim is reviewed......
  • Linda EASTWOOD v. HORSE HARBOR Found. INC.
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 4 Noviembre 2010
    ...it is the unique role of this court to decide what the law is and what tort duties are recognized in this state. Brown v. State, 155 Wash.2d 254, 261-62, 119 P.3d 341 (2005) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803)). The independent duty rule was never a rul......
  • American Legion v. Wash. Dept. of Health
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 11 Septiembre 2008
    ...subject to judicial interpretation.'" Id. (quoting State v. Thorne, 129 Wash.2d 736, 762-63, 921 P.2d 514 (1996)); Brown v. State, 155 Wash.2d 254, 267, 119 P.3d 341 (2005) (noting that an initiative must be read as written, not as a court would like it to be written). "`In construing the m......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT