Brown v. State

Decision Date22 November 2016
Docket NumberNo. 49A05–1311–CR–550.,49A05–1311–CR–550.
Citation64 N.E.3d 1219
Parties Wendell BROWN a/k/a Menes Ankh El, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Menes Ankh El, Greencastle, IN, Appellant pro se.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Ian McLean, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

RILEY, Judge.

[1] AppellantDefendant, Wendell Brown, now known as Menes Ankh–El1 (Ankh–El), appeals his conviction for burglary, a Class C felony, Ind.Code § 35–43–2–1 (2011) ; forgery, a Class C felony, I.C. § 35–43–5–2(b) (2011) ; and driving while suspended, a Class A misdemeanor, I.C. § 9–24–19–2 (2012).

[2] We affirm.

ISSUES

[3] Ankh–El raises five issues on appeal, which we restate as follows:

(1) Whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over this case;
(2) Whether the trial court denied Ankh–El the right to counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution;
(3) Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Ankh–El's conviction for burglary, forgery, and driving while suspended beyond a reasonable doubt;(4) Whether the charging Information was defective; and
(5) Whether the trial court committed fundamental error by exhibiting prejudice.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] In January of 2012, Bank of America acquired a foreclosed home located at 2401 West 39th Street, Indianapolis, Marion County, Indiana (the Property), through a sheriff's sale. Because Bank of America utilized Bank of New York Mellon to service its mortgage rights, Bank of New York Mellon is also listed on the Sheriff's Deed. The Sheriff's Deed was stamped by the Marion County Assessor on February 10, 2012, and filed with the Marion County Recorder on February 13, 2012.

[5] Shortly after procuring the Property, Bank of America engaged Integrated Asset Services "to manage, market, and sell the [P]roperty." (Tr. p. 148). Integrated Asset Services assigned the Property listing to one of its real estate brokers, Mark Forcum (Forcum). It was Forcum's responsibility to prepare, market, and sell the Property. Under ideal circumstances, the Property would have been valued between $700,000 and $800,000; however, given its condition following the foreclosure, Forcum agreed to list the Property for $325,000. Pursuant to his obligations, in addition to showing the Property to prospective buyers, Forcum paid the utility bills; he ensured that the lawn was mowed and the Property was otherwise maintained; and he conducted weekly inspections, during which he verified that the house was secure.

[6] On April 16, 2012, Forcum drove past the Property and noticed that a red flag was hanging from the gate at the end of the driveway. The next day, he returned to the Property to conduct his weekly inspection. Upon arrival, he observed a lawn mower and mowing trailer in the driveway and initially assumed that the regular mowing crew was working on the yard. However, he grew concerned when he noticed that two men were standing on a second-floor balcony because the mowing crew would have no reason to enter the residence. When Forcum exited his vehicle, one of the men on the balcony—Ankh-El—inquired into Forcum's presence. Forcum explained that he is a real estate broker, and, in response, Ankh–El identified himself as the new owner of the Property. Knowing this could not be the case given his exclusive listing rights, Forcum returned to his vehicle and drove away from the Property while calling the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD).

[7] Forcum waited at the end of the long driveway until IMPD officers arrived. Forcum apprised the officers of his concern that there was an individual squatting on the Property, and he provided the officers with his credentials and a copy of the listing agreement which identified him as the agent responsible for selling the Property. Thereafter, the officers proceeded down the driveway and observed Ankh–El and another male standing outside. The officers identified themselves and explained the nature of their visit. Ankh–El informed the officers that he had recently purchased the property for $250,000, and he acted perplexed as to why there would be any indication that the Property was still listed for sale. When asked for proof of his ownership, Ankh–El stated that he had such documentation at another location, so he locked the doors to the house and drove away from the Property while the officers and Forcum waited for him to return. During Ankh–El's absence, one of the officers contacted the Marion County Assessor's Office, which reported that the current owner of record for the Property was Bank of New York Mellon. A short while later, Ankh–El drove up to the Property on a black Yamaha motorcycle. Ankh–El provided the officers with an identification card with his name and photograph, which identified him as a "Moorish National" and listed his birthplace as Marion County, Indiana. (State's Exh. 13). Ankh–El admitted that he had created the identification card himself and explained some of the history of the Moorish people; specifically, he "talked about [how] the laws of [the] land [do not] apply to Moorish Nationals." (Tr. p. 216).

[8] In addition, Ankh–El tendered a document to the officers entitled "FREEHOLD IN DEED. " (State's Exh. 1). According to Ankh–El, this deed, which he had also created himself, evidenced his ownership rights in the Property. The homemade deed, stated, in part:

I, Menes Ankh–El, being in propria persona, sui juris, am a Free Moorish American National of Al Moroc (America) North, Central, South America and Adjoining Islands anciently referred to as Amexem, and I am part and parcel to the Land of my ancient Foremothers, and Fathers (Moabites/Moroccans) by birthright and inheritance as an aboriginal, indigenous and de jure natural citizen of the Continental United States of America Republic. Therefore, by the power and authority vested in me by right of birth and right of soil, retaining all substantive unalienable rights and immunities in the Organic United States of America Republic Constitution, I, Menes Ankh–El, am claiming FREEHOLD IN DEED of the abandoned and unoccupied [Property].

(State's Exh. 1). Immediately preceding his signature, the Freehold in Deed contained a declaration that "I, Menes Ankh–El, am NOT a citizen governed under Naturalization or Immigration, NOT a 14th Amendment ‘Person’ or ‘U.S. Citizen’, NOT subject to statutory, colorable law jurisdiction of the United States in the corporate monopoly of the federal, State, local, and municipal governments(s) [sic ]." (State's Exh. 1). Ankh–El filed his Freehold in Deed with the Marion County Recorder on March 28, 2012.

[9] Based on Ankh–El's self-created documents, the officers determined that he was unlawfully occupying the Property and placed him under arrest. A subsequent inspection of the Property revealed that Ankh–El, after gaining access to the house, had changed all of the locks and had mounted multiple "No Trespassing" signs. (State's Exh. 6). He had also moved a number of his personal belongings, including a set of bolt cutters, into a third floor bedroom, and his laptop was plugged into an outlet. At the jail, Ankh–El was fingerprinted, and his fingerprints matched the criminal record of Wendell Brown.2 A review of Wendell Brown's record from the Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV) revealed that his driver's license was suspended.

[10] On August 30, 2012, the State filed an amended Information, charging Ankh–El (i.e., Wendell Brown) with Count I, burglary, a Class C felony, I.C. § 35–43–2–1 (2011) ; Count II, forgery, a Class C felony, I.C. § 35–43–5–2(b) (2011) ; Count III, theft, a Class D felony, I.C. § 35–43–4–2(a) (2011) ; Count IV, trespass, a Class A misdemeanor, I.C. § 35–43–2–2(a)(4) (2011) ; and Count V, driving while suspended, a Class A misdemeanor, I.C. § 9–24–19–2 (2012).

[11] After the charges were filed, Ankh–El elected to represent himself and began filing a multitude of motions. Several of his motions sought dismissal based on the claim that the trial court lacked both personal and subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, Ankh–El asserted that the trial court lacked authority under the United States Constitution to hear the case, and he further insisted that he is neither a citizen of the United States or Indiana, nor a party to a contract with the State of Indiana. Essentially, he insisted that as a "Private Moorish American National Man," he is not subject to the power of the courts or the laws of this state. (Appellant's App. p. 28). Ankh–El also sought dismissal due to lack of evidence, arguing, in part, that he was rightfully entitled to claim the Property under the doctrine of adverse possession. Additionally, Ankh–El claimed that the trial court violated his right to assistance of counsel and the Vienna Convention by refusing to allow his "Consuls" to address the trial court on his behalf. (Appellant's App. p. 27). He also accused the trial court of committing perjury, and he alleged that the trial court had exhibited extreme prejudice by failing to rule on motions and by preventing the State from responding to his motions. In a few motions, Ankh–El alleged that he was entitled to a default judgment because the trial court and the State had failed to respond to his various motions regarding the trial court's lack of jurisdiction, as well as other accusations by Ankh–El against the State and trial court, including treason, fraud and "[b]arratry." (Appellant's App. p. 30). Furthermore, Ankh–El challenged the validity of the charging Information, positing that the Information does not clearly identify the owner of the Property and that it includes other vague references. Ankh–El additionally argued that the Information failed to properly identify him because he has "a Nationality which is Moorish American [and] for the [I]nformation to designate [him] as a black male and as WENDELL...

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