Brown v. State

• Decision Date: 04 June 1968
• Docket Number: No. 243,243
• Citation: 242 A.2d 570,4 Md.App. 261
• Parties: Nathaniel Elwood BROWN v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 261

4 Md.App. 261

242 A.2d 570

Nathaniel Elwood BROWN v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 243.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

June 4, 1968.

Frank Cannizzaro, Jr., Baltimore, for appellant.

Alfred, J. O'Ferrall, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Charles E. Moylan, Jr. and I. Elliott Goldberg, State's Attys. and Asst. State's Atty. for Baltimore City, respectively, Baltimore, on the brief, for appellee.

Before MURPHY, C. J., and ANDERSON, MORTON, ORTH, and THOMPSON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

On May 25, 1967, the appellant, Nathaniel Elwood Brown, was convicted of murder in the second degree in the Criminal Court of Baltimore by Judge James A. Perrott, sitting without a jury. On June 6, 1967, appellant's Motion for a New Trial was denied and he was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment under the jurisdiction of the Department of Correction.

Appellant raises three contentions on appeal.

1. That his oral statements were inadmissible in view of Miranda.

2. That the lower court erred in not accepting the defense of self-defense.

3. That the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction.

From the evidence adduced at the trial the court could properly find that Daniel Clay was shot to death by the appellant on September 12, 1966, in front of 1413 Pennsylvania Avenue, Baltimore, Maryland.

An autopsy report, submitted into evidence by stipulation, established that the deceased, Daniel Clay, age 23 years, Negro male, 6 9 tall, weight 157 lbs., died as the result of multiple gunshot wounds of the chest, causing a massive internal hemorrhage.

The State's first witness was Officer Carl Johnson who testified that upon receiving certain information regarding a shooting, he investigated and found the deceased lying on the sidewalk, with his head and shoulders leaning against the building at the avove address, and that no weapon was observed upon the deceased nor within the vicinity of his body. He further testified that he called an ambulance and was unable to ascertain the identity of the assailant.

The State's second witness was Joyce Worley who testified that she and Annie Williams were in the vicinity of the shooting when they heard a shot. As they ran to the scene, they bumped into the appellant, whom they knew well and positively identified, and were informed by him that he had shot her cousin, the deceased.

The State's next witness was Annie Williams whose testimony fully substantiated the aforenoted testimony of Joyce Worley.

The State's next witness was the deceased's mother, Laura Clay, who testified that on the date in question, the appellant came to her house seeking out the deceased for the expressed purpose of apologizing to him for an argument they had the previous night. After waiting a short while, he left.

The State's final witness was Detective William Schneeman who testified that while sitting in his office on September 14, 1966, at about 9:10 p.m., the appellant came to his office door and stated, 'I'm Fish. You are looking for me.' He further stated to the effect, 'I shot and killed that man.' Detective Schneeman responded, 'What?' and invited the appellant inside. The appellant continued his explanatory statement, without interruption. 'I want to tell you about it. My mother told me come in and get it squared away.' Appellant then entered and sat down and was informed that the officers would like to go over the statement again, 'get it written down, advise you of your rights, and get a written statement.' Appellant was then informed of his Miranda rights, excepting the warning that anything he said could and would be used against him in a court of law.

After reviewing the question of voluntariness, the trial court excluded the written statement, while admitting the oral statement.

Appellant, testifying in his own defense, stated that he was 29 years old, 5 7 tall, weighing 106 lbs., and admitted shooting the deceased, but urged the court to find that he had acted in self-defense. As background to the shooting, the appellant testified that he owed the deceased $85.00 for some drug purchases, plus an additional amount for some drugs he had agreed to sell for the deceased but had converted the drugs to his own use instead. It was over this owed money that the prior argument arose and the deceased knocked the appellant to the ground and kicked him. It was allegedly to repair the friendship from this altercation that the current confrontation arose. After the appellant admitted that he was in the wrong and told the deceased that he had spent the money which he previously had of him, the deceased stated, 'I'm tired of this' and trached for his back pocket while asking, 'Where's my money?'. Deceased then, according to the appellant, 'hit me on my shoulder, knocked me down, went to kick me, going in his back pocket. Before I know it, I come out with the gun, shooting, getting away from him. He was still coming. I kept on shooting.' The gun was allegedly given to the appellant to sell earlier in the evening and he just happened to be carrying it at the time of the attack.

Appellant's testimony regarding the circumstances surrounding the oral statement, was diametrically opposed to that of Detective Schneeman. Appellant contends that upon entering the police station, he approached an officer and stated, 'I'm inquiring about a murder I've been accused of.' Thereupon, another officer was summoned and he began questioning the appellant and invited him into an office. Appellant urges that he initially refused to give a statement because he was 'under the influence of narcotics and I would rather see a lawyer before I give a statement or anything.' He stated that thereafter the officer continued to urge him to give a statement, since he said he didn't do it, and that thereafter, due to his groggy condition and the officer's persistence, he finally gave in and made the desired statement.

Detective Schneeman testified again on redirect. After reviewing the contradictory testimony addressed to the circumstances surrounding the oral statement, the trial judge, in performing his duty of judging the credibility of the witnesses, found that Detective Schneeman's version was the credible one. McRae v. State, 3 Md.App. 388, 393, 293 A.2d 607, 610 (1968).

Appellant's first contention urges that the oral statement was inadmissible owing to the failure of the police to interrupt the appellant after the initial statement, 'I'm Fish, I shot that man,' and fully advise him of the warnings enunciated in Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

It is well settled that under Miranda volunteered statements or 'blurts' are admissible. Carrington v. State, 1 Md.App. 353 357, 230 A.2d 112, 114 (1967) citing Campbell v. State, 244 Md. 363, 366, 223 A.2d 604, 606-607 (1966); Carwell v. State, 2 Md.App. 45, 50, 232 A.2d 903, 906 (1967).

We think it clear that the oral statement was not obtained by a 'custodial interrogation.' In discussing the procedural safeguards set forth in Miranda, we stated in Carwell v. State, supra, 2 Md.App. 45 at page 50, 232 A.2d at page 906:

'We held in Gaudio and Bucci v. State, 1 Md.App. 455, 230 A.2d 700, that those safeguards applied to statements made during a 'custodial interrogation' and that Miranda did not protect an accused 'under any and all circumstances * * * to the extent that no inquiry at all by the authorities is permissible without prior warning.' In the instant case there was not even an inquiry by the police; the appellant simply 'blurted out' the statement to which objection was made.'

The Miranda mandate directs absolute compliance with the prerequisite minimal standards set forth therein where the appellant is being subjected to custodial interrogation. Tillery v. State, 3 Md.App. 142, 147, 238 A.2d 125, 128 (1968). However, this protective shield addresses itself to the 'custodial interrogation' of the accused and is not so all pervasive as to compel the police officers to interrupt the spontaneity and continuity of volunteered statements. As was stated in Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at page 478, 86 S.Ct. at page 1630:

'Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence. * * * There is no requirement that police stop a person who enters a police station and states that he wishes to confess to a crime, or a person who calls the police to offer a confession or any other statement he desires to make. Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today.'

Here, it affirmatively appears from the record that the appellant voluntarily presented himself at the Baltimore City Police Department's Homicide Division and, prior to his being placed in custody, and before he could be advised of his constitutional rights embodied in Miranda, gave the oral statement which was introduced at trial. Based upon the totality of circumstances surrounding the procurement of the statement, we are of the opinion that appellant's spontaneous utterance, upon voluntarily presenting himself in conjunction with the absence of interrogation, is clearly within the realm of the permissible 'volunteered statements' alluded to in Miranda. See Parsons v. United...