Campbell v. State

• Decision Date: 11 November 1966
• Docket Number: No. 474,474
• Citation: 223 A.2d 604,244 Md. 363
• Parties: Larry Anthony CAMPBELL v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 363

244 Md. 363

223 A.2d 604

Larry Anthony CAMPBELL v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 474.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Nov. 11, 1966.

John K. Barbour, Jr., Baltimore, for appellant.

Alan M. Wilner, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Thomas B. Finan, Atty. Gen., Charles E. Moylan, Jr. and Frank A. DeCosta, Jr., State's Atty. and Asst. State's Atty., for Baltimore City, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Before HAMMOND, C. J., and HORNEY, MARBURY, OPPENHEIMER and BARNES, JJ.

HAMMOND, Chief Judge.

The appeal is from a judgment and sentence of two years for receiving stolen goods. The contentions put before us were all made at the request and insistence of the appellant, who says that (1) his trial was invalid because the Grand Jury which indicted him was forced to swear to a belief in God; (2) the trial and the 'severe' sentence given to him at the age of sixteen were unfair (a) in light of the value of the stolen record player, and (b) because of his inability to prove payment for the record player; (3) his constitutional rights were violated because (a) he was not furnished a lawyer before he was questioned by the police, and (b) the person who told the police that he had the record player was not at the trial; (4) the informer's prejudice against him made the conviction void; (5) he has new evidence; and (6) he was not formally advised by the court of the time he was to appear in court.

Appellant was indicted shortly before Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121, 213 A.2d 475, was decided. He was tried some two weeks later, after his counsel had advised him that his indictment was defective and that he had a right to be reindicted by a constitutionally constituted Grand Jury. Appellant decided to proceed to trial on the original indictment. At the beginning of the trial, appellant's counsel explained for the record his advice to his client and the appellant's decision to proceed. Questions of appellant by Judge Jones made it plain that he was fully aware of the situation and of his rights on the point and that he knowingly and voluntarily waived them, as we have held can be done. Smith v. State, 240 Md. 464, 480, 214 A.2d 563.

Appellant was convicted of receiving a stolen record player on testimony that very soon after the theft the player was in his possession. In an effort to meet his burden of explaining this unfortunate fact, appellant testified that he innocently bought the player from an acquaintance who it would seem was a friend of the informer. The trial judge did not believe the explanation, we think justifiably, in light of the small price claimed to have been paid for the player in relation to its actual value, appellant's financial circumstances, and the lack of corroboration by the alleged seller. The sentence of two years was substantially less than the statutory maximum for the crime and appellant had been 'in quite a bit of trouble,' which Judge Jones found to show 'a great deal of maturity in committing offenses.' There was no unfairness in the trial or the sentence.

On the claim of prejudicial failure to provide counsel, appellant denied to the police that he had stolen the record player but said he took it to his dwelling where the police found it after he had bought it. He urges that this admission should not have been received in evidence because he did not have the advice of a lawyer before he made it. He does not claim that he ever asked for counsel or that the police affirmatively denied him the right to have counsel, or that the admission was in fact involuntary. At the times here involved the controlling federal law was that of Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (June 22, 1964). Escobedo made a confession inadmissible even though it was in fact voluntary if it was...