Brown v. State
Decision Date | 06 October 2014 |
Docket Number | Nos. S14A0800,S14A0801.,s. S14A0800 |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Parties | Rickey BROWN v. The STATE. Mecco McKinney v. The State. |
Chaunda Brock, for appellant (case no. S14A0800).
Sanford A. Wallack, for appellant (case no. S14A0801).
Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Atty. Gen., Samuel S. Olens, Atty. Gen., Andrew George Sims, Asst. Atty. Gen., Paula Khristian Smith, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Paul L. Howard, Jr., Dist. Atty., Paige Reese Whitaker, Sheila Elizabeth Gallow, Arthur C. Walton, Asst. Dist. Attys., Atlanta, for appellee.
Rickey Brown and Mecco McKinney appeal their convictions for murder and a firearm offense related to a gun fight between them and co-indictee Teon Richardson that resulted in the death of an innocent bystander, four-year-old Sedriana Rosser. Finding no reversible error as to any of the many claims raised by one or both of the Appellants, we affirm in both cases.1
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to their verdicts, the evidence presented at trial showed the following. About three weeks before the shooting at issue here, Brown, McKinney, and Richardson got into a physical fight because Brown and McKinney believed Richardson had stolen something from them. Richardson also left a voice-mail on another person's phone threatening to kill Brown and McKinney with his TEC–9 gun. On March 17, 2004, Richardson was walking around the Jonesboro South apartment complex trying to sell a TEC–9, which he had attached to a string around his neck. When Brown and McKinney, who were giving two women a ride to the apartment complex, arrived in the parking lot, the three men spotted each other, drew their guns, and opened fire. Brown and McKinney got out of the car, and Richardson ran toward an occupied area of the complex and took cover in Cheryl Jackson's apartment. One of the shots struck and killed the victim child, who was outside playing. Brown and McKinney then drove away; when Richardson left Jackson's apartment, he was apprehended by Jonesboro South residents and held until the police arrived.
At Appellants' trial, eight eyewitnesses testified about the exchange between Brown, McKinney, and Richardson. The accounts varied considerably, both from witness to witness and within some of the witnesses' testimony, regarding which of the three men had guns, who drew his gun first, and who actually fired his gun. Some of the testimony indicated that Brown and McKinney both had guns and both fired, and three of the witnesses testified that Brown and McKinney drew their guns first. The other five witnesses said that Richardson pointed his gun first, but only two of them believed that Richardson was actually able to shoot his gun. The police also found unfired bullets from a TEC–9 at the crime scene, which indicated that although he tried to shoot, Richardson's gun would not fire. Brown, McKinney, and Richardson did not testify. The jury was charged on self-defense justification, but rejected that defense and found Brown and McKinney guilty.
Neither Appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Nevertheless, in accordance with this Court's practice in murder cases, we have reviewed the record and conclude that the evidence presented at trial and summarized above was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find Brown and McKinney guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which they were convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). See also Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33, 673 S.E.2d 223 (2009) .
2. Before trial, McKinney filed a special demurrer to the indictment, arguing that it contained prejudicial surplusage in Counts 2, 6, and 7 and that its reference to his alleged alias was impermissible bad character evidence. The trial court denied the special demurrer, and we see no error in that ruling.
Count 2 of the indictment, which charged felony murder based on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, alleged that McKinney, Brown, and Richardson caused the death of the victim “by engaging in a gun battle with each other which caused Sedriana Rosser to be shot and killed in the crossfire.” Count 6, which charged felony murder based on aggravated assault, alleged that the victim was killed “in the crossfire.” And Count 7, which charged aggravated assault, included another allegation that there was a “gun battle.” McKinney contends that these allegations were prejudicial surplusage. However, “mere surplusage does not vitiate an otherwise valid indictment.” Malloy v. State, 293 Ga. 350, 360, 744 S.E.2d 778 (2013). The language to which McKinney objects was permissible because the references to the “gun battle” and “crossfire” “accurately described the offenses charged and made the charges more easily understood” by the defendants and the jury. Id.
Andrews v. State, 196 Ga. 84, 110–111, 26 S.E.2d 263 (1943), overruled in part on other grounds, Frady v. State, 212 Ga. 84, 90 S.E.2d 664 (1955). See also Allen v. State, 231 Ga. 17, 18, 200 S.E.2d 106 (1973).
A claim that the indictment has misidentified the defendant should be challenged by a special plea of misnomer, which will be sustained only when the defendant has never been known by any of the names listed in the indictment. See OCGA § 17–7–112 ; Andrews, 196 Ga. at 110–111, 26 S.E.2d 263. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the mere mention of an innocuous-sounding alias in the caption of the indictment caused McKinney any harm. Cf. Hawes v. State, 266 Ga. 731, 732–733, 470 S.E.2d 664 (1996) ( ).
3. McKinney also contends that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to sever the count of the indictment charging possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 10) and the related felony murder count (Count 2) for trial separately from the other charges, on the ground that evidence of his prior felony conviction for possession of cocaine was otherwise inadmissible as bad character evidence under former OCGA § 24–2–2.2 This Court has held that, in cases where a felon-in-possession firearm charge “is unrelated to another count for which the defendant is to be tried,” the proceedings should be bifurcated so that the jury will hear and decide the more serious charge(s) before learning about the firearm charge and the defendant's prior conviction. Head v. State, 253 Ga. 429, 431–432, 322 S.E.2d 228 (1984), overruled on other grounds by Ross v. State, 279 Ga. 365, 614 S.E.2d 31 (2005). However, “a motion to bifurcate should be denied where the count charging possession of a firearm by a convicted felon might serve as the underlying felony supporting a felony murder conviction.” Poole v. State, 291 Ga. 848, 850, 734 S.E.2d 1 (2012). See also Head, 253 Ga. at 432, 322 S.E.2d 228 ; Jones v. State, 265 Ga. 138, 139–140, 454 S.E.2d 482 (1995) ( ). Because in this case one of the counts of felony murder was based on the felon-in-possession firearm charge (and the indictment also charged malice murder), the trial court did not err when it denied McKinney's motion to bifurcate the trial.
4. Brown contends that the trial court erred during jury selection when it failed to grant his request to strike Juror 69 for cause. Juror 69 was a pediatrician who said during voir dire that “someone needed to pay” for what happened to the child victim, that she did not like guns, that it would be difficult for her to sit and listen to the evidence, and that she did not want to see the mother of the child cry. However, Juror 69 also testified that she would be “willing to hear the facts” and confirmed that she had not presumed that Brown was guilty. She also said:
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