Brown v. Ware, 2

Decision Date07 April 1981
Docket NumberCA-CIV,No. 2,2
Citation129 Ariz. 249,630 P.2d 545
PartiesJames E. BROWN and Rita J. Brown, husband and wife, and Billy C. Van Valkenburg and Naomi Van Valkenburg, husband and wife, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. Henry W. WARE and Blanche E. Ware, husband and wife, and Donald F. Ameigh and Phyllis G. Ameigh, husband and wife, Defendants/Appellees. 3795.
CourtArizona Court of Appeals

Waterfall, Economidis, Caldwell & Hanshaw, P. C. by Steven M. Cox, Tucson, for plaintiffs/appellants.

Silverstone & Stern by Maurice M. Stern, Tucson, for defendants/appellees.

BIRDSALL, Judge.

OPINION

In 1947 appellant James E. Brown's parents purchased a five acre tract on the southwest corner of the intersection of Country Club and Bilby Roads in a subdivision of Pima County then on the outskirts of Tucson. They moved onto the property that same year locating their home near the center of the tract. The third day they were there Mrs. Brown "hooked a bedspring to my car and hauled it up and down myself" to make a road north from the home to Bilby Road. The right to use that road as an easement was the subject matter of the lawsuit from which this appeal arises.

The Browns used the road as ingress and egress to their home. It was also used by their visitors, neighbors, children, including their own, delivery people, and others. It accommodated not only automobiles, but also horses, bicycles and foot traffic. It was the only driveway to the home. It had constant daily use.

The Browns continued to own all the acreage until 1951 when they sold a parcel not contiguous to the road to one of the appellant Brown's older brothers. 1 In 1954 they sold another parcel to a Mr. Battershell. This tract included the land over which the road had been maintained. The conveyance of this real property did not include a reservation of any easement for road. However, the Browns continued to use the road in the same manner as before the sale. There was no interruption.

A subsequent conveyance resulted in a Mr. Mason acquiring the north portion of the property purchased by Battershell. This sale included all the land used for the road. Mason then sold to appellees in 1974. No improvement has ever been made on appellees' property and the land used for the road has had no other use since 1947.

As a result of subsequent conveyances appellants Brown became the owners of the original homesite and appellants Van Valkenburg acquired a portion of the original five acre lot lying east of the homesite. The road leads north from each of their properties.

In 1965 Mr. Brown's business, Tucson Custom Sheet Metal, Inc., was moved to the original homesite and has operated there ever since. Brown's mother, however, still resides there.

The Van Valkenburgs made their home on their land in 1958 and continue to reside there.

Over the years the use of the road has obviously increased. The use includes the U. S. Mail delivery, city garbage collection, salesmen, and employees of Brown's business numbering in the hundreds.

Only two attempts have ever been made to interfere with the use of the land as a road. The first, in 1964, was by Mr. Mason and consisted of stringing a piece of barbed wire across it at the north end. This lasted overnite only, as the "egg lady" drove through it early in the morning, breaking the wire.

The second attempt was by appellee Donald F. Ameigh who placed debris on both the north and south ends completely obstructing passage on June 13, 1978. Mr. Brown cleared the debris away the next day.

The complaint in this case was filed June 22, 1978 against appellees because of this action by Ameigh. It prayed for the declaration of an easement over the 17.5' roadway for the properties owned by appellants. The case was tried to the court and resulted in a judgment which recited in part:

"The court finds that the use of the land in question had its inception in the permission of the original owner, and thereafter through two successive owners, such use continued by Plaintiff and the general public through said successive owners' neighborly indulgence and therefore no 'prescription' ever took place."

The judgment was in favor of appellees (defendants in the trial court), denying any easement.

The only issue presented is whether the trial court's ruling can be affirmed under the facts of the case. Did the appellants, who own properties served by the road, have an easement by prescription for its use? We hold that they did.

Appellants also argue that the trial court could not base its decision on what it found to be permissive use unless such use had been pled as an affirmative defense. In view of our disposition of the first issue we need not consider whether this was error.

Appellants had the burden of clearly showing that their use of the road was adverse to the ownership rights of appellees and their predecessors in title. Gusheroski v. Lewis, 64 Ariz. 192, 167 P.2d 390 (1946). Such use must have continued uninterrupted for at least ten years. The statute of limitations for actions to recover land in the adverse and peaceable possession of another, A.R.S. § 12-526, fixes the time for acquiring by prescription an easement of use. See Gusheroski v. Lewis, supra. Where it is shown that the use is open, visible, continuous and hostile for the necessary period the use will be presumed to be adverse and in order to overcome such presumption the owner of the servient estate (appellees here) have the burden of showing that the use was permissive. Id. If the owner of the alleged servient property succeeds in showing the use was permissive then no easement by prescription can be found to...

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12 cases
  • Golonka v. General Motors Corp.
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • April 1, 2003
    ...fact. See, e.g., Eng v. Stein, 123 Ariz. 343, 346, 599 P.2d 796, 799 (1979) (presumption of community property); Brown v. Ware, 129 Ariz. 249, 251, 630 P.2d 545, 547 (App.1981) (presumption of adverse possession); Coffman v. Coffman, 121 Ariz. 522, 523, 591 P.2d 1010, 1011 (App.1979) (presu......
  • Bunyard v. U.S., Dept. of Agriculture, CV02-0083-PCTJAT.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Arizona
    • February 9, 2004
    ...will rely on the later, explicit holding in Harambasic as providing a proper statement of Arizona law. See also Brown v. Ware, 129 Ariz. 249, 630 P.2d 545, 547 (Ariz.App.1981) (applying a similar presumption without discussion). 7. At oral argument, counsel for Defendant argued that ANILCA ......
  • Spaulding v. Pouliot, 2 CA-CV 2007-0108.
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • April 23, 2008
    ...at 198, 167 P.2d at 393; see also Inch, 176 Ariz. at 136, 859 P.2d at 759 (recognizing Gusheroski presumption); Brown v. Ware, 129 Ariz. 249, 251, 630 P.2d 545, 547 (App. 1981) (same); see generally Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 2.16 cmt. (g) (2000) ("The majority of America......
  • Husain v. Cal. Pac. Bank
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • March 9, 2021
    ...case addresses the precise issue in a prescriptive easement situation, an Arizona case does, a case we find persuasive: Brown v. Ware (1981) 129 Ariz. 249, 630 P.2d 545. There, the Browns owned two adjacent lots, on one of which was their home. They built a dirt road from their home across ......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Top Ten Real Property Cases of 2021
    • United States
    • California Lawyers Association California Real Property Journal (CLA) No. 40-1, March 2022
    • Invalid date
    ...(4th ed. 2020)); see Cal. Civ. Code § 805 ("A servitude thereon cannot be held by the owner of the servient tenement"); Brown v. Ware, 129 Ariz. 249, 630 P.2d 545, 546.52. See Richardson v. Franc, 233 Cal. App. 4th 744 (2015) (citing 6 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Est., Easements § 15:2, 15-10......

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