Golonka v. General Motors Corp.

• Citation: 204 Ariz. 575,65 P.3d 956
• Decision Date: 01 April 2003
• Docket Number: No. 1 CA-CV 00-0467.,1 CA-CV 00-0467.
• Parties: Eugene GOLONKA, surviving husband of Ruth Bertha Golonka, deceased, on his behalf; and for and on behalf of Carol Chapman, Edward Golonka, Jack Golonka, Laurence Golonka, and Richard Golonka, surviving children of Ruth Bertha Golonka, deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona

65 P.3d 956

204 Ariz. 575

Eugene GOLONKA, surviving husband of Ruth Bertha Golonka, deceased, on his behalf; and for and on behalf of Carol Chapman, Edward Golonka, Jack Golonka, Laurence Golonka, and Richard Golonka, surviving children of Ruth Bertha Golonka, deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Defendant-Appellant.

No. -0467.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department B.

April 1, 2003.

Gallagher and Kennedy, P.A., by Robert W. Boatman, Adam A. Studnicki, Shannon L. Clark and Ulrich and Anger, P.C., by Paul G. Ulrich, Phoenix, Attorneys for Appellee.

Snell and Wilmer, L.L.P, by James R. Condo, Andrew F. Halaby, Todd Feltus and McCutchen, Doyle, Brown and Enersen, L.L.P., by Leslie G. Landau (Admitted pro hac vice), San Francisco, Attorneys for Appellant.

OPINION

TIMMER, Presiding Judge.

¶ 1 The family of Ruth Golonka initiated this products liability case against General Motors Corporation ("GM") after Mrs. Golonka was tragically killed when her idling GM truck shifted into reverse and struck her as she stood behind the truck. A jury found GM at fault for negligence and strict liability information defect, and awarded compensatory and punitive damages. GM appeals from the subsequent judgment, arguing that the court erred by denying GM's motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, and by making certain evidentiary rulings.

¶ 2 To resolve this appeal, we must answer the following questions, among others: Could the jury have consistently found GM not at fault for strict liability design defect but liable for negligent design? Does Arizona continue to recognize the so-called "heeding presumption" used in information defect cases? How do evidentiary presumptions operate in civil cases? Did the trial court properly apply the heeding presumption in this case? After answering these questions, we decide that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the heeding presumption. Because this error prejudiced GM's substantial rights, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 3 On April 17, 1997, Ruth Golonka pulled her 1987 GM Sierra truck in front of her neighbor's curb to load chairs into the truck bed. She attempted to shift her transmission into "park" but, according to GM, mis-shifted to a position between "park" and "reverse." Before exiting the truck, Mrs. Golonka did not turn off the engine, remove the key, or set the parking brake. Mrs. Golonka walked to the rear of the truck and dropped the tailgate to load the chairs. The truck then shifted into "reverse" and backed over Mrs. Golonka, killing her.

¶ 4 Mrs. Golonka's husband and children ("Plaintiffs") brought this wrongful death lawsuit against GM based on theories of strict product liability (defective transmission design and an information defect) and negligence (transmission design and failure to warn). Plaintiffs sought both compensatory and punitive damages.

¶ 5 At the conclusion of the subsequent jury trial, GM moved for judgment as a matter of law ("JMOL") on the non-design aspects of each claim, arguing that Plaintiffs had failed to present evidence that any information defect or failure to warn caused Mrs. Golonka's death. GM also moved for a JMOL on Plaintiffs' request for punitive damages. The court denied both motions.

¶ 6 The court submitted a single verdict form to the jurors that asked them to check a box to indicate whether GM was "at fault" or "not at fault" on the negligence claim. The form did not require the jurors to state whether they found GM liable for negligence based on its transmission design, the failure to warn of mis-shifts, or both. Assuming the jurors found GM "at fault" for negligence, they were then instructed to assign percentages of fault between Mrs. Golonka and GM.

¶ 7 Unlike its treatment of the negligence claim, the verdict form distinguished between the two theories underlying Plaintiffs' strict products liability claim. Specifically, the jurors were asked to check a box to indicate whether GM was "at fault" or "not at fault" for the products liability claim alleging defective design. The form then instructed the jurors to check a box to indicate whether GM was "at fault" or "not at fault" for the products liability claim alleging an information defect. Assuming the jurors found GM at fault for either or both claims, they were then instructed to assign percentages of fault between Mrs. Golonka and GM.

¶ 8 The jurors found GM at fault on the negligence claim and assigned 40% of fault to Mrs. Golonka and the remaining 60% to GM. The jurors also found GM at fault on the products liability claim alleging an information defect and assigned 50% of fault to Mrs. Golonka and the remaining 50% to GM. But the jurors found GM not at fault on the products liability claim alleging defective design. The jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages to Plaintiffs. After the trial court denied GM's renewed motion for JMOL and its motion for new trial, this appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 9 We review de novo the trial court's denial of GM's motion for JMOL. Monaco v. HealthPartners of S. Arizona, 196 Ariz. 299, 302, ¶ 6, 995 P.2d 735, 738 (App. 1999); see Ariz. R. Civ. P. 50. However, we will reverse the trial court's denial of GM's motion for a new trial only if the court abused its discretion given the record and circumstances of the case. Styles v. Ceranski, 185 Ariz. 448, 450, 916 P.2d 1164, 1166 (App.1996). Likewise, we will not disturb the court's evidentiary rulings unless the court abused its discretion and GM suffered prejudice. Selby v. Savard, 134 Ariz. 222, 227, 655 P.2d 342, 347 (1982).

DISCUSSION

¶ 10 GM argues that the trial court erred by (1) denying GM's motion for JMOL because Plaintiffs failed to prove that any information defect or failure to warn regarding mis-shifts caused Mrs. Golonka's death and (2) denying GM's motion for new trial because a jury instruction incorrectly imposed a burden on GM to disprove that Mrs. Golonka would have heeded any warning about mis-shifts.

¶ 11 Each of these contentions relates solely to the information defect and failure-to-warn theories of liability. But if the negligence verdict was grounded on Plaintiffs' assertion that GM negligently designed the truck transmission, we will affirm regardless of any error relating to the information defect and failure-to-warn theories. See Murcott v. Best Western Int'l, Inc., 198 Ariz. 349, 361,

¶ 64, 9 P.3d 1088, 1100 (App.2000) (holding court will uphold a general verdict if evidence on any one count, issue, or theory sustains the verdict). Thus, before considering the merits of GM's contentions, we must first decide whether the jury could have found GM negligent based on its design of the truck transmission.

A. Basis of negligence verdict

¶ 12 GM argues that the jury necessarily rejected Plaintiffs' theory of negligent design because it found GM not at fault on the strict products liability claim that was based on defective design. Consequently, GM contends, the jury must have based its negligence verdict on GM's failure to adequately warn Mrs. Golonka about mis-shifts.¹ Plaintiffs respond that the design-based theories of recovery are not mutually exclusive, and the jury's rejection of the strict products liability theory did not necessarily reflect a rejection of the negligence theory. In order to resolve this issue, we examine the interplay between these theories.

¶ 13 A manufacturer is strictly liable for injuries caused by use of any product that was in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous." Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 147 Ariz. 242, 244, 709 P.2d 876, 878 (1985) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts ("Restatement (Second)") § 402A (1965)). Under this theory, the manufacturer can be held liable "despite its best efforts to make or design a safe product." Mather v. Caterpillar Tractor Corp., 23 Ariz.App. 409, 411, 533 P.2d 717, 719 (1975). The courts have developed two models of inquiry to determine whether a product was in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous": the "consumer expectation test" and the "risk/benefit analysis." Dart, 147 Ariz. at 244-45, 709 P.2d at 878-79.

¶ 14 Under the "consumer expectation test," the fact-finder determines whether the product "failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonable manner." Id. at 245, 709 P.2d at 879 (quoting Barker v. Lull Eng'g, 20 Cal.3d 413, 143 Cal.Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443 (1978)). If so, the product was in a defective condition and unreasonably dangerous. Dart, 147 Ariz. at 245, 709 P.2d at 879. The "risk/benefit analysis" asks the fact-finder to decide, in light of relevant factors,² whether "the benefits of [a] challenged design... outweigh the risk of danger inherent in [the] design." Id. (quoting Barker, 143 Cal.Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d at 446). If not, the design was defective and unreasonably dangerous. Dart, 147 Ariz. at 245, 709 P.2d at 879.

¶ 15 The consumer expectation test works well in manufacturing defect cases because consumers have developed safety expectations from using properly manufactured products of the same general design. See id. at 244, 709 P.2d at 878. In design defect cases, however, the consumer expectation test has limited utility as "the consumer would not know what to expect, because he would have no idea how safe the product could be made." Id. (quoting Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 829 (1973) (citations omitted)). Consequently, when application of the consumer expectation test is unfeasible or uncertain in design defect cases, courts additionally or alternatively employ the risk/benefit analysis to determine whether a design is defective and unreasonably dangerous. Dart, 147 Ariz. at 245, 247, 709 P.2d at 879, 881.

¶ 16 In order to succeed on a negligent design claim, a plaintiff must prove that...