Browning v. FLORIDA HOMETOWN DEMOCRACY
Decision Date | 18 February 2010 |
Docket Number | No. SC08-884.,SC08-884. |
Citation | 29 So.3d 1053 |
Parties | Kurt S. BROWNING, etc., et al., Appellants, v. FLORIDA HOMETOWN DEMOCRACY, INC., PAC, et al., Appellees. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Scott D. Makar, Solictor General, Courtney Brewer, Craig D. Feiser, Deputy Solicitors General, Blaine H. Winship, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL; Lynn C. Hearn, General Counsel, Florida Department of State, Tallahassee, FL, for Appellants.
Ross Stafford Burnaman, Tallahassee, FL, for Appellees.
This case is before the Court on appeal from the decision reported as Florida Hometown Democracy, Inc. v. Browning, 980 So.2d 547 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), in which the First District Court of Appeal held that the signature-revocation provisions of section 100.371, Florida Statutes (2007), and associated implementing regulations (i.e., Florida Administrative Code Rules 1S-2.0091 and 1S-2.0095), are unconstitutional in violation of article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution, which delineates the citizen-initiative method of amending this foundational document.1 We thus possess mandatory appellate jurisdiction to resolve this case under article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution.2 As further explained in our analysis, we affirm the decision of the First District because the politically charged counter-petition revocation campaigns created by these provisions in operation would essentially eviscerate and render meaningless the citizen-initiative process. Such campaigns are neither contemplated nor permitted by the self-executing plain text of article XI, nor are they "necessary to ensure ballot integrity." State ex rel. Citizens Proposition for Tax Relief v. Firestone, 386 So.2d 561, 566 (Fla.1980) (emphasis supplied).
While the Legislature and the Secretary of State have an obligation to ensure ballot integrity and a valid election process, these parties possess only "limited authority to adopt regulations that affect the initiative process." Smith v. Coalition to Reduce Class Size, 827 So.2d 959, 962 (Fla.2002) (emphasis supplied).
We must ensure that any legislation and administrative rules affecting the initiative process are either neutral, nondiscriminatory regulations of petition-circulation and voting procedure, which are explicitly or implicitly contemplated by article XI, or, if otherwise, are "necessary for ballot integrity since any restriction on the initiative process would strengthen the authority and power of the legislature and weaken the power of the initiative process." Tax Relief, 386 So.2d at 566 (emphasis supplied). In other words, as a condition precedent for validity, legislative and executive measures affecting the initiative process that are neither expressly authorized in article XI, sections 3 and 5, nor implicitly contemplated by these constitutional provisions, must be necessary for ballot integrity. Our precedent further communicates that authentication efforts intended to preserve the integrity of the petition process should be conducted and supervised by neutral election officials rather than biased advocates. See Krivanek v. Take Back Tampa, 625 So.2d 840, 844-45 (Fla.1993) ( ); cf. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 128 S.Ct. 1610, 1623-24, 170 L.Ed.2d 574 (2008) ( )(plurality opinion).
The legislation and administrative rules at issue in this case fail each of these requirements. Ultimately, alteration of the initiative process through measures that are not expressly or implicitly contemplated by article XI, sections 3 and 5 of the Florida Constitution, and are not necessary to ensure ballot integrity, must be accomplished through constitutional amendment. Along with our colleagues at the First District, we remain firmly committed to these well-established legal principles and, accordingly, we affirm the decision of the First District below.
During its 2007 regular session, the Legislature adopted chapter 2007-30, Laws of Florida. In relevant part, the act's title provides that the legislation amended section 100.371, Florida Statutes, by "providing procedures for revocation of a signature on a petition form." Ch.2007-30, title, at 321-22, Laws of Fla. Effective August 1, 2007, section 25 of chapter 2007-30 amended subsection (1) of section 100.371, Florida Statutes, fashioned a new subsection (6), and amended and transferred the prior contents of subsection (6) to new subsection (7). Despite the gloss presented by the act's title, these statutory changes did not merely "provide procedures"; rather, they "established" a substantive revocation concept that was previously foreign to Florida's constitutional petition-circulation process. § 100.371(1), Fla. Stat. (2007); ch.2007-30, § 25, at 339-40, Laws of Fla. As amended, these statutory subsections provide:
§ 100.371(1), (6)-(7), Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis supplied).
Pursuant to the bounded rule-making authority conferred by sections 100.371(7) and 120.54, Florida Statutes (2007), the Department of State later promulgated two administrative rules to implement this newly minted concept of signature revocation. See Fla. Admin. R. 1S-2.0091, 1S-2.0095. In sum, the material portions of these rules outline:
Therefore, section 100.371 permits, and the administrative rules create, a framework for partisan-fueled counter-petition revocation campaigns, which seek to broadly persuade elector-signatories that they should revoke their prior signatures for any number of asserted reasons, even if illegitimate.
These signature-revocation campaigns are inherently designed to vitiate the effectiveness of the petition-circulation process because those entities conducting revocation campaigns may submit their gathered revocation forms as late as February 1 preceding the relevant general election, which is the same date on which the Secretary of State must verify whether the initiative proponents have gathered enough signatures to secure ballot placement. Hence, initiative proponents will likely receive no notice with regard to...
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