Brownson v. Reynolds

• Decision Date: 09 May 1890
• Citation: 13 S.W. 986
• Parties: BROWNSON <I>et al.</I> <I>v.</I> REYNOLDS <I>et al.</I>
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

13 S.W. 986

BROWNSON et al.v.

REYNOLDS et al.

Supreme Court of Texas.

May 9, 1890.

Appeal from district court, Atascosa county.

Browne & Beasley, for appellants.

GAINES, J.

This was an original action, brought by appellants against appellees, for the purpose of setting aside a judgment of the district court rendered at a former term in a cause in which the appellants were plaintiffs, and appellee Brownson was defendant, and of obtaining a new trial of the case. A demurrer to the petition in the present suit was sustained, and that ruling is now assigned as error. The allegations in the petition show that the former suit was an action of trespass to try title to 640 acres of land, that the land had been patented, and that the plaintiffs had a regular chain of title from the patentee down to themselves. A link in that chain is a deed from Lee, the patentee, to one Rose. It is alleged that, at the time of the trial of the former suit, that deed had been lost; that, after diligent search, it could not be found; and that consequently the plaintiffs went to trial relying upon a certified copy from the record of deeds of Bexar county. It was further averred that, when the copy was offered in evidence, it was objected to by the defendants upon sundry grounds, which are stated in the petition, and was by the court excluded, and that thereupon the plaintiffs' counsel permitted a judgment to be rendered against them, without offering to introduce in evidence the subsequent deeds under which they claimed. It is also alleged that the case was not appealed, but that it was agreed between the parties that the affirmance or reversal of the judgment should depend upon the action of the supreme court upon another case, involving the same questions, tried at the same term. It is also averred that since the disposition of the cause, and the adjournment of the term at which the judgment was rendered, the plaintiffs had discovered the original deed in the hands of a third party, who had no connection with the title, and in whose hands they had never had any reason to suspect it to be.

It is a rigid rule that courts of equity will not grant a party to a judgment a new trial when the failure to have a full and fair presentment of his case has resulted from the negligence or mistakes of his counsel. Public policy demands that, in the absence of fraud on the part of his counsel, the party should be as fully concluded by the act of his attorney as if he were acting for himself. It is also a fixed rule that a court of equity will not interfere to set aside a judgment, and grant a new trial, except upon a showing of strict diligence in the...