Bruce Brayman Builders, Inc. v. Lamphere

• Decision Date: 13 February 2015
• Docket Number: No. 2013–53–Appeal.,2013–53–Appeal.
• Citation: 109 A.3d 395
• Parties: BRUCE BRAYMAN BUILDERS, INC. v. James M. LAMPHERE, in his capacity as Town Planner for the Town of Hopkinton.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

109 A.3d 395

BRUCE BRAYMAN BUILDERS, INC.

v.James M. LAMPHERE, in his capacity as Town Planner for the Town of Hopkinton.

No. 2013–53–Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Feb. 13, 2015.

Kelly M. Fracassa, Esq., Westerly, for Plaintiff.

Scott D. Levesque, Esq., Providence, for Defendant.

Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.

OPINION

Justice ROBINSON, for the Court.

The plaintiff, Bruce Brayman Builders, Inc. (Brayman), appeals from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the defendant, James M. Lamphere, the Town Planner for the Town of Hopkinton, denying Brayman's declaratory judgment action on the basis of Brayman's purported failure to exhaust its administrative remedies. On appeal, Brayman argues, inter alia, that the trial justice¹ erred in denying it declaratory relief because the parties did not have a meaningful opportunity to brief and/or argue whether the administrative exhaustion doctrine should apply to the present case. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court.

IFacts and Travel

In 2009, Brayman applied to the Town Planning Board for a preliminary plan approval of a minor subdivision. Pursuant to the Town of Hopkinton's Land Development & Subdivision Regulations, such an applicant is required to “submit to the Administrative Officer all plans and supporting materials as required by the Preliminary Plat Checklist for Minor Subdivisions” (the Checklist).² Town of Hopkinton's Land Development & Subdivision Regulations, Article IV, Section C.1 (1995, as amended August 16, 2000). The just-referenced Checklist requires submission of, inter alia, “[p]roof of paid up-to-date property taxes.” In seeking to comply with that requirement, Brayman provided a “Municipal Lien Certificate,” which indicated that, while all of the company's real property taxes were current, it nevertheless owed $45,162.97 in personal property taxes as of that time. In a letter dated July 14, 2009, the Town Planner stated that he would certify the subdivision application as complete once Brayman submitted proof of payment of all taxes due—including personal property taxes as well as real property taxes.

Instead of paying the outstanding personal property taxes, on May 3, 2010, Brayman filed a complaint in the Superior Court for Washington County, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Town Planner to certify Brayman's subdivision application as complete (Count One). Thereafter, on July 14, 2010, the Town Planner moved to dismiss Count One, alleging that, inter alia, Brayman had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies in view of the fact that it had not appealed the Town Planner's decision to the Platting Board of Review.³ In further support of his motion to dismiss, the Town Planner also argued that his refusal to certify Brayman's subdivision application as complete did not involve a ministerial act such as might be amenable to a writ of mandamus. In due course, Brayman objected to the Town Planner's motion to dismiss and also moved to amend its complaint in order to add a count seeking declaratory judgment; it sought a declaration to the effect that the term “property taxes” in the Checklist refers only to real property taxes. On October 18, 2010, the Town Planner filed an objection to Brayman's motion to amend.

On March 21, 2011, the trial justice heard arguments relative to the above-referenced motions. The trial justice first granted Brayman's motion to amend its complaint to add a count seeking declaratory relief (Count Two). The Town Planner then argued that both counts should be dismissed because Brayman had not appealed the Town Planner's decision to the Platting Board of Review and, therefore, had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial justice, finding that the Town Planner's decision was “not ministerial but * * * within the sound exercise of his discretion,” granted the Town Planner's motion to dismiss Count One (the mandamus count). With respect to Count Two, however, he summarily ruled that “[t]he declaratory judgment action survives * * *.”

Thereafter, in April and May of 2012, the declaratory judgment action still being viable, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment seeking a ruling as to the meaning of “property taxes” in the Checklist. Brayman's sole argument was that the term “property taxes” refers only to real property taxes, whereas the Town Planner's sole argument was that the term “property taxes” includes both real and personal property taxes. Neither party made reference to the administrative exhaustion doctrine in their respective memoranda of law or at the hearing on the cross-motions, which was held on May 21, 2012. In a written decision dated June 19, 2012, the trial justice denied both motions.⁴ In that same written decision, the trial justice also sua sponte expressly denied Brayman's request for declaratory relief in view of his conclusion that Brayman had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. Thereafter, Brayman filed a timely notice of appeal.

IIStandard of Review

It is well settled that, “with respect to the ultimate decision by a trial justice to grant or deny declaratory relief, our standard of review is deferential.” Grady v. Narragansett Electric Co., 962 A.2d 34, 41 (R.I.2009) ; see also Hagenberg v. Avedisian, 879 A.2d 436, 441 (R.I.2005). However, a trial justice's discretion to grant or deny declaratory relief “is not absolute and is subject to appropriate appellate review.” Sullivan v. Chafee, 703 A.2d 748, 751 (R.I.1997) ; see also Rhode Island Republican Party v. Daluz, 961 A.2d 287, 293 (R.I.2008). Accordingly, we review a trial justice's ruling in the declaratory judgment context “with an eye to whether the court abused its discretion, misinterpreted the applicable law, overlooked material facts, or otherwise exceeded its authority.” Sullivan, 703 A.2d at 751.

IIIAnalysis

Although we are mindful of the deference due to a trial justice's decision to grant or deny declaratory relief, we have no choice at this point in time but to agree with Brayman's contention that the trial justice erred in deciding sua sponte to apply the administrative exhaustion doctrine. This is so because we adhere to the principle that, “when a trial justice considers and rules on an issue sua sponte, the parties must be afforded notice of the issue and allowed an opportunity to present evidence and argue against it.” Catucci v. Pacheco, 866 A.2d 509, 515 (R.I.2005) (holding that a trial justice erred in adding new party defendants sua sponte at the close of the plaintiff's case); see also D'Alessio v. State, 101 A.3d 1270, 1278 (R.I.2014) (stating that the “hearing justice incorrectly, and sua sponte, passed on the issue of ineffective assistance of [the] applicant's trial counsel,” where neither party had raised that issue); Lomastro v. Iacovelli, 56 A.3d 92, 96 (R.I.2012) (discerning an abuse of discretion in the trial justice's failure to give the parties an opportunity to address the issue of whether or not a motion to amend should be granted); Providence Journal Co. v. Convention Center Authority, 824 A.2d 1246, 1248 (R.I.2003) (stating that the trial justice erred in sua sponte ordering additional redactions that the defendant had never requested); Vargas Manufacturing Co. v. Friedman, 661 A.2d 48, 55 (R.I.1995) ; Santos v. Santos, 568 A.2d 1010, 1011 (R.I.1990).

In view of the fact that the trial justice's sua sponte invocation of the administrative exhaustion doctrine deprived Brayman of the opportunity to present argument concerning that issue at the summary judgment stage, it is our view that the case at bar is analogous to what was at issue in the above-cited Vargas Manufacturing Co. and Santos cases. In Vargas Manufacturing Co., 661 A.2d at 55, this Court reversed a trial justice's award of punitive damages where “the trial justice, presented with a counterclaim seeking punitive damages based solely on misrepresentation, sua sponte awarded punitive damages based upon threats made by [the plaintiff's] agent that the trial justice found amounted to the crime of extortion.” Somewhat similarly, in Santos, 568 A.2d at 1011, a husband filed a motion to reduce the support order which had entered at the time of the parties' divorce, but the trial justice decided sua sponte to order an increase in support. Thereafter, this Court granted the husband's petition for certiorari and quashed the trial justice's order increasing the amount of support, stating:

“[I]t must be recognized that both parties appeared before the trial justice that day with the expectation of arguing the merits of a motion to decrease. Rather, the husband found himself in the precarious situation of defending against what amounted to an entirely unexpected determination on the part of the trial justice to increase the support paid by the husband. We find this to be substantially unfair to the husband. Such a determination without notice and an opportunity for a meaningful hearing cannot be allowed to stand. ” Id. (emphasis added).

The Town Planner, citing Johnston Ambulatory Surgical Associates, Ltd. v. Nolan, 755 A.2d 799 (R.I.2000), contends that the trial justice's dismissal of Count Two (the declaratory judgment count) on the basis of the...