Bruckner v. City of Dania Beach, 4D01-1749.

• Decision Date: 03 July 2002
• Docket Number: No. 4D01-1749.,4D01-1749.
• Citation: 823 So.2d 167
• Parties: John BRUCKNER and The First Amendment Foundation, Appellants, v. CITY OF DANIA BEACH, Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

823 So.2d 167

John BRUCKNER and The First Amendment Foundation, Appellants, v. CITY OF DANIA BEACH, Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D01-1749.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

July 3, 2002.

Rehearing Denied August 23, 2002.

Jonathan D. Kaney III of Cobb Cole & Bell, Daytona Beach, for appellants.

Mitchell A. Bierman and Carmen I. Tugender of Weiss Serota Helfman Pastoriza & Guedes, P.A., Miami, for appellee.

ROBY, WILLIAM L., Associate Judge.

John Bruckner and The First Amendment Foundation (collectively "Bruckner") timely appeal a summary judgment on their complaint in favor of the City of Dania Beach (City). This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(b)(1)(A).

On January 6, 2000, Bruckner sued the City in federal court in order to challenge the constitutionality of Section 9.1 of City Resolution 28-85. On March 13, 2000, the City met with its attorneys behind closed doors, to discuss settlement negotiations and strategy in connection with the federal lawsuit. During the meeting, the City through its Commissioners and its attorneys discussed three litigation options. The first option discussed was to accept a proposal for settlement presented by Bruckner. The City's attorneys discussed Bruckner's demands and litigation expenses associated with settling the dispute. The second option discussed was proceeding forward with the suit; litigation expenses associated with that course of action were then discussed. The third option entailed the City's serving their own proposal for settlement upon Bruckner, i.e., modifying the language of Section 9.1. The attorneys for the City then discussed the costs associated with proceeding with the third option.

The transcripts provided in this matter reflect the City's commissioners mulled over the first and third options. The Mayor asked the Commissioners what their preference would be with the various options. Each of the Commissioners individually stated that they would prefer the third option, the modification of the language thus modifying the wording of Section 9.1. At the conclusion of the meeting, the city attorney announced the amendment to the resolution and it was suggested by one of the Commissioners that the city attorney should include in the offer of judgment the language that the commission proposed to be modified. The exact wording of the amendment was discussed before adjourning.

On March 24, 2000, the City's attorney served on Bruckner an offer of judgment in which the City offered to settle the matter by amending Section 9.1. Mr. Bruckner rejected the offer. On March 28, 2000, the City Commission held an open public meeting and approved an amendment to Section 9.1 by formal vote. The amendment repealed former Section 9.1, the subject of Bruckner's federal challenge. On April 17, 2000, Bruckner made a public records request of the City for a transcript of the March 13, 2000, meeting and the City denied him access to the transcript until the federal litigation concluded.

On June 12, 2000, Bruckner filed the action that is the subject matter of this appeal for declaratory and injunctive relief against the City. He alleged that the City's March 13, 2000, closed meeting violated the Government-in-the Sunshine Law ("Sunshine Law"). He also alleged that the City denied him access to the transcript of the closed meeting.

Both parties filed respective motions for summary judgment. In support of its motion the City filed an affidavit of the Deputy City Clerk. The Deputy Clerk testified that on July 25, 2000, after the suit had been filed, the City re-adopted Revised Section 9.1 at another public hearing. After reviewing the transcript of the March 13 meeting, the trial court denied Bruckner's motion but granted the City's motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.

Cases involving alleged violations of the Sunshine Law are determined on a case by case analysis basis. Review of these types of cases by courts of appeals are made pursuant to a de novo standard.

Based on an analysis of the facts of this case, this court cannot say that the summary judgment was wrongfully entered. This court affirms the summary final judgment against Bruckner and finds that the actions taken by the City were valid and not in violation of the Sunshine Law. The well stated law in this state is that a party moving for summary judgment must show conclusively the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and the court must draw every possible inference in favor of the non moving party. Moore v. Morris, 475 So.2d 666, 668 (Fla. 1985). If the evidence raises any issue of material fact, if it is conflicting, if it will permit different reasonable inferences, or if it tends to prove the issue, it should be submitted to the jury as a question of fact to be determined by it. Id. It is undisputed in this matter that cross motions for summary judgment were filed and that the court had authority to rule on such motions as the parties stipulated there were no genuine issues of material fact.

The purpose of the Sunshine Law is to "prevent at non public meetings the crystallization of secret decisions to a point just short of ceremonial acceptance." Zorc v. City of Vero Beach, 722 So.2d 891, 896 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). rev. denied, 735 So.2d 1284 (Fla.1999). As such, Florida law requires that any governmental meeting, in which official acts are to be taken, must be open to the public, and no "resolution, rule or formal action shall be considered binding except is taken or made at such meeting." § 286.011(1), Fla. Stat. (1999). An exemption to the Sunshine Law, however, allows a governmental entity to meet privately with its attorney provided that certain conditions are met. Section 286.011(8), Florida Stat. (1999) provides, in pertinent part,

(8) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1), any board or commission of any state agency or authority or any agency or authority of any county, municipal corporation, or political subdivision, and the chief administrative or executive officer of the governmental entity, may meet in private with the entity's attorney to discuss pending litigation to which the entity is presently a party before a court or administrative agency, provided that the following conditions are met:

* * *

(b) The subject matter of the meeting shall be confined to settlement negotiations or strategy sessions related to litigation expenditures.

While courts must liberally construe the statute to give effect to its public purpose, its exemptions must be narrowly construed. Zorc, 722 So.2d at 897.

Bruckner primarily contends that the City's March 13, 2000 meeting did not fall within the aforementioned exemption to the Sunshine Law. He maintains that the transcript of the meeting reflects that the City took formal action in amending Section 9.1 and directed its attorneys to make an offer of judgment. He concludes that the subject matter of the meeting went beyond settlement negotiations or strategy sessions related to litigation expenditures.

Section 286.011(8)(b) enables a governmental entity to meet privately with its attorneys to discuss pending litigation in which the entity is presently a party before a court or administrative agency provided that the entity's attorney shall advise the entity at a public meeting that he or she desires advice concerning the litigation and that the subject matter of the meeting is confined to settlement negotiations or strategy sessions related to litigation expenditures. The City in this matter satisfied all of the above mentioned requirements. At the time of the meeting the City was embroiled in Bruckner's federal suit, and the discussions at the March 13th meeting centered on that suit. The discussions further centered on the issue of settlement negotiations and strategy related to litigation expenditures as provided for in the law. The strategy or negotiations dealt with matters on which foreseeable actions would be taken by the City and such matters related directly to the strategy of negotiating a settlement pursuant to an offer of judgment. Under the facts of this case, the City had a right to and did weigh its options, considered the...