Ribaya v. Bd. of Trs. of the City Pension Fund for Firefighters & Police Officers in Tampa
| Decision Date | 08 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 2D13–4549.,2D13–4549. |
| Citation | 162 So.3d 348 |
| Parties | Dennis RIBAYA, Appellant, v. The BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the CITY PENSION FUND FOR FIREFIGHTERS AND POLICE OFFICERS IN the CITY OF TAMPA, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
David M. Snyder of David M. Snyder Professional Association, Tampa, for Appellant.
Paul A. Daragjati and Robert D. Klausner of Klausner, Kaufman, Jensen & Levinson, Plantation, for Appellee.
Jonathan D. Kaney, Jr., of Kaney & Olivari, P.L., Ormond Beach, for Amici Curiae First Amendment Foundation, Florida Chapter Reporters' Committee for Freedom of the Press, Florida Press Association, Florida Scholastic Press Association, Society of Professional Journalists, Creative Loafing Tampa, LLC, and Sandra F. Chance, J.D., as Executive Director of Brechner Center for Freedom of Information, in Support of Appellant.
Dennis Ribaya appeals an order dismissing his second amended complaint with prejudice. In his complaint, he alleged a violation of subsection 286.011(1), Florida Statutes (2012), often called “the Sunshine Law,” and also sought declaratory relief under Chapter 86, Florida Statutes (2012), the Declaratory Judgment Act, concerning actions of the Board of Trustees of the City Pension Fund for Firefighters and Police Officers in the City of Tampa (the Board). Specifically, he sought a declaration that: (1) his conduct at a meeting in June 2012 did not violate Policy 109, which regulated conduct at the meeting; (2) his exclusion from one or more public meetings based on the Board's decision that he had violated the policy was a violation of the Sunshine Law; and (3) the violation of the Sunshine Law voided all actions taken by the Board at those meetings. The circuit court dismissed the action, not because it failed to state a cause of action, but because the circuit court determined that the issues alleged were moot and unworthy of declaratory relief. Discussing our standard of review in greater detail in this opinion, we conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing this action without reaching its merits. In the context of an action for declaratory relief that is filed to enforce the Sunshine Law, the fact that the conditions allegedly resulting in the violation have been resolved does not necessarily render the action moot where it is unclear from the pleadings whether a violation has occurred and whether a remedy would be required for such violation. It may be that the circuit court will ultimately rule against Mr. Ribaya on one or more of these three issues, but the matter could not be dismissed on the pleadings alone. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
According to his second amended complaint, Mr. Ribaya is a retired firefighter who receives a pension from the fund that is administered by the Board. He attended a meeting of the Board on June 28, 2012. During a break when the meeting was in recess, someone asked him if he expected a timely response to a public records request that he apparently had made to the Board. Mr. Ribaya's pleading alleges that “in a low, soft voice” he replied: “Sh*t, no.”1
His conduct apparently offended others in attendance at the meeting. At the time, the Board's policy concerning disruptions at its meetings was Policy 109, which in its entirety stated:
The Board relied on this policy and had a police officer deliver a trespass warning to Mr. Ribaya immediately before its next meeting on July 25, 2012. To avoid arrest, he did not attend that meeting. Despite written requests to the Board, at least one of which was from his attorney, Mr. Ribaya was not allowed to attend the public meetings until after the ninety-day period expired. Thus, he was allegedly barred from the monthly meetings in July, August, and September.
Mr. Ribaya did not sue the Board under any theory that might have allowed him to obtain a monetary judgment for some civil wrong. Instead, his complaint alleged a violation of the Sunshine Law and sought declaratory relief. He claimed that his exclusion from the meetings was not warranted under Policy 109, and that under section 286.011(1), his wrongful exclusion from the meetings violated Florida's Sunshine Law. Finally, he claimed that the only appropriate remedy for this violation required voiding all actions taken at those meetings.
By the time the circuit court dismissed this action, the ninety-day period had expired and the Board had adopted a new policy to address disruptions at its meetings. Thus, there can be no dispute that aspects of the overall controversy had become moot. The circuit court entered an order carefully explaining its reasons for dismissing this action with prejudice. Although we reverse that order, its content has been very helpful during our review.
The circuit court accurately noted that Mr. Ribaya was not challenging the facial validity of Policy 109. The court concluded that the “real issue” was whether Mr. Ribaya was wrongfully issued a trespass warning. Given the change in circumstances, as to this issue, the court concluded that there was no present dispute and that the mere possibility of a dispute in the future did not justify the full adjudication of an action for declaratory relief. It recognized that there was “no precise Florida case on point” on the question of whether the use of the trespass statute can be a violation of the Sunshine Law. Nevertheless, concluding that a public body has the authority to ensure orderly conduct at its meetings without violating the Sunshine Law, it saw no reason to reach the merits of the complaint. It relied, in part, on this court's decision in Leach–Wells v. City of Bradenton, 734 So.2d 1168 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), in which we affirmed a summary judgment in favor of the defendant in an action to enjoin a public construction project despite the defendant's technical violation of the Sunshine Law. Mr. Ribaya appeals the trial court's order of dismissal.
Because the second amended complaint was dismissed with prejudice on a motion to dismiss, we are required to assume the truth of the well-pleaded facts. See, e.g., X Corp. v. Y Person, 622 So.2d 1098, 1100 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). There is likely more to this story, but both the circuit court and this court must assume that Mr. Ribaya was barred from public meetings due to his quiet use of a single word of profanity in the public section while the Board's meeting was in recess.
The parties argue that this case is governed by two distinctly different standards of review. Relying on this court's decision in Angelo's Aggregate Materials, Ltd. v. Pasco County, 118 So.3d 971, 973–74 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013), Mr. Ribaya claims that we should perform a de novo review of the dismissal as a pure issue of law. The Board, relying on Abruzzo v. Haller, 603 So.2d 1338, 1339 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), and other similar cases, argues that we should give great deference to the circuit court's ruling and reverse only in the event of an abuse of discretion. There is little question that the case law discussing the standard of review for an order dismissing an action for declaratory relief under chapter 86, at least if read outside its context, presents two or more views. To the largest extent, however, we believe the case law can be reconciled.
A complaint for declaratory relief under chapter 86, like any other complaint, must be legally sufficient. In general, the complaint must allege that: (1) there is a bona fide dispute between the parties; (2) the plaintiff has a justiciable question as to the existence or nonexistence of some right, status, immunity, power or privilege, or as to some fact upon which existence of such a claim may depend; (3) the plaintiff is in doubt as to the claim; and (4) there is a bona fide, actual, present need for the declaration.2 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wallace, 209 So.2d 719, 721 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968). A complaint can be legally sufficient even if the plaintiff ultimately loses the case on its merits. See X Corp., 622 So.2d at 1101 ; accord Murphy v. Bay Colony Prop. Owners Ass'n, 12 So.3d 924, 926 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). Thus, when a defendant challenges a complaint for declaratory relief on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action, i.e., that it is legally insufficient, the trial court rules on that motion as a matter of law.3 In that situation, this court reviews the order de novo as an issue of law. See, e.g., Combs v. City of Naples, 834 So.2d 194, 197 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) ().
But beyond legal sufficiency, the case law has created a gatekeeper function for the trial court. The trial court, within its sound discretion, may dismiss an action that technically states a cause of action when the circumstances do not justify using legal resources to try the factual issue and resolve the legal questions. See, e.g., Abruzzo, 603 So.2d at 1339.
The need for this gatekeeper function arises from the breadth of the potential statutory cause of action created in chapter 86. The goals of the Declaratory Judgment Act are to relieve litigants of the common law rule that a declaration of rights cannot be adjudicated unless a right has been violated, and to render practical help in ending controversies that have...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Webster v. Inch
...power or privilege" and that "the plaintiff is in doubt as to the claim." Ribaya v. Bd. of Trustees of City Pension Fund for Firefighters & Police Officers in City of Tampa , 162 So. 3d 348, 352 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) ; see also X Corp. v. Y Person , 622 So. 2d 1098, 1101 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). Ap......