Bruneau v. Seabrook
Decision Date | 24 August 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 24400.,24400. |
Citation | 854 A.2d 818,84 Conn.App. 667 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | Heather BRUNEAU v. Stanley SEABROOK, Jr., et al. |
Terence A. Zemetis, Wallingford, with whom, on the brief, was Jane G. Beddall, for the appellants (defendants).
William F. Gallagher, with whom, on the brief, were Hugh D. Hughes, Brian M. Flood, Cheshire, and Garrett Moore, for the appellee (plaintiff).
LAVERY, C.J., and SCHALLER and HENNESSY, Js.
In this personal injury action, the defendants, Stanley Seabrook, Jr., and Mihaly Seabrook, appeal from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a jury trial, in favor of the plaintiff, Heather Bruneau. On appeal, the defendants claim that the court improperly (1) admitted into evidence a certain letter pursuant to General Statutes § 52-174(b) and (2) denied their motion for remittitur with respect to the jury's award of noneconomic damages. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The record discloses the following relevant facts and procedural history. On March 11, 1998, the plaintiff and Stanley Seabrook, Jr., were involved in a motor vehicle accident in Orange. By complaint filed on February 7, 2000, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants1 to recover damages for personal injuries she allegedly sustained as a result of the accident. In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that she sustained permanent injuries to her left shoulder and neck as a result of the accident, and that the accident was caused by the negligence of Stanley Seabrook, Jr. In their answer, the defendants denied the plaintiff's claims of liability and damages.
At trial, the plaintiff sought to introduce into evidence, pursuant to § 52-174(b),2 all her medical records from her treating physician, Patrick A. Ruwe, including a letter dated March 27, 2001, which was written in response to a request by the plaintiff's counsel.3 In the letter, Ruwe summarized his impression of the plaintiff's shoulder injury on the basis of his treatment of her between May 13 and August 6, 1998. Specifically, he stated in relevant part:
The defendants objected to the admission of the Ruwe letter on the ground that it was not a medical report pursuant to § 52-174(b). The court overruled the defendants' objection and admitted the letter into evidence. On March 5, 2003, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and assessed economic damages at $70,000 and noneconomic damages at $200,000.
On March 11, 2003, the defendants filed a timely motion to set aside the verdict and for a remittitur. The sole ground asserted in the motion was that "the jury's award of economic damages was excessive in light of the evidence...." On May 2, 2003, the defendants filed a supplemental motion to set aside the verdict and for a remittitur, which expanded the original ground to include a claim that the court improperly admitted the Ruwe letter into evidence. The supplemental motion also requested a remittitur of the noneconomic damages in addition to the economic damages.
The court granted the defendants' motion to set aside the verdict and for a remittitur only as to the jury's award of economic damages, reducing the award by $26,600. The court denied the motion in all other respects.4 Thereafter, the plaintiff accepted the remittitur and the defendants appealed.
The defendants claim that the court improperly admitted into evidence the March 27, 2001 Ruwe letter pursuant to § 52-174(b). Specifically, they argue that the court incorrectly interpreted § 52-174(b) as not requiring the plaintiff to establish that the Ruwe letter satisfies the requirements for a business entry to be admissible pursuant to General Statutes § 52-180.5 We are not persuaded.
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Carmel Hollow Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Bethlehem, 269 Conn. 120, 129, 848 A.2d 451 (2004).
A party seeking to introduce into evidence a document pursuant to § 52-180 must show: (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Struckman v. Burns, 205 Conn. 542, 551, 534 A.2d 888 (1987).
Our Supreme Court has set forth the requirements for a report to be admissible pursuant to § 52-174(b). (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lopiano v. Lopiano, 247 Conn. 356, 383, 752 A.2d 1000 (1998).
"The rationale for allowing self-authenticating documents from physicians in personal injury ... actions is to avoid trial delays due to the difficulty in scheduling doctors' appearances; especially because in the majority of cases the physician's testimony is consistent with his treatment report." Seperack v. Solaz, 17 Conn.App. 684, 688, 556 A.2d 175, cert. denied, 211 Conn. 804, 559 A.2d 1138 (1989).
In the present case, the court found that the Ruwe letter was a document signed by Ruwe, who was the plaintiff's treating physician, and that it was on Ruwe's letterhead. The court also found that "[t]he letter expresses Ruwe's opinion based on the treatment he rendered [to the plaintiff], and it is consistent with Ruwe's contemporaneous [medical] reports." The court therefore concluded that, pursuant to § 52-174(b), "it was unnecessary for [the plaintiff] to lay a foundation under the business record exception ... § 52-180, for the admissibility of the letter" and that "when viewed in the context of Ruwe's entire treatment of [the plaintiff]... the letter was not created for purposes of litigation nor is it unreliable."
On the basis of our examination of the record, we conclude that the court, in its thoughtful and comprehensive memorandum of decision, properly interpreted § 52-174(b) as it applies to this case. Accordingly, the court properly admitted into evidence the March 27, 2001 Ruwe letter.6
The defendants also claim that the court improperly denied their motion for remittitur with respect to the jury's award of noneconomic damages. Specifically, they argue that the jury's award of noneconomic damages was excessive and tainted by the jury's apparent mistake in calculating its award of economic damages. We disagree.
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...law firm's motion for remittitur, we are limited to a determination of whether the court abused its discretion. See Bruneau v. Seabrook, 84 Conn. App. 667, 674, 854 A.2d 818 (damages award "will not be disturbed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion" [internal quotation marks omitted]......
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...of § 53a-167a. Issues of statutory construction raise questions of law over which we exercise plenary review. Bruneau v. Seabrook, 84 Conn.App. 667, 670, 854 A.2d 818, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 930, 859 A.2d 583 (2004). Accordingly, we begin with our well established principles of statutory c......
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Milliun v. New Milford Hosp.
...physician.... Lopiano v. Lopiano, 247 Conn. 356, 383, 752 A.2d 1000 (1998).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bruneau v. Seabrook, 84 Conn.App. 667, 671, 854 A.2d 818, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 930, 859 A.2d 583 (2004); see also Shegog v. Zabrecky, supra, 36 Conn.App. at 737, 654 A.2d 771 ......
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Private sector business records
...duty to report the statement (or the statement must otherwise fall within an exception to the hearsay rule). 97 Bruneau v. Seabrook, 854 A.2d 818, 84 Conn. App. 667 (2004). In a personal injury action alleging auto negligence, a letter from the plaintiff’s treating physician summarizing his......
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Private Sector Business Records
...a critical issue in dispute. Moreover, medical opinions in hospital records may not be admissible 86 (Continued) Bruneau v. Seabrook, 854 A.2d 818, 84 Conn. App. 667 (2004). In a personal injury action alleging auto negligence, a letter from the plaintiff’s treating physician summarizing hi......
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Private Sector Business Records
...to someone other than the declarant may be admissible under the medical records exception to the hearsay rule. Bruneau v. Seabrook, 854 A.2d 818, 84 Conn. App. 667 (2004). In a personal injury action alleging auto negligence, a letter from the plaintiff’s treating physician summarizing his ......
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Private Sector Business Records
...to someone other than the declarant may be admissible under the medical records exception to the hearsay rule. Bruneau v. Seabrook, 854 A.2d 818, 84 Conn. App. 667 (2004). In a personal injury action alleging auto negligence, a letter from the plaintiff’s treating physician summarizing his ......