State v. Aloi

• Decision Date: 14 December 2004
• Docket Number: No. 24641.,24641.
• Citation: 86 Conn.App. 363,861 A.2d 1180
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Paul ALOI.

861 A.2d 1180

86 Conn.App. 363

STATE of Connecticut v. Paul ALOI.

No. 24641.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 14, 2004.

Decided December 14, 2004.

Glenn T. Terk, Wethersfield, for the appellant (defendant).

Annemarie L. Braun, special deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Scott J. Murphy, state's attorney, and Louis J. Luba, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

SCHALLER, BISHOP and MIHALAKOS, Js.

BISHOP, J.

This appeal requires us to consider whether proof of a refusal to provide one's identification to an officer on request coupled with nonthreatening speech provides a sufficient basis for conviction under General Statutes § 53a-167a, interfering with an officer. The defendant, Paul Aloi, appeals from the judgments of conviction, rendered after a trial to the court, of criminal trespass in the second degree as a lesser offense included within burglary in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-108, interfering with an officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167a and criminal mischief in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-117. On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of interfering with an officer and criminal mischief in the third degree, (2) by convicting him of criminal trespass in the second degree as a lesser offense included within burglary in the third degree, the trial court violated his due process right to fair notice and his right to offer the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations, and (3) the charges of criminal mischief in the third degree and interfering with an officer were barred by the statute of limitations. We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgments of the trial court.

The court reasonably could have found the following facts. Since 1985, the defendant has resided adjacent to Mill Woods Park, a public park in Wethersfield. Winding Brook Turf Farm (Winding Brook) is located on the opposite side of Mill Woods Park from the defendant's residence. Winding Brook has pumped water from a stream in Mill Woods Park for several years to irrigate its crops. The noise associated with the pumping activities has been a cause for contention between the defendant and Winding Brook for some time. In 2002, Winding Brook began using a fire truck, which was stationed in close proximity to the defendant's home, to pump water from Goff Brook at Mill Woods Park. During the summer of 2002, some Winding Brook employees discovered that the fire truck had been vandalized and contacted the Wethersfield police department. In response, the police installed a video surveillance camera to monitor the fire truck.

On August 2, 2002, the defendant approached Winding Brook's fire truck and stood on its side platform. He subsequently opened the door to the cab of the fire truck, leaned inside and placed his hands on the dashboard as well as on the front seat. The exterior emergency lights on the fire truck flickered on and off while the passenger door was still open. The emergency lights remained on for approximately fifty minutes. Consequently, William D. Morgan, the owner of Winding Brook, filed a complaint against the defendant for trespassing. In response, a Wethersfield police officer told the defendant to stay off of the Winding Brook property and to stay away from the pumping equipment.

On August 14, 2002, after the fire truck unexpectedly ceased operating, Richard Peruta, an employee of Winding Brook, approached the fire truck to inspect the equipment. He noticed that the defendant was standing nearby. The defendant stated to Peruta: "Why don't you call the police, and I'll have you arrested for false arrest." Peruta, consequently, contacted the Wethersfield police and complained that the defendant was trespassing. The police arrived at Mill Woods Park in response to Peruta's complaint and found the defendant standing on public property near the fire truck. Police Officer Jay Salvatore approached and advised the defendant that Peruta had complained that the defendant was trespassing and possibly had damaged the fire truck. Salvatore requested that the defendant produce identification. The defendant did not immediately hand over his identification. The defendant also stated that he did not need to produce identification, that he was on public property and that "this isn't Russia. I'm not showing you any...."¹ Additional facts will be presented as necessary.

I

We first turn to the defendant's claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of interfering with an officer and criminal mischief in the third degree. The standard of review employed in a sufficiency of the evidence claim is well settled. We apply a two part analysis. "First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict.... Second, we determine whether, from that evidence and all the reasonable inferences which it yields, a [trier of fact] could reasonably have concluded that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gordon, 84 Conn.App. 519, 534, 854 A.2d 74 (2004).

"[T]he inquiry into whether the record evidence would support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt does not require a court to ask itself whether it believes that the evidence... established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.... Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Barretta, 82 Conn.App. 684, 688, 846 A.2d 946, cert. denied, 270 Conn. 905, 853 A.2d 522 (2004).

A

The defendant first claims that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of interfering with an officer. He argues that the state failed to prove acts of hindrance that are required to constitute the offense. We agree.²

The defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to constitute the crime of interfering with an officer under § 53a-167a because his comments and failure to produce identification immediately did not hinder Salvatore in the performance of his duties.³

We recognize that the defendant's claim raises an issue implicating the interpretation of § 53a-167a. We note, too, that neither this court nor our Supreme Court has yet determined whether mere declaratory statements and a refusal to show identification in response to an officer's request constitute interference with an officer in violation of § 53a-167a.

Issues of statutory construction raise questions of law over which we exercise plenary review. Bruneau v. Seabrook, 84 Conn.App. 667, 670, 854 A.2d 818, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 930, 859 A.2d 583 (2004). Accordingly, we begin with our well established principles of statutory construction. Our legislature recently enacted No. 03-154, § 1, of the 2003 Public Acts, which provides: "The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." In the present case, the relevant statutory text and the relationship of that text to other statutes do not reveal a meaning that is plain and unambiguous. Accordingly, our analysis is not limited to the statutory language, and we look to other factors relevant to the meaning of § 53a-167a, including the circumstances surrounding its enactment and its purpose. See Nine State Street, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 270 Conn. 42, 46, 850 A.2d 1032 (2004).

The state maintains that § 53a-167a proscribes verbal as well as nonverbal conduct that is intended to interfere with a police officer in the performance of his or her duties. The state further contends that a refusal to cooperate is equivalent to interfering with an officer. Thus, the state argues that by refusing initially to identify himself and by remarking that "this isn't Russia. I'm not showing you any" identification, the defendant was guilty of interfering with an officer. Neither the legislative intent nor the weight of judicial authority supports such a broad interpretation of § 53a-167a.

In analyzing the issue, we will first consider whether a refusal to provide one's identification to a police officer on demand can constitute a violation of § 53a-167a. Section 53a-167a(a) provides that "[a] person is guilty of interfering with an officer when such person obstructs, resists, hinders or endangers any peace officer or firefighter in the performance of such peace officer's or firefighter's duties."

In ascertaining statutory meaning, we look to a statute's relationship to other legislation. See Thames Talent, Ltd. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 265 Conn. 127, 136, 827 A.2d 659 (2003). "Where a statute, with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject ... is significant to show that a different intention existed. ... That tenet of statutory construction is well grounded because [t]he General Assembly is always presumed to know all the existing statutes and the effect that its action or non-action will have upon any one of them." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) East Hampton v. Dept. of Public Health, 80 Conn.App. 248, 255-56, 834 A.2d 783, cert. denied, 267 Conn. 915, 841 A.2d 221 (2004); see also Hatt v. Burlington Coat Factory, 263 Conn. 279, 310, 819 A.2d 260 (2003). The court is likewise "not permitted to supply statutory language that the legislature may have chosen to omit." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Light & Power...